

JPRS 79404

9 November 1981

# Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2429

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9 November 1981

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# IRAQ, BRAZIL TO FORM DEVELOPMENT BANK

London 8 DAYS in English No 39, 3 Oct 81 pp 38, 39

[Article by Piers Montondene]

[Text] ONE OF THE FIRST casualties of the Gulf War was trade between Iraq and Brazil, as the Shatt al Arab was effectively closed to traffic. However, in the last nine months efforts by both nations to restore two-way trading links have been successful, and have culminated in the announcement that Iraq and Brazil are to establish a joint trade development bank, to be based in Rio de Janeiro.

The formal agreement will not be signed until a Brazilian delegation arrives in Iraq towards the middle of November. Even then the bank is unlikely to begin operations until mid-1982. Nonetheless, the announcement of the bank's formation, released only days before the first anniversary of the Gulf War, is a good measure of the progress made in restoring commercial activity between the two countries.

At the start of the war in September 1980, Brazil was heavily dependent upon Iraq for its oil supplies — between 40–50 per cent of all imported oil products came from Iraq, or 350,000 b/d out of 700,000 b/d. In spite of a rigorous programme to convert Brazilian cars to run on gasohol — a mixture of petrol and alcohol distilled from locally-grown sugar cane — and a continuing oil exploration drive deep into the Amazon basin, 80 per cent of all Brazil's oil needs were still being supplied by imports.

The reasons for this overwhelming dependence on Iraq went back to 1977. Braspetro (the overseas branch of the Brazilian state oil company, Petrobras) had been providing the Iraqi government with technical expertise in searching for new oil

reserves in Iraq. It discovered a major oil formation close to Basra: the Majnoon field, which proved to be one of the largest oil deposits, producing 350,000 b/d.

Under the terms of their bilateral agreement, Brazil had the right to purchase all the crude lifted from Majnoon. This special purchasing arrangement was terminated by mutual agreement in 1980 with a once-off sale of oil to Brazil at substantially below market rates to ease the country's balance of payments problems. From the start of 1980, Brazil was to be supplied with the same quantities of oil as in the past, only no longer on a preferential basis.

Since 1977 Brazil had been balancing its trade with Iraq — in part at least — by arms sales to Baghdad. Brazil's chief arms manufacturer, Engesa, supplied a variety of armoured vehicles and troop transporters until the start of the war. Brazil had also agreed to supply Iraq with nuclear technology.

The impact of the Gulf War was felt in Brazil from the first day: Iraqi oil supplies ceased immediately and a virtual state of emergency was declared. Western bankers, already concerned about the massive external debt which Brazil was running at the time — estimated at \$55bn in October 1980 — stopped lending money to Brazilian institutions, fearing that the economy was on the point of collapse; senior Brazilian ministers described the country's predicament as 'very, very difficult.'

A rescue mission was organised by Venezuela to find alternative oil supplies for Brazil, while Iraq attempted to divert its

exports through Lebanon and Syria — successfully. Since the second quarter of 1981, Brazil's trade balance has been in surplus, with an overall break-even being forecast for the year end. In the last week, a new oil find has been reported off the coast of Rio de Janeiro which is expected to raise the country's oil reserves by nearly 10 per cent.

Now trade links with Iraq have been restored sufficiently to warrant the formation of a special trade development bank with an initial capital of \$40m. But why start a bank? While Iraq has apparently resumed its position as Brazil's largest single oil supplier, the establishment of a commercial bank was not considered necessary in the last five years.

The answer is the desire for secrecy. At the time of the Tammuz bombing, the Iraqi government was unhappy at the publicity surrounding the nuclear cooperation treaty between the two countries, as well as the reports that Brazilian contractors were working in Iraq on a number of major projects. Brazil has been supplying arms to Iraq for the last five years, moreover, and there was speculation in the western press that Brazil's involvement with Iraq might extend further than trade links.

A specialist organisation run by the two countries will enable Iraq and Brazil to keep their trading operations private and their government-to-government deals under one roof.

CSO: 4400/31

RELATIONS BETWEEN SYRIA, LIBYA DISCUSSED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI No 27, 7-13 Sep 81 pp 18-19

[Article by Wadi' Helou: "Unity and Military Coordination Discussions Beset by Obstacles"]

[Text] Arab diplomatic centers in Damascus were puzzled by the absence of a joint communique at the end of the Libyan-Syrian discussions. This conspicuous omission is all the more puzzling in view of the great importance attached to Colonel Qadhafi's 3-day visit by the Syrian news media, and amidst rumors that the visit might be followed by a summit meeting of the Steadfast Front upon Qadhafi's return to Tripoli, a meeting that would coincide with celebrations commemorating the September Fatih Revolution. Qadhafi's Arab tour had taken him to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Syria. The 11-day tour included the Aden Tripartite Conference and coincided with the American-Libyan confrontation over the Gulf of Sirra.

While the Aden 3-nation conference which brought together President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad [al-Hasani], Mengistu Haile-Mariam, and Colonel Qadhafi marked one of the major accomplishments of the Libyan president's tour, his visit to Damascus and the ensuing negotiations were of greater importance to Arab diplomatic circles.

In connection with the Summit meeting at Aden, Col Qadhafi's action in joining the Yemen-Ethiopia-Soviet Union alliance was clearly seen as his response to America's act of aggression against Libya [the downing of 2 Libyan planes over the Gulf of Sidra]. That incident served to push Qadhafi closer to the Soviet axis, and the move was seen as an act of further increasing the ire of the United States.

Arab diplomatic circles claim that Africa, not the Gulf states, is now the focus of attention of the Yemen-Ethiopia-Libya axis. This claim was supported by pointing to Qadhafi's stops in the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, as well as to his telegraphed greeting to King Khalid of Saudi Arabia as his [Qadhafi's] plane passed through Saudi airspace, all of which were interpreted as Qadhafi's way of dispelling Gulf nation fears that his joining the Yemen-Ethiopia alliance might threaten their security. This assurance, Arab diplomatic sources claimed, was made at the behest of the Soviet Union.

According to one rumor in Arab diplomatic circles, former South Yemen President 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, by his own account, was once on the verge of invading North Yemen, and that his decision to go through with the plan was abandoned only after the Soviets summoned him and convinced him of the folly of his plan. According to Mr Ismail,



his plan to invade North Yemen, was ultimately responsible for his removal from office in favor of a leader who would carry on a more realistic policy [as viewed by the Soviets] toward the Gulf nations. In view of this assessment, Africa is now the target of both the Soviets and the regional alliance consisting of Libya, South Yemen, and Ethiopia. It is not far fetched, but rather expected, that this new alliance will soon be knocking on Sudan's doors in response to South Africa's recent attack against Angola.

On the Damascus scene, attention is now pivoted on Libyan-Syrian unity negotiations. When his plane stopped for refueling at Damascus International Airport, where he was welcomed by Prime Minister 'Abd al-Rauf Qasim and Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam, Col Qadhdhafi was careful to request meetings with government and national leaders, as well as with leaders of people's organizations. His request received a positive response and he met with leaders of the Ba'ath Socialist Party in Damascus as well as with representatives of labor unions and people's organizations. In addition, Col Qadhdhafi met with Syrian President al-Assad, PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat and other Palestinian leaders, as well as with representatives of the Lebanese National Movement. At all of these meetings, Col Qadhdhafi emphasized the need for unity.

According to informed sources, the discussions went beyond the Libyan slogan "He who calls for division on party lines is a traitor," a clear reference to obstacles that prevented unity in previous talks. The fundamental issue now appears to hinge on reconciling Libya's Jamahiriyyah [masses-based] government with Syria's party-based government. Qadhdhafi reportedly insisted that power be vested in the people, and that the government be an instrument for implementing the will of the people. It is noteworthy that this was precisely the issue on which earlier unity negotiations had stumbled, and this despite the preparatory work of joint committees, which preceded President al-Assad's last trip to Libya approximately one year ago to take part in the celebration marking the September Fatih Revolution, the occasion on which President Qadhdhafi declared Libya's readiness to unite with Syria.

The lack of agreement on ways to bring about unity, despite agreement in principle on the need for such a union, has not prevented Syria from standing beside Libya in its confrontation with the United States. In fact while Col Qadhdhafi was still in Damascus, the chief of staff of the Syrian army, Gen Hikmat al-Shahabi returned from Tripoli, where he had met with Lt Col Abu Bakr al-Yunis [of Libya] and declared Syria's solidarity with Libya. After a meeting with Col Qadhdhafi in Damascus, Gen al-Shahabi left for Aden to coordinate military planning with South Yemen, one of the members of the Steadfast Front. It is well known that Syria maintains an air force contingent in Libya. It is reported that agreement has been reached to increase the number of Syrian pilots stationed in Libya to counter the threat posed by the massing of Egyptian troops on the Egyptian Libyan border.

The question now is whether the Libyan-Syrian dispute over the means for achieving unity--despite agreement on military coordination--is behind the absence of a joint communique on the Qadhdhafi-al-Assad talks.

Official sources in Syria claim that Libyan-Syrian relations are strong, much stronger, in fact, than could be described in a communique. There is no pressing need for a communique according to these sources. The absence of a communique should not be interpreted as signalling a deep rift between the two countries. Arab diplomatic sources in Damascus simply say that the Syrians and Libyans have agreed to hold more meetings on the unity proposal. They maintain that the existing military coordination plan is an old one and does not require the issuance of a joint communique.

**LIBYAN INITIATIVE STRESSES LEBANESE RECONCILIATION**

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 242, 10 Oct 81 p 17

[Text] On 11 June, Col Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi said in his speech on the anniversary of the American evacuation of Wheelus Base, "I shall propose an initiative to restore peace and harmony to Lebanon." This was the first sign of an Arab-Libyan initiative to end the war in Lebanon. On 1 September, the Jamahiriyyah's Revolution Day, al-Qadhdhafi reaffirmed the initiative, and he said that the time has come for the Muslim rifle to stop fighting the Christian rifle and for all rifles to be united against the enemy.

Because Colonel Qadhdhafi's words were not just talk, they have been accompanied by energetic political activity during the past few months, in both Arab and Lebanese spheres. According to an informed and reliable Arab source, al-Qadhdhafi conferred with President al-Asad on the initiative each time they met (in Damascus and Tripoli), and al-Qadhdhafi got al-Asad's approval of his initiative. This initiative contains the following broad political lines, without going into details which are still subject to positive changes as the initiative is worked out:

1. Syrian forces participating in the Arab Deterrent Forces will withdraw from the Lebanese cities which they are now in, and security matters there will be handed over to whoever is authorized by the legitimate authorities, normally the Lebanese army.
2. Syria will receive political and military guarantees (through security agreements) of protection, since Lebanon has such strategic importance for Syria and is the crucial buffer through which it is possible to strike Syria.
3. Palestinian resistance forces will withdraw from Lebanese cities and will increase their presence in other appropriate places.
4. The Palestinian resistance will be given political guarantees assuring it freedom of movement, politically, in communications, and militarily, in emergency circumstances. The resistance will also be strengthened with arms (as was the case during the 15-day war) to confront any developments which are hostile to it.
5. Parties having dealings with Israel will break off their relations with it without delay.



6. The Lebanese National Movement will be strengthened as a prelude to a "balanced dialogue" so that "an agreement of the strong, not subject to violation or exploitation" can be reached.

7. A roundtable of all Lebanese forces will be convened for mutual understanding, without intervention by anyone, so that a final agreement can be reached, bringing about peace, stability, and the continued integrity of Lebanon--with regard to land and people--in a different system from the old sectarian system.

After clarifying these broad outlines, Mr Salih (al-Duruqi), head of the People's Bureau, and Mr 'Abd-al-Qadir Ghawqah, member of the People's Bureau (formerly Libyan ambassador to Lebanon for a number of years), were active in explaining the aims of the initiative to all Lebanese parties. Within this framework, they held repeated meetings with all Lebanese forces in the west Beirut area or in the north ([former] President Sulayman Franjiyah). Also, the performance given by the [Libyan] Folkloric Troupe at Casino du Liban last Sunday constituted an important first step in building bridges for dialogue with former President Camille Sham'un and Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil. A far-reaching political dialogue was to have taken place between (al-Duruqi) and Ghawqah and the leadership of the Lebanese Front by the end of this week.

CSO: 4504/45

# REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL ISSUES DRAFT LAW ON LOCAL ORGANS

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 3, 4, 5, 6, Oct 81 pp 2, 3

[Text] Part I

Following is the Decree of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan concerning the draft law of the local organs of state power and administration of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan:

Kabul city,

22 September 1981,

The Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, after the assessment of the draft law of the local organs of state power and administration of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, in pursuit of the order of article 37 (paragraph 13) of the Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan approves that—

I.—The draft law of the local organs of state power and administration of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, in nine chapters and 87 articles, is confirmed in principle and in general, and this draft law is placed before the public for

their views through the mass media for further deliberations.

II.—The Presidium of the Revolutionary Council is duty bound to collect and coordinate the peoples views and suggestions concerning this draft law and taking that draft into consideration, prepare the final law of the local organs of state power and administration and submit it for assessment to the session of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Babrak Karmal,

President of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA.

In the name of God, the Compassionate and Most merciful,

The draft law of the local organs of state power and administration of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan,

## CHAPTER—I

### General Order

#### Article One:

This law is passed in pursuit of the article 51 of the Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan toward the realisation of the aims of the

national, democratic Saur Revolution, for the following purposes.

I. stability of democratic principles of the organisations and activities of the local organs of state power and administration.

II. To widely attract the toilers toward the state administration and to expand and promote the principle of collective activity in the local organs of the state power and administration.

III. To regulate relations between the local organs of the state power and administration and the higher organs of the state power and administration, the ministries, departments and their related organs.

#### Article Two:

In pursuit of the Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, in the provinces, cities, precincts, districts, sub-districts and villages the relevant jirgahs are considered as the local organs of the state power.

#### Article Three:

The local organs of the state power are formed for a period of four years.

#### **Article Four:**

The local organs of the state power on the basis of the authorities embodied in this law will solve all the problems having local importance having in view the interests of the state and citizens residing at their related localities.

#### **Article Five:**

The activity of the local organs of the state power will take place under the guidance of the Revolutionary Council, the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council and the Government of Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in cooperation with and by relying on all patriotic, progressive and democratic forces and social and political organisations of the country which are united in the National Fatherland Front.

#### **Article Six:**

The local organs of the state power will perform their activities on the basis of the following principles:

I. Consistent and unbiased realisation of the policy line of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan toward the consolidation of the gains of the Saur Revolution, implementation of its ideals and aspirations, further strengthening and development of the progressive regime in the country, abolition of the remnants of feudalistic and pre-feudalistic relations, backwardness, unemployment, illiteracy, poverty and disease.

II. Respect and observance of the sacred religion of Islam, all-sided aid to the lawful activity of religious organisations and institutes.

III. Revolutionary and democratic legality of justice, protection of rights and legal interests of the citizens of Afghanistan.

IV. Wide attraction of all strata of toilers including workers, farmers, craftsmen, nomads, intellectuals, women, youth, religious figures, democratic and progressive forces and representatives of all nationalities, peoples and tribes in the running of the affairs of local state organs of the state power.

V. Protection and safeguarding of state, combined, cooperatives, private and personal property.

VI. Giving help to the legal undertakings and activity of the national traders and capital holders.

VII. Serious respect and observance of the historical, national, cultural and religious traditions and customs of the people.

#### **Article Seven:**

Any kind of limitation of the participation of the citizens in the activity of the local organs of the state power and administration directly or indirectly with the creation of conditions of privilege and racial, tribal, national or religious supremacy is prohibited.

#### **Article Eight:**

The local organs of the state power and administration will perform their activity on the basis of the orders and values of the Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the order of this law and other laws and decrees of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic

Republic of Afghanistan and the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council, resolutions of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the decisions of the supreme local organs of the state power and administration. (To be continued).

## Part II

### CHAPTER — II METHOD OF FORMATION OF LOCAL ORGANS OF THE STATE POWER

#### I. Village Jirgah

##### Article Nine:

In any village having at least fifty families village jirgah (council) can be elected. The villages with less than fifty families would join the bigger neighbouring villages.

The Council's elections can be held in the case of participation of at least half of the village voters.

The number of the people's candidates to be elected in the village council would be determined by the election commission of the village according to law.

#### 2. Sub-district jirgahs:

##### Article Ten:

The sub-district council is elected by the representatives of the village councils situated within the area of the sub-district. The number of the people's representatives to be elected for the sub-district council would be determined by the election commission of the sub-district according to the law.

#### 3. District Jirgah (Council).

##### Article Eleven:

The district council would be elected by the representatives of the sub-district councils and the village councils which are under the administrative jurisdiction of the district.

The number of the people's representatives to be elected to the district council will be determined by the election commission of the district according to the law.

#### 4. Precinct Council

##### Article Twelve:

Where there are precincts in the set-up of a city, a precinct council will be elected for each precinct.

The number of the people's representatives to be elected for the precinct council would be determined by the elections commission of the precinct according to the law.

#### 5. The city council.

##### Article Thirteen:

The city council will be elected by the citizens of a city. The elections will be held if at least half of the city voters participate in the elections.

The city council the set up of which envisages the precincts is elected by the representatives of the precinct councils.

The number of the people's representatives to be elected for the city council would be determined by the city elections commission according to the law.

#### 6. The Provincial Council

##### Article Fourteen:

The provincial council is elected by the representatives of the districts' and cities' councils of the related province. The number of the people's representatives to be elected for the provincial councils would be determined by the provincial election commissions according to the law.

#### 7. The Kabul Province Council and the Kabul city Council

##### Article Fifteen:

The Kabul province council will be elected by the

representatives of the related district councils.

The number of the people's representatives to be elected for the Kabul province council would be determined by the provincial election commission according to the law.

The Kabul city council will be elected by the representatives of the related precinct councils.

The number of the people's representatives to be elected for the Kabul city council would be determined by the elections commission of Kabul city according to the law.

##### Article Sixteen:

Every council would hold its first session within one month after the election date.

### CHAPTER — III THE METHOD OF ELECTING PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVES

##### Article Seventeen:

The date of the elections of local organs of the state power will be fixed by the decree of the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan within forty five days after the termination of the preceding term of authority of the local organs of the state power.

##### Article Eighteen:

Every citizen of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan who has completed 18 years of age, regardless of any racial, nationality and tribal, relations, language, sex, place of residences, religion and sect, education, ascription, property and social status

will have the right to elect the people's representative to a local council.

**Article Nineteen:**

Every citizen of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan who has completed 21 years of age, with the observance of the principle embodied in article seven of this law, can be elected as the people's representative in the local council.

**Article Twenty:**

The right to recommend the candidates of the people's representatives to the local councils belongs to the organisations of the people's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the National Fatherland Front, and the Cooperatives, social and political organisations.

**Article Twentyone:**

In order to organise and hold elections for local council and to control the procedures, election commissions, will be established by the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council in the provinces, cities, precincts, districts, sub-districts and villages. The members of the election commission will be suggested by the collectives and organisations mentioned in article 20 of this law. The number and composition of the commission will be determined by the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

**Article Twentytwo:**

The election commission should be formed thirty days before the holding of the elections of the local organs of the state power.

**Article Twentythree:**

The Presidium of the Revolutionary Council of

the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan appoints from amongst the members of the election commission, the Chairman, the vice-chairman and the secretary of the commission.

**Article Twentyfour:**

The election commission will have the following duties:

1. General guidance, preparations and holding of elections of local councils.
2. Registration of the names of the candidates of the people's representatives in the local councils according to the regulations.
3. Study the petitions and complaints of the citizens with regard to the preparatory work and holding of elections.
4. Registration of the names of representatives elected for the local councils and arrangement of related documents.

**Article Twentyfive:**

The result of the elections will be submitted by the commission to the high commission for approval.

The election commissions of the provinces and the election commission of the Kabul city will present the documents related to the results of the elections to the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan for approval.

**Article Twentysix:**

The complaints concerning the executions of the election commissions will be submitted to the higher commission, which will be considered according to the law.

**Article Twentyseven:**

The introduction of candidates of the people's re-

en people of Palestine.

He caused the intensification of the plots, provocations and shameful and anti-human-rights aggressions of the Zionists of Israeli against the territorial integrity, independence and national sovereignty of Lebanon.

He has thrown away his masks and revealed his shameful anti-Afghan face for all the world to see. He shamelessly admitted that he has provided weapons to counter revolutionary Afghan bands and continues to do so.

The Government of the DRA has repeatedly made it clear that imperialism headed by unharnessed and discredited US imperialism, in collusion with the renegade leadership of China, the militarist ruling coterie of Pakistan and traitor Sadat, are continuing at



### Part III

#### Article Thirtyone:

Those persons who have been deprived of political and civil rights, and those who are affected by psychological diseases cannot be elected to the local councils and cannot vote for it. Persons affected by diseases which prevent them from performing their duties cannot be elected to the local councils.

#### Article Thirtytwo:

Cooperation in the preparations and holding the elections for the local organs of the state power will be undertaken by the general department of the local organs and the state administration.

### CHAPTER—IV DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LOCAL ORGANS OF THE STATE POWER

#### Article Thirtythree:

The councils of the provinces, the Kabul city, cities, precincts, districts and sub-districts will have the following duties and authorities:

1. To maintain, observe and implement the laws, decrees, resolutions and other regulations and decisions of the higher organs.

2. To maintain and preserve the social order, and to protect the rights and freedoms of the citizens.

3. Cooperation with the the judicial, police and judicial organs in the advancement of their activities.

4. Protection and support of the activities of the heads and elders and all others related to the tribes in the

maintaining of peace, fraternity, security, safety, and welfare, and in safeguarding the frontiers of the country.

5. To organise the implementation of social and economic development plans of the state.

6. To approve the annual budget of incomes and expenditures.

7. To guide the private and cottage industries and to help in the activity of the state enterprises situated in their related regions.

8. To take measures towards the promotion of democratic changes in agriculture in the interest of the vast masses of farmers with their all-sided participation, cooperation toward obtaining machine tools, sowing seeds and chemical fertilisers and in selling the agricultural products, protect, encourage and develop the production and consumer cooperatives as well as other forms of cooperatives in agriculture.

9. Cooperation with the state organisations in the task of purchasing crops, products of industrial herbs and other agricultural yields.

10. To solve the disputes emanating from the use of water in accordance with the orders of the law.

11. To supervise the usage of agricultural land, the water resources, forests and other natural assets.

12. Cooperation in the development of the activities of combined and private enterprises and craftsmen and to encourage their voluntary unification with the cooperatives,

13. Deliberation and approval of the master plan of the cities and residential towns, to choose the sites for building residential buildings and social establishments, commercial projects and public services and to issue permissions in the field.

14. Construction, protection and maintenance of roads and streets in the related regions.

15. To control the activities of transport organisations and to help toward the development of public transportation.

16. To solve the problems related to the construction, repair and distribution of residential buildings.

17. To control the observance of regulations of hygiene in the commercial establishments and food provisions and public services.

18. To issue trade license and permission letters for the establishment of organisations for public services.

19. To take measures toward the further development and completion of the system of education, abolition of illiteracy, expansion of the network of schools and libraries.

20. To inform the citizens about the most important events in the country and the world.

21. To take measures toward the development of sports and physical fitness, especially the development of various national sports.

22. To take measures towards the development of public health and protection from contagious diseases.



23. To help in the drafting of the draftees for the military service and consolidation of the defence force of the country and, in case of necessity, to take direct part in the defensive measures.

24. To help in the activity of social and political organisations who are united in the National Fatherland Front.

25. To organise the building works of the residential areas, to take measures to prevent natural calamities and to remove their consequences.

26. To protect and repair the mosques, the Takya-khanas, shrines and other holy places and historical and cultural relics.

27. To take measures to protect and maintain the wells, sewers, lakes, the sources of reservoirs of drinking water, to plant trees and take care of them.

28. To organise and encourage voluntary activity of the citizens toward the execution of socially useful works.

29. To examine and solve the complaints and petitions of the citizens at due time.

30. To help preparation of general statistics among them statistics of manpower, and to take measures to maintain work for the citizens.

31. To collect the taxations according to law.

32. To help in the development of vocational education.

33. To control the prices.

34. To help in the development of communications.

35. To help in the provision of facilities for the nomads, tribes and cattle-breeders

in the task of using the grazing areas in a just manner, to help in the development of cattle-breeding and selling of their products, to raise the material welfare and cultural level and to improve the living conditions of nomads, tribes and cattle-raisers.

36. To help the families of those persons who are martyred or crippled in the defence of Saur Revolution or are engaged in the military service.

37. To organise the convention of elections of the local organs of the state power and performance of other authorities according to the law.

#### **Article Thirtyfour:**

The village council will have the following duties and authorities:

1. To all-sidedly help in maintaining progressive social and agricultural transformations in the village.

2. To help in the advancement of activity in campaign against illiteracy.

3. To take measures toward establishing schools and improve their activities.

4. To inform the village peoples about the events in the country and the world.

5. To help with the families of the persons who are martyred or crippled in the defence of the Saur Revolution or are serving in the military.

6. To help in the conscription of the draftees for the military service.

7. To take measures toward maintaining the primary materials for the farmers.

8. To take measures toward the building and maintenance of buildings, bridges

and dams on streamwaters, wells, sewers and other sources and reservoirs of drinking water.

9. To take measures toward the repair and maintenance of mosques, Takya-khanas, shrines and other holy places and graveyards.

10. To take measures toward the maintenance of roads and in case of necessity, the construction of new roads.

11. To take measures toward the plantation of trees in the related region.

12. To issue permit letters for the opening of shops, cafes and tea-houses.

13. To control the observance of regulations in the public services and commercial organisations.

14. To take measures to prevent contagious diseases,

15. To participate in the preparation of the village development draft plan.

16. To mobilise the farmers toward the performance of socially useful works.

17. To help collection of the taxes according to law.

18. To organise the work of guarding the social order, security and tranquillity in the village area.

19. To help toward the voluntary unification of farmers in the cooperatives.

20. Other duties and authorities anticipated by the law.

#### **CHAPTER—V**

#### **EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES OF THE LOCAL ORGANS OF THE STATE POWER**

##### **Article Thirtyfive:**

The executive committee of the council belongs to the executive organ of the local

organs of the state power.

#### **Article Thirtysix:**

The executive committees of the local councils are formed and approved by the higher executive committees from among the people's representatives who are elected in these councils.

In the executive committees, on the basis of the recommendation of the general department of the Islamic Affairs, the representatives of the ulama and religious figures can be included.

#### **Article Thirtyseven:**

The executive committees of the provincial councils and the Kabul city council will be formed and approved by the council of Ministers of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan from amongst the people's representatives who are elected in these councils.

#### **Article Thirtyeight:**

The executive committees of the provincial councils and the Kabul city council will be formed with the following composition:

- 1—A president,
- 2—A vice president,
- 3—A secretary

4—Members from nine to eleven persons.

The executive committees of the city councils, precinct councils and districts councils will have the following composition:

- 1—A president
- 2—A secretary
- 3—Five to seven members.

The executive committees of the subdistrict councils will have the following composition:

- 1—One president
- 2—One secretary
- 3—Three to five members.

#### **Article Thirtynine:**

The executive committees will be responsible before the related councils and the higher executive committees and will report to them on their activities.

#### **Article Forty:**

The executive committees will continue with their duties until the formation of the new executive committees.

(To be continued).

### **Part IV**

#### **Article Fortyone:**

The executive committees will report about their activities to their councils at least once a year.

#### **Article Fortytwo:**

The executive committees will have the following duties and powers:

1. To guide the affairs of economic, social and cultural structure in the related area on the basis of the decision of the council and decision of the higher organs of state power and administration.

2. To prepare and convene sessions of the local councils.

3. To lead the activities of the administrative organs under them.

4. To solve the complaints and to justly care for the petitions of the toilers in a definite time and to control the implementation of resolutions in the field.

5. To implement the laws, decrees, decisions and resolutions of the higher organs.

6. To help the people's representatives in the execution of their duties.

7. To perform other duties and authorities according to the law.

#### **Article Fortythree:**

The executive committees of the councils of subdistricts, districts, precincts and cities will suggest to the higher organs the award of medals and decorations of Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the executive committees of the provincial councils and the Kabul city council will make such suggestions through the higher organs.

#### **Article Fortyfour:**

The president of the executive committee of the local council will have the following duties and authorities:

1. To take measures toward the implementation of the resolutions of local council and its executive committee and the resolutions of the higher organs of state power and administration and its supervision.

2. To convene and preside over the sessions of the executive committee.

3. To preside over the sessions of the council excepting the sessions in which the report of the executive committee is heard.

4. To administer financial affairs according to law and the signing of financial documents.

5. To control distribution of material aids to the needy persons.

6. To appoint and to dismiss the officials and employees of the body of the executive committee in accord with the orders of law.

7. To lead and regulate the activity of the heads of the executive committees under him.

8. To issue orders to the members of the executive committee, heads of the departments and sections and offices under the executive committee concerning the execution of the entrusted duties and its control.

9. To issue orders on other matters within the authority.

10. To give authority to the vice president or, in case of the absence of vice president, to one of the members of the executive committee, in cases of sickness, duty, day off or other reasons.

#### **Article Fortyfive:**

The performances of the heads of the executive committee of the councils of provinces and the Kabul city council will be guided and supervised by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan or his deputies or by the chairman of the general department of the local organs of state administration.

#### **Article Fortysix:**

The secretary of the executive committee of the local council will be at the same time secretary of the related council.

The secretary of the executive committee will have the following duties and authorities:

1. To arrange documents related to the activity of the local council and its executive committee.

2. To prepare the draft of the work plan of the local council and the executive committee and to propose it for approval.

3. To convene meetings, seminars, conferences and other gatherings toward the raising of the level of activity of the local council and its executive committee.

4. To execute the orders of the president and vice-president of the executive committee.

5. To control the execution of the resolutions of the local councils and their executive committees.

#### **Article Fortyseven:**

The resolutions made by the executive committee of the local councils will be signed by the president and secretary of the executive committee.

#### **Article Fortyeight:**

The resolutions of the executive committee issued within the limit of authority will be applicable for all the organisations responsible included in the area of ens included in the area of the council.

#### **Article Fortynine:**

The resolutions of the executive committee of the local council can be cancelled by the related council or the higher executive committee.

#### **Article Fifty:**

The resolutions of the executive committee of the provincial councils and the executive committee of the Kabul city can be cancelled by the related councils or the Council of Ministers of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

#### **Article Fiftysix:**

The meetings of the executive committees can be held when required.

#### **Article Fiftytwo:**

The meetings of the executive committee can be held with the presence of two-thirds of its members.

#### **Article Fiftysix:**

The decisions of the executive committees will be adopted by a majority of votes of the members present in the meeting.

#### **Article Fiftysix:**

The presidents of the executive committees, vice-presidents, secretaries and members of the executive committees will have individual responsibility before the higher executive committees for the activities of the executive committees.

### **CHAPTER — VI THE OFFICES OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES OF THE LOCAL COUNCILS**

#### **Article Fiftysix:**

The councils of provinces, cities, districts and precincts of the Kabul city will establish the related offices, when required, toward the guidance of economic, social, cultural and constructional affairs.

A list of these offices and the method of their establishment will be determined by the Council of Ministers of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

#### **Article Fiftysix:**

The regulations of the offices of the executive committees will be approved by the Council of Ministers of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

**Article Fiftyseven:**

The executive committees of the precincts and sub-district councils can employ officials and other employees for the accomplishment of duties in the related fields within the limit of the set-up determined by the Council of Ministers of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

**Article Fiftyeight :**

The appointment and dismissal of the heads of the offices will be carried out by the executive committees on the basis of the agreement of the upper organs of the state administration according to the law.

**Article Fiftynine:**

The heads of the offices of the executive committees of the council of provinces, the cities, districts and precincts of the Kabul city, within the limit of their own authorities will issue the required orders toward the execution of the resolution of the councils and the related executive committees and the resolutions and decisions of the higher organs.

**Article sixty:**

The offices of the executive committees will be under the higher executive committees and organs of the state.

**Article Sixtyone:**

The heads of offices of the executive committees will have individual responsibility for their undertakings before the executive committees, the Ministries and related offices.

## CHAPTER—VII TO REGULATE THE ACTIVITY OF THE LOCAL ORGANS OF THE STATE POWER

**Article Sixtytwo:**

The local councils will deliberate and solve in their meetings all the issues which the law has placed within the limit of their authority.

**Article Sixtythree:**

The executive committee shall call the sessions of the related council at least twice a year.

**Article Sixtyfour:**

The local councils in their first meeting will choose the commissions of credentials and the said commissions will consider the authorities of the representatives elected in the council.

**Article Sixtyfive:**

The meetings of the councils can be held with the presence of two thirds of its members.

**Article Sixtysix:**

The first session of the council will be opened by an elderly representative and will continue under his chairmanship.

The following sessions will be opened by the president of the executive committee and will continue under his chairmanship.

**Article Sixtyseven:**

During the submission of the executive committee's report to the council session, the sessions will be presided over by an elderly representative.

**Article Sixtyeight:**

The councils will hold open sessions and in case of

necessity they can hold closed-door sessions.

**Article Sixtynine:**

The council session shall be held according to the approved agenda.

**Article Seventy :**

The council's resolutions will be made through free voting with the majority of votes of the members present in the session.

**Article Seventyone:**

The council's resolutions will be made through the council's voting and signed by the secretary of the council.

The resolutions will be recorded according to the law.

**Article Seventytwo:**

The council's resolution will be cancelled by the higher council in case they are against the law.

The resolutions of the provincial councils and of Kabul city council, in case of being inconsistent with the law, will be cancelled by the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

**Article Seventythree:**

The council in its sessions will solve all the issues within the limit of its power according to the law.

**Article Seventyfour:**

In the council sessions, persons who are invited by the executive committees and also the responsible officials of the General Department of the local organs of the state administration can attend.

**Article Seventyfive:**

The procedures of the



council sessions will be recorded, and signed by the president and secretary of the council.

#### **Article Seventysix:**

The resolutions of the council will be conveyed within ten days by the executive committees for the information of the related offices, incharges of the affairs and the citizens of the related area.

#### **Article Seventyseven:**

In the regions where tribes are residing, the related administrative organisations are to respect their customs and historical traditions.

#### **Article Seventyeight:**

The state flag of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan should be hoisted on the building where the local council's sessions are convened during the session and on the headquarters of executive committee permanently according to the law.

### **CHAPTER—VIII**

#### **THE POPULAR REPRESENTATIVES OF THE LOCAL ORGANS OF THE STATE POWER**

##### **Article Seventynine:**

To represent people in the local organs is considered an honourable duty.

##### **Article Eighty:**

The authority of the people's representative begins from the date of his election

in the council and terminates with the election of the next term of the council.

##### **Article Eightyone:**

The people's representative will have the following rights:

1. To take part in the solution of the problems submitted to the session.
2. To propose the issues for deliberation to the council.

##### **Article Eighty-two:**

The people's representative will have the following obligations:

1. To consistently cooperate in the implementation of the resolutions of the local council.
2. To honestly fulfill the orders of the local council.
3. To meet regularly with the clients and to report the resolutions of the council to them and to carry out the propagatory works among them.
4. To make efforts to implement the decisions of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the Revolutionary Council and the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

##### **Article Eightythree:**

The representatives of the people to the local jirgahs will perform honorary duties.

During participation in the meetings of the jirgah, travel allowance and lodging expenses are paid to the representatives of the people to the local jirgahs.

##### **Article Eightyfour:**

Whenever the manners of the people's representative in the local council cause damage to the prestige of the people's representation, or if he does not perform his duties in a worthy manner, he will be stripped of his authority by the organ which has elected him.

##### **Article Eightyfive:**

The authority of the people's representatives of the local councils will be ended in the case of death or movement to another locality or in the case of lack of possibility to execute it, and another person will be elected in his place according to this law.

### **CHAPTER—IX THE FINAL ORDERS**

##### **Article Eightysix:**

Organisational and methodic help for the local organs of the state power and the arrangement of material provisions of the local organs of the state power and administration will be provided by the general department of the local organs of state administration.

##### **Article Eightyseven:**

The executive committees of the local councils and the offices of the executive committees of the councils of the provinces, cities, districts, and precincts of the Kabul city will have a corporate personality and will possess a stamp inscribed with the insignia of the state of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the name of the executive committee and administration. (Concluded)

## MEASURES FOR RESURGENCE OF INDUSTRIES UNDERTAKEN

### Government Plans

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 19 Oct 81 p 2

[Editorial: "For Reactivation and Resurgence of Industries"]

[Text]

Development of industries has been a prime objective of the DRA Government. Since the victory of the Saur Revolution, especially its new phase, constructive measures have been taken to achieve growth of national industries. Appropriate plans have been drawn and implemented to raise the output of industrial plants in the country. Special attention is being paid to reorganisation and improvement of the managerial set-up of industrial complexes to ensure efficiency in work and increase in production.

Some of the factories, which were compelled to shutdown due to bad organisation and inappropriate management, have been reactivated to avoid loss to national economy. Unlike under the past Governments, the industrial plants in the country now enjoy full support and

protection of the DRA Government and every efforts are being made to further develop these plants to the benefit of growth of the national economy.

Added incentives and facilities as well as fringe benefits are now provided for the workers as part of the drive to increase industrial production. Better working conditions, rise in salaries for industrial workers and other privileges introduced by the DRA Government have been very effective in raising the industrial production in the country.

Many major industrial plants in the country have undergone renovation and modernisation, a major factor in boosting production recorded by many industrial plants in the country. Plans are also underway to expand the output of some industrial plants, specially those which were on the verge of closure and stagnation.

With the wise and timely action of the DRA Government, not only one of the important industrial plant that is the Kabul Ceramic Factory was saved from total shut down and liquidation, but plans are being drawn up to further develop and expand its production to meet part of the requirements of our people for chinaware. Economic and technical feasibility studies are being made and ways and means sought on how to increase and expand the factory's production.

Another major industrial complex, which the Government plans to expand, is the Jangalak Factories. A Soviet expert team has already begun to prepare technical and economic feasibility studies on expansion of the complex. The expansion and scope of operations of these factories, to be made with the technical and economic assistance



of the friendly country, the Soviet Union, will enable it to enlarge its motor repair and casting shops.

The reconstruction plan of the Jangalak Factories, being completed with the help of Soviet designers, is scheduled to be finished by mid-1982 and the actual reconstruction will be carried in 1983 and 1985, according to a report of the factories' management.

Another major and successful factory, the Aho Shoe Factory, has also reported increase in production due to improved management and hard work of its workers. The Aho management, reporting increase in daily output, adds that at the beginning, the factory produc-

ed some 55 pairs of shoes a day. However, after the victory of the Saur Revolution, especially its new phase, the daily output of the factory has reached 155 to 855 pairs of shoes.

These are but a few examples of the success of the wise and principled economic policy of the Government in achieving economic and industrial development.

The increased activities of the Afghan Industrial Bank have also been instrumental in encouraging industrial development and productions. The bank has been providing loans on easy and favourable terms to private and public sectors, helping them develop their plants and achieve rise in their productions.

Recently, the Government launched a work emulation drive in the industrial plants as part of its efforts to further encourage the workers to increase production. The drive has been widely welcomed by all workers and productive firms. It has already scored marked achievements.

It is hoped that, with continued efforts by the Government and the appropriate plans drawn up or to be drawn up, the country will achieve impressive successes in development of national industries to meet the essential needs of the people and save a considerable amount in hard currency.

### Loans to Enterprises

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 5 Oct 81 p 3

[Text]

The net profit of the Industrial Development Bank of Afghanistan during 1359 amounted to Afs. 38,815,628, showing an increase of some 60 per cent compared to 1358. The bank's loan towards the end of 1359 amounted to Afs. 639 million which, compared to 1358, shows some 11 per cent increase. In addition to carry-over loans, the bank made some Afs. 420 million new loans in 1359 to industrial organisations in the country.

This was stated by Eng Timor Shah Surkhabi, caretaker president of the

bank, in an interview with the Kabul New Times.

Talking of the activities of the bank, Surkhabi added: "During 1359, the bank's revenues amounted to Afs. 71,268,690 and its net profit to Afs. 38,815,628, while these figures in the previous year of 1358 were Afs. 52,578,458 and Afs. 24,215,040 respectively. Thus, during the 1359 the Bank's revenues shows some 34 per cent increase and that its net profit some 60 per cent, compared to the year 1358".

The bank's activity, in the light of the lofty ob-

jectives and useful goals of the liberating Saur Revolution and especially its new phase, has been very satisfactory compared to previous years both in credit and non-credit areas.

In addition to loans carried over from the previous year, some Afs. 420 million of new loans were extended by the bank during 1359 which, in view of number and the volume of the loans extended, shows an increase of some 24 per cent compared to 1358.

The balance of the bank's loans, which were

carried over from 1358 to 1359 amounted to Afs. 574 and in the course of 1359 an additional Afs. 420 million new loans were made and Afs. 355 million loans were retrieved during the same period. Thus the balance of loans of the bank towards the end of 1359 amounted to Afs 639, showing an increase of some 11 per cent compared to 1358.

"This figure indicates the interest and confidence of people in investment in accordance with the developmental projects of DRA, as well as the zeal, enthusiasm and untiring efforts of the employees of the bank", noted Surkhabi.

Answering a question, he said: "During 1360 the bank has furnished financial assistance to 107 industrial projects and as envisaged in the five-year financial plan, these loans will cover 137 projects by the end of the current Afghan year and towards the end of 1364 the number of projects to be financed by the bank are anticipated to reach to 254".

#### LOANS

"The bank extends loan for creation and establishment, expansion and revitalisation of industrial projects, both in public and private sectors and mixed sectors. These loans are made available after technical and economical feasibility studies of a certain project against guarantees", he pointed out.

The minimum duration of the loan can be one

year and that maximum more than ten years.

The bank was established in 1972 with a capital of Afs. 240 million to help development and growth of industries in the country as well as granting financial, technical, consultative, administrative and accounting services to industrial enterprises. At the outset 40 per cent of total capital was shared by foreign shareholders and the remaining 60 per cent belonged to local, public, private sectors and individual shareholders. However, since 1976, the Government owns the total capital. The value of shares held by foreign shareholders were paid to them by Da Afghanistan and that of individual and private shareholders were paid by the Finance, Ministry.

Since its inception, the bank has been in the service of national industries. At present the bank has 150 industrial projects, both public and private, as its clients.

"The bank has rendered useful services in development of industrial sectors through providing loans on favourable terms. Following the Saur Revolution, especially its new phase, the Bank's terms under which loans are extended were reviewed and it has become very easy and favourable", recalled Surkhabi, "so that, in accordance with the DRA Government's objectives, the pace of development of industries in the country is accelerated through use of national cap-

ital in the industrial sector".

The bank plans to establish centres of small industries and handicraft in other provinces.

The bank at present has set up a pilot small industries centre and when such small industries are developed to medium industries, they will be transferred to other centres such as industrial parks.

"The bank also plans to set up provincial branches shortly for coordination of industries in the country", Surkhabi added.

## Increase in Ceramic Production

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 19 Oct 81 p 3

[Text]

The survey and preliminary studies for development of the Kabul Ceramic Factory continues. In pursuance of the policy of the Government in developing productive industries of the country, recently it was resolved to carry out an all-sided study for seeking more effective and better ways and means to increase the production of the factory.

This was said to our reporter by Eng Abdurahman Qazikhani, head of the factory.

Recalling historical background of the factory, Eng Qazikhani said: "The factory was established in 1956 through private investment under the name of Shaker Ceramic Factory. In the early stage of operation the processed raw materials was being imported from Japan, and its primary products included ceramic wares which were of good quality and to the satisfaction of the customers. However, the use of already processed raw materials did not last long as it was becoming too expensive for the owner of the factory to import such raw materials. Thus, the management of the factory decided to make use of the locally available raw materials like ballclay which was found in Takhcha Kahan sale mine field of Taluqan, Kaolin, obtained from Talao Barfak and Feldspath from Dare Noor of Jalalabad."

Due to lack of modern and sophisticated technical facilities, the locally available raw materials were not properly processed within the factory, and this led to the quality of the products becoming inferior and at the same time the cost of production becoming higher than the similar foreign goods imported into the country. Thus, the factory's products lost their marketability and remained unsold at the warehouses. This state of affairs compelled the factory owners to change the system of production and their machinery to produce insulators and shimoot tiles for steam furnace, and coal stoves, instead of china wares. The insulators were used for power lines and that shimoot tiles, for stove and furnaces.

By changing the production line, the factory was able to sustain itself financially. But, unfortunately, this operation also did not last long and finally, in 1966, the factory came to standstill and its shutdown continued until 1974. "The Mines and Industries Ministry decided to reactivate the factory. And, it began a trial run and at the same time the study began on ways and means to increase the production, as part of the policy of the Government's drive to develop the productive industries in the country", said Qazikhani.

The factory was visited personally by the Mines

and Industries Minister as well as an authorised expert team of the ministry which made a study of ways to reactivate and further develop the factory. It was also visited by an expert team of the Soviet Union. The team, after a study, presented a detailed report to the authorities of the Ministry.

The preliminary survey, including geological and constructional, is under progress at present and, in the near future, marked changes will be made at the factory with the Soviet assistance, he noted.

The factory was purchased by the ministry at the repeated request of its owner. Now that the factory operates as an industrial state institute, constant efforts are being made to develop the factory and it was decided to secure the Soviet advisers' help in achieving this end, he said.

Now eight experienced Soviet experts help in further development and expansion of the factory, who have already carried out preliminary studies for its future development. The cooperation of other Government organisation is also sought for completion of the technical and economic feasibility studies. If this proves fruitful and justifies an expansion of the factory, it is possible at the following production capacity:

Production of chinaware up to some 500,000 pieces —141,66 tons. production of insulator up to some 110,000 or 49,50 tons, production of plumbing equipment up to some 5400 pieces or 72 tons which will come to a total of 263.16 tons.

As of now, some of the products of the factory such as insulator and shimoet tiles, are sold to various ministries and government organizations. The chinaware of the factory is sold through cooperative sale outlets at reasonable prices and to Government officials on instalment.

"Due to the increasing demand for chinaware, it is hoped that, in the near future, the production of the factory will be increased and the quality improved to meet international standard", said Qazikhani.

CSO: 4600/75



## CONSUMER SUPPLY FACILITIES OPENED

## New Bakery for Kabul

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 14 Oct 81 p 3

[Text]

The second bakery of Kabul, commissioned recently, has been completed six months ahead of planned target. This is attributed to the hard work and preserverence of the workers and employees of the Afghan Construction Unit and sincere cooperation of the Soviet engineers and technicians.

With a capacity of producing 72 tons of bread and cookies in 24 hours, the Kabul second bakery will supply 25 per cent of the baked bread required by the Kabul inhabitants.

This was stated by Eng Mohammad Aziz, president of the food procurement and cooperative department, in an interview with the Kabul New Times.

"The completion of the second bakery, equipped with modern facilities, is of vital importance for the people of Afghanistan", he pointed out the new equipment means that most of the manual

works is now replaced by machine work, and the workers only supervise and watch the operations of the machinery.

Due to increasing demand for baked bread the production capacity of the first bakery was raised from 50 tons to 62 tons in 24 hours. Though the final production capacity of the second bakery is 72 tons in 24 hours, in view of the reconstruction and substitution of old with the modern machinery at the first bakery, the total output of the two bakeries will be 72 tons in 24 hours until the end of the current Afghan year.

The construction work on the second bakery began in Saratan 1358 and took two years to be completed. The survey, and design of the building were carried out by Soviet firms. The new bak-

ery covers an area of 7.7 thousand square metres.

The total expenditures of the second bakery, said Eng Aziz, amounted to over 260 million. "The Afghan personnel, actively participated, with the help and technical assistance of the Soviet Union, in installation of machinery". The bakery employs over 178 workers.

Referring to the future plans of the department, he said: "Presently, work is in progress for construction of a silo in Mazare Sharif with the storage capacity of 20,000 tons, a mill with the capacity of 60 tons in 24 hours and a bakery with the baking capacity of 25 tons in 24 hours. The new project is scheduled to go into operation in the first quarter of the Afghan year 1361".

Similarly, the establishment of a mill in Pule Khumri with the capacity of 200 tons in 24 hours has also been undertaken

and is scheduled to go into operation by the first quarter of Afghan year 1361, thus "removing totally the difficulties in view of the shortage of flour", he added.

Likewise, the construction of a mill with the capacity of 60 tons and a bakery with the capacity of 25 tons are planned in Herat. The survey work, design and the drawing are ready and "soon work will begin for the construction" he said.

The setting up of a rice processing plant and a silo for storage of rice with the storage capacity of 20,000 tons in Baghlan, development of the Pule Khumri silo capacity from 20,000 and the Mazar Sharif silo capacity from 20,000 to 50,000 tons each and installation of a plant to provide for confectionary plants, are also envisaged in the future plans, according to Eng Aziz.

### New Sugar Outlets

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 18 Oct 81 p 3

[Text]

"With the opening up of new sugar sale outlets in various parts of the city, the Kabul citizens' requirement for daily consumption of sugar is fully ensured. The new sale outlets run by the Government are well organised, ensuring normal sale of sugar to consumers".

This was stated by Lemar Ahmad Lemar, president of the petroleum and sugar department, in an interview with the Kabul New Times.

The sale of sugar on commission basis continues from the time the Government Monopoly was established, he recalled. However, in an effort to provide added facilities for the Kabul citizens and to serve them better, the department recently decided to open up a number of new sale outlets in various sections

of Kabul. Presently there are some 1,100 shops, along the Government-run sale outlets, where sugar is sold to the public at subsidised price, he pointed out.

If assessed in view of the supply of sugar and size of the population, one can say with certainty that the requirements of inhabitants of Sayyed Noor Mohammad Shah Mena, Rahman Mena and Khairkhana Mena for sugar is fully met through the four sugar sale outlets established by the Government in these areas. Similarly, the inhabitants of Share Nau Microroyan and Mirwa is Maidan are meeting a greater part of their sugar requirements from the new sale outlets there, Lemar Ahmad said. There is a plan to open up more of these outlets in other parts of the city so that the consumers can

easily and without wasting much time obtain their required amount of sugar.

The working programme of the new sale outlets are organised in such a way that the consumers can receive their quota from 7 in the morning to 6:30 in the evening. Through those new sale outlets, the sugar is directly supplied to the consumers, according to their needs. Earlier many shops sold sugar on commission basis and created difficulties for the consumers through hoarding and were thus able to sell sugar at higher prices.

The Petroleum and Sugar Department, keeping in mind its responsibility, has always tried to import the required amount of sugar in the country and distribute it on a normal way so that no shortage is felt, Lemar said.



In pursuance of this policy, the department has concluded an agreement with the friendly country of the Soviet Union for purchase and import of 100,000 tons of sugar for the current year. Compared to the last year an increase of 30 per cent is taken in consideration in the new agreement.

The delivery of the sugar has already begun without interruption, he added.

#### Automated System for Coal Railway

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 19 Oct 81 p 3

[Text]

An automated control system has been installed at the station of Osnova, the main sorting station of the Southern Railway.

This will speed up the passage of trains carrying coal from the Donbass coal fields, ore from the Dnieper valley, and engineering products from Kharkov.

The system replaces a complex of operations which were previously carried out by a large staff of railway operators. Gathering information

about the cargoes which have arrived, the computers immediately issue orders for the most rational distribution of the trains. All the necessary information is reproduced on display panels, while machines automatically print and produce all relevant documentation. The electronic dispatcher has reduced the time that rolling stock has to spend in station's yards and 1,500 spare trucks will thus be released for additional loading operations.

(MN)

CSO: 4600/78

# CAMPAIGN TO INCREASE AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT ACTIVATED

## Government Efforts

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 20 Oct 81 p 2

[Editorial: "A Productive Campaign"]

[Text]

Afghanistan is an agricultural country, where the majority of the population is engaged in farming. However, for long years, the farmers in this country tilled their land under the most arduous conditions and with very simple and primitive means, and what they produced could hardly meet the people's daily requirements.

The meagre land productivity caused by social and economic factors, could not sustain the farmers and their families the year round, compelled them to resort to borrowing, especially at the sowing season. The heavy burden forced them to sell their products at low prices in order to repay their debts.

They borrowed money to pay for the improved seeds, chemical fertilisers, and other essentials, but the back-breaking loans never allowed the farmers

to improve their miserable economic condition and that of their families. This state of affairs also caused an increasing deficit in the total agricultural production of the country.

With the victory of the Saur Revolution, especially its new phase, having realised all these difficulties and hardships of the toiling farmers in the country, the DRA Government has undertaken effective and specific plans aimed at helping the farmers, augmenting the land productivity and agricultural output as a whole.

The Government has exerted and is exerting all possible efforts to encourage the toiling peasants to enhance their per unit land productivity by providing technical guidance, improved seeds, chemical fertiliser and modern agricultural tools on most favourable and easy terms.

To help the farmers and enable them to increase the land productivity, the Government decided to reduce the selling price of chemical fertiliser, seeds, and agricultural tools and machinery to farmers. The prices of industrial crops such as cotton to be purchased by the Government, enterprises and companies, have been considerably increased.

As part of the effort to increase the land productivity and help the farmers, the Government has stepped up its activities for further popularisation of use of fertiliser and modern agricultural means. With the enlarged network of sale outlets for fertiliser, improved seeds and other essentials, the Afghan farmers now have an easy access to what is needed for them to increase land productivity.

Among the most constructive and effective plans undertaken by the Government are the campaigns for spring and autumn sowing, which are drawn up on the basis of a resolution of the DRA Council of Ministers. These plans and programmes have already yielded fruitful results, as the experiences of the autumn sowing of 1359 and spring sowing of 1360 show.

The autumn sowing campaign this year has begun on Sunbula 1 and will continue until Jaddi 1. Over 10,000 tons of improved varieties of wheat seeds have been supplied for distribution to Afghan farmers to be used in the autumn sowing of 1360. In the same proportion, other essentials are also made available to the farmers to make use of them for the autumn sowing.

In order to implement the autumn sowing program-

me, meetings are being held in various provinces to ensure the full and satisfactory fulfilment of the programme.

In Afghanistan, the majority of the farmers are in need of improved seeds, chemical fertiliser, agricultural chemicals, improved irrigation schemes, agricultural tools and better markets for their surplus produce. Yet, individual farmers find it difficult to market their surplus products and secure desirable prices as the farms are located far away from the market places.

Agricultural cooperatives provide a solution to most of these problems. Through the cooperatives, the farmers can easily establish contact with the interested organisations such as the Agricultural Development Bank, the Afghan Chemical Fertiliser Company and the Afghan Seeds Company, in order to meeting their essential needs.

#### Improved Wheat Seed

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 15 Oct 81 p 3

[Text]

Over 10,000 tons of improved varieties wheat seeds have been supplied for distribution to Afghan farmers by the Improved Seeds Company to be used in the 1360 autumn sowing campaign.

In an interview with our reporter, president of the company Mirdad Panjsheri said that the company sold 5,352 tons of the seeds worth Afs

59,000,000 to the farmers all over the country for the spring sowing during 1360. The company also provided over 10,000 tons of the seeds worth Afs. 121,000,000 for sale to the farmers in the current year, which constitutes a total of 15,352 tons worth Afs 180,000,000.

The campaign begins at different times in different regions of the co-

untry, but generally it starts in mid-Sunbula and continues till mid-Jadi. Already, a large number of farmers in the country have been organised in such cooperatives. Now, the toiling farmers in this country find it easier to seek the necessary assistance and continuously augment the land productivity. They can be better helped in successful implementation of spring and autumn sowing through the technical guidance and facilities provided by their respective cooperatives.

With the impressive arrangements and facilities provided for the farmers and on the basis of the experience gained from the successful implementation of the last year's autumn sowing, it is hoped the campaign of 1360 will also prove a success benefiting the farmers as well as improving the overall agricultural production of the country.

untry, but generally it starts in mid-Sunbula and continues till mid-Jadi.

About 5,000 tons of such seeds for spring sowing and 5,000 tons for the autumn sowing have been imported from the USSR as a grant-in-aid. Import of 10,000 tons of the seeds is envisaged from that country in 1361.

He added that, according to the plan, sowing of

2,300 hectares of lands comprising the extension farms of the company in Kandahar, Marja, Helmand and Ghazni has been envisaged for the autumn sowing. "If we estimate the average yield per hectare two tons, approximately 4,000 tons is expected from the above land in 1361.

Panjsheri said that, realizing that improved seeds are the major factor for growth and development of the agricultural production in the sector, the company as a producer of the improved seeds cooperates in devising development plans in agriculture and coordinating the programmes with the concerned departments. Provision of the seeds from various sources according to its planned allocation and putting them at the disposal of the Afghan Fertiliser Company at the appropriate time according to the protocol are the measures adopted.

He stated that, with the victory of the glorious Saur Revolution, especially its new, evolutionary phase, major changes were introduced in all aspects particularly in the production sectors in the country. One of these is RC Decree 8 and its appendix 1. With the completion of land reforms, over 350,000 landless and deserving families will receive land.

Building of new state farms is another step in development of agriculture in the country and boosting agricultural yields.

"In view of the major changes in different fields and the land reforms in the country, our duties have become more and heavier. For better utilisation of the land by the farmers, provision of appropriate improved seeds, chemical fertilisers, pesticides and insecticides and other chemicals is necessary.

Though fertilisers and agricultural machinery and implements are imported from abroad, the improved seeds should be produced in the country".

Considering the present situation of the farms and the demand for distribution and production of the improved seeds, in addition to development of 6,460 hectares of land in the farms of the company, 3,600 hectares of land is envisaged to be allocated for the new extension farms for improved seeds in the Herat, Balkh and Takhar provinces.

Building of such farms will prevent the unnecessary transport expenses. Rice, paddy, maize, beans, seeds of vegetables and fruit-bearing seedlings will be supplied in the farms.

In reply to a question, Panjsheri said that, at present, sale and distribution of seeds are carried out by the Afghan Fertiliser Company. "If our programme expands, a marketing and distribution section will be required to function in the framework of the Improved Seeds Company".

Moreover, to meet the demand for storage facilities,

the company envisages building of godowns with a capacity of 1,000 to 5,000 tons in Kabul, Kunduz, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Herat and Mazare Sharif.

Since the extension of the improved seeds requires specialised vocational knowhow, the company plans to send a number of its technical and vocational cadres to the friendly countries for training.

The president of the company added that the better-yield specifications of the improved seeds are the results of the persistent activities of research institutions and experts. Necessary measures have to be adopted to supply improved seeds according to international standards.

To achieve this, the company has started work on a draft law for improved seeds with the cooperation of the UN experts. The law has been drafted, and will be enforced after finalization.

By enforcement of the law, the improved seeds will be produced and distributed according to international standards all over the country. With the implementation of the law, further facilities will be provided for the farmers.

"To further assist the farmers with improved seeds and for controlling the quality of the seeds, the company envisages construction of well-equipped laboratories in the capital and provinces", he added.



## Expanded Raisin Exports

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 20 Oct 81 p 3

[Interview with A. W. Saighani, president of the Raisin Export Promotion Institute]

[Text]

Some 37,428 tons of raisin worth \$ 53,746,608 have been exported abroad during the last six months of the current year.

In an interview with the Kabul New Times, president of the raisin export promotion institute Ahmad Wali Saighani said that a 162 per cent increase has been recorded in the volume of raisin export in the last six months of 1360 compared with the previous year. Raisin has been supplied to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Britain, India, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Finland, Denmark, Holland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Japan. But the major importers of the Afghan raisin are the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Britain and Ireland.

Saighani said that, from among the three kinds of raisin—red, green and black—the red raisin attracted the most purchasers.

Of the total exported, it accounted for 35,182 tons.

The average price of raisin in the free markets was \$1,472 and in the barter region \$ 1,390. The raisin is exported to the European countries via Hairatan port and via Chaman to India and Pakistan.

In reply to a question, Saighani said that, since the institute is a non-profit organisation, it has no direct role in purchase of raisin. It only controls and supervises the export of raisin by the export institutions and individual merchants.

Speaking on prospects of the total income of raisin export from the 1360 produce, he said that, due to the price fluctuations in the international market, the total can not be estimated. But due to increase in the raisin production in the producing countries in the current year and limitations of the international markets, a decrease in the price is envisaged.

According to reports from the grape-producing regions in the country and in view of the favourable weather conditions, the current year's grape production will be satisfactory. It can be

estimated at between 110 to 120,000 tons.

### GRAPES

To guide the producers and boost raisin production in the major grape-producing areas—the Kabul, Parwan, Balkh, Kandahar and Herat provinces—the institute has established experimental farms and is willing to introduce modern methods to the viniculturists. To achieve this goal, the institute envisages a new system of viniculture with the technical cooperation of the concerned authorities of the Agriculture Development Bank, the Agricultural Cooperatives and the general directorates of agriculture.

Experienced experts in the institute are ready to serve the producers. To assist the viniculturists, the institute cooperates in fixing the minimum price of raisin to prevent the malpractices of the middlemen and creating a direct relation between the exporters, producers and other institutions purchasing the raisin at a set price.

Saighani said that the

institute, according to the provisions of its charter is in direct contact with the viniculturists, providing them information on improving the quality of raisin, changing the drying system and proper picking of the raisin. It has also put at the disposal of the viniculturists a publication, 'Guide on picking and drying of grapes', through the provincial agriculture and cooperatives departments which will considerably contribute in improving the quality of raisin.

The institute also su-

pervises the processing and packing of raisins in the raisin-cleaning factories and has issued necessary instructions to them to help improve their performance. To achieve this goal, samples of raisin are checked by the concerned officials before export so that it should be according to the set standard of the institute.

Otherwise, export certificates are not issued and the raisin will be returned to the processing factory. This procedure has proved very useful he added.

#### More Use of Fertilizers, Medicines

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 3 Oct 81 p 3

[Interview with G. S. Akbari, president of the Afghan Fertilizer Company]

[Text]

Distribution of 30384 tons of urea fertiliser, 30651 tons of phosphate and agriculture and veterinary medicines worth Afs 20,000,000 has been envisaged in the current year's autumn sowing campaign.

In an interview with the Kabul New Times, the president of the Afghan Fertiliser Company, Ghulam Sakhi Akbari, said that to successfully implement the 1360 H. S. autumn sowing programme, the company has made necessary arrangements. According to the plan, the company will provide different kinds of chemical fertiliser, pesticides, insecticides and me-

dicines for animal diseases through its retail selling outlets and the company's agricultural medicines depots to the country's farmers and livestock owners.

The farmers and livestock breeders can obtain different chemical fertiliser, medicines and improved wheat seeds by cash payment or with the credit coupons prepared for the farmers through the Agricultural Development Bank branch offices or from the retail selling outlets.

To provide further facilities for the farmers, in addition to 26 agriculture medicines depots, the nu-

mber of Afghan Fertiliser Company retail selling outlets have been promoted from 1,040 to 1,100.

In reply to a question Akbari said that although the autumn sowing campaign begins early in Sunbula and continues till late Jaddi, until the end of the sowing campaign in the current year a total of 66,212 tons of urea fertiliser worth Afs 529,696,000,; 40,142 tons of phosphate fertiliser worth Afs 585,670,800, agricultural veterinary medicines and small agricultural equipment worth Afs 49,000,000 will be distributed.

He noted that since the beginning of the current

year a total of 45,548 tons of fertiliser worth Afs 374,000,000 and agricultural and veterinary medicines worth Afs 33,570,000 has been sold to the farmers and livestock owners.

The Afghan Fertiliser Company will produce 60,000 tons of phosphate and will put it at the disposal of the farmers, he said. It also envisages production of agricultural and veterinary medicines and small agricultural tools worth Afs 90,000,000. The president added that every year 18 to 20 per cent increase is envisaged in selling of fertiliser and agricultural and veterinary medicines. Necessary measure for storage and distribution of these items are also envisaged.

CSO: 4600/76

## LIVESTOCK HEALTH CARE PROGRAMS EXPANDED

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 13, 14 Oct 81 p 3

[13 Oct 81]

[Text]

Afghanistan is a country of about 15.54 million people dependent mainly on 37-million livestock population and land produce to keep its economy on the move. The population of pastoralists, nomads and semi-nomadic tribes (1.65 million Kuchis and 11.10 million rural people) have, over thousands of years, organised their lives in and around their cattle and livestock flock, so much so that their summer and winter habitats depend on the needs of well-being of their stocks. Clothing in this severe climatic condition is also provided by livestock produce, housing (tents and carpets) and their food too (dairy product and meat) come from the animals they own or from the wild animals they hunt.

**VITAL**

Agriculture thus plays the major role in the country's economy. Eightyfive to 90 per cent of the agricultural production accounts for 50 per cent of the

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and supports almost 13 million people living in the rural areas who are exclusively dependent upon it for their livelihood. About 1/3 of this total agricultural produce comes from livestock. Therefore livestock industry in Afghanistan is of vital importance to the national economy, and it is this special man-and-his-domestic-flock relationship that governs the economic and social wellbeing of the rural and pastoral population.

In modern times livestock also contributes to 30 per cent of Afghanistan's exports with the sheep industry alone providing, by value of national livestock production, 90 per cent. The value of recorded exports, excluding substantial non-recorded exports of live sheep for slaughter and wool, are:

Product	1969-70	1973-74
	(In US\$ millions)	
Karakul pelts	13.1	16.8
Hides, skins	2.6	5.6
Wool	6.7	5.8
Casings	1.0	1.5
Other skins	0.4	1.4
Carpets, rugs	6.2	14.5
	30.0	45.5

Although the livestock number in the country was drastically reduced in 1970-72 years of drought, in 1975 the Ministry of Planning estimated the livestock population to be:

Sheep—14.9 million  
 Karakul sheep—6.5 m  
 Goat—3.2m  
 Cattle—3.6m  
 Buffalo—23,000 heads.  
 Camel—299,000 heads.  
 Horses—403,000 heads.  
 Donkey—1.3 million  
 Mule—413,000 heads.  
 Poultry—6.3 million

In 1357 H.S., the GDP for agriculture and forestry was 82 billion Afghanis while for the year 1358 it was estimated at



84.0 billion Afghanis. The value of gross agricultural production was 81,487 million Afghanis in 1357 and in 1358 it was estimated at 83,427 million Afghanis. The target for 1359 was 87,082 million Afghanis.

Out of this the total gross products of livestock with comparative prices were: 22,565 million Afghanis in 1357, 23,414 million Afghanis was the 1358 estimate and the target for 1359 was 23,903 million Afghanis.

The number of cows and buffaloes at the end of 1359 was planned as 3820 (per head). The total sheep population was planned at 19,500 (per head). These are figures related to the private sector while in the public sector, total sheep population was 8,000 (per head), milch cattle was 500 heads and cows and buffalo was 2,000 (per head), while that of Karakul sheep was also 8,000 (per head). Gross livestock production planned for 1359 was worth 16.9 million afghanis. For 1359 the planned export was worth 187 million dollars of which 30 per cent or more was animal produce.

Out of the total area of 64.90 million hectares of land in the country, only 5.31 million hectares (8.1 per cent) is suited to cultivation, with about 2 per cent of forest land and meadow. Therefore, there is about 85 per cent of land with vegetation growing on it which remains useless unless livestock graze it.

### INSUFFICIENT

While the countryside is tailored to grazing, a survey of actual livestock utility

shows that in the northern provinces it is the Karakul sheep breed that provide wool while the Arabi variety is used for meat in the villages. In the west sheep production is sedentary, with a few semi-sedentary production in winter bases near a village. The milk yield is higher for goat. In village communities, cattle receive priority allocation of grazing and supplementary feed. Calf crop is 50 per cent and milk production amounts to 400 kgs per lactation. There are very few commercial poultry units near Kabul, in neighbourhood villages there is also a low scavenger yield, and a great scope of improvement exist in this area.

Although 90 per cent of the population of Afghanistan are dependent on livestock in the first two 5-year development plans (1955-1960 and 1961-1966) the main emphasis was laid in transport and communication and in the third 5-year plan, emphasis was on industry and agriculture. Since 1973 there was an annual investment planning that recognized the urgent need to stimulate livestock production but did not provide any capital fund to support the plans of livestock improvement. The need for properly trained personnel at all levels from university graduates to the producers themselves to ensure the survival and improvement of livestock in the country was not sufficiently felt or overlooked. Centralised administration of livestock and veterinary services impedes their extension to the countryside where it is most needed. Livestock services

are allocated only about 3 per cent of the total Government budget.

Today, the main constraints against increased livestock industry development and animal productivity are: (a) virtual absence of animal disease control services, particularly of annual vaccination services arising from a lack of qualified staff; regional centres, transport, vaccines and finance.

(b) Low level of animal nutrition, particularly during winter and early spring. Contributing factors are shortage of irrigated land, distribution of rangeland winterpoints for drinking, declining rangeland area and productivity, unavailability of adequate winter feed supply (hay, straw, feed, grain, crop by-products), lack of knowledge required for increased pasture production.

(c) Poor communication. This results in poor distribution and availability of agricultural production inputs, poor marketing with exaggerated seasonal ups and downs in volume and price, livestock weight losses and mortality between production and consumption areas, lack of information and responses to the market demand.

(d) Social constraints of land tenure, land usage and maintenance resulting in, fragmentation of irrigated land, multiple ownership of productive areas, common use and abuse of state grazing, difficulty in obtaining security for credit from the Agricultural Bank.

Facing such heavy odds and harsh physical and seasonal environment, the Af-

ghan farmers and pastoralists are found to be alert to the needs of their flocks and have evolved a viable and sophisticated, indigenous system of husbandry. They also show willingness to spend flock inputs from limited financial resources and make immense efforts to protect and feed their flocks.

As such, it is apparent, farmer-pastoralist responses to any efforts to improve livestock quality and productivity and increase production and marketing facilities is not a constraint in any livestock projects in the country.

[14 Oct 81]

[Text]

It is probably a mutualistic relationship that once co-existed between wild canines and flocks of wild sheep and goats over large areas of the eastern hemisphere that were also inhabited by man. This early man, a berry, nut and snail gatherer who developed a liking for meat by sharing, as wolverines and foxes do, in the canine pack's kill.

Once man's taste for flesh was acquired, he found that he too could kill for meat.

In the beginning perhaps, man's inclination was to kill as many as he could whenever he chanced on a wild flock of sheep or goat. But much meat spoiled this way as not all of the kill could be consumed at one go. So he began following the wild flock. Later he learned to domesticate and stock animals, to be killed when the need for food arose. To stock live animals, it became necessary to breed a domestic flock, look after the herds, feed them adequately during severe climatic changes and prevent them from dying of diseases. That is how animal health sciences must have developed. It was in Egypt that veterinary sciences really found foothold. Eventually, from studies on animals rose human health services.

The volume of livestock production was expected to be increased in 1359 by 2.1 per cent that is, to the tune of 25.903 million Afghanis. The total gross agricultural product (with comparative prices) of livestock target for the same year was for 63,179 million Afghanis. Of this, total butchered meat would be of 205,000 tons, milk 850,000 tons, sheep wool target was 23.4 thousand tons and 1,400,000 Karakul pelts. However, reference to these target figures show a relatively slow growth for livestock. The actual achievements for the year are not

yet available. However, the number of cattle, at the end of the year was expected to be 3,820 heads of cows and buffaloes, 1,176 heads of cows, the total sheep population was expected to reach 195,000 heads and the Karakul sheep 4700 heads.

In the public sector the gross livestock production target was worth 16.3 million Afghani, the total sheep (including Karakul population) target was 16,000 heads, milch cattle 500 heads and meat cattle (cows and buffaloes) 2,000 heads.

In distribution of domestic resources, the investment in the agriculture and irrigation sector including livestock was 28 parts compared to the total allocation of 1.7 billion Afghanis. The expenditure target for last year was to the tune of 326.7 million Afghanis.

## SERVICES

At present, the Government services the stock raisers and pastoralists through two institutions: Department of Veterinary Services and Department of Animal Husbandry of the Ministry of Agriculture. Staff

complement of the Veterinary Department is 43 Animal Health and Production officers and about 350 auxiliary workers. The Animal Husbandry Department has only 30 Animal Science graduates and about 136 auxiliary workers. Further, the compartmentalisation and centralisation of the two services may lead to further neglect of the rural stock owners and pastoralists,

What is needed most is extension of veterinary services to the provinces by decentralisation and by strengthening of staff, equipment and supplies at the decentralised units. At present, throughout the country there are only 30 veterinary subclinics. Soviet veterinarians man seven of these clinics, the Food and Agricultural Organisation five and the remaining are manned by nonprofessional staff. There are six veterinary diagnostic laboratories in the areas of livestock concentration operated by Soviet veterinarians. The central veterinary diagnostic laboratory and the vaccine production laboratory are run by the FAO. In all these clinics, subclinics and in the provinces, what is most felt is the need for trained Afghan personnel. Afghan graduate veterinarians are also required to man all the future animal health clinics planned by the Government.

An international experts group meeting has not long ago determined that the number of graduate veterinarians required to serve a livestock enterprise in a

developing country is—one veterinarian for every 30,000 livestock units.

At least developed country depending primarily on livestock produce, like Afghanistan needs at least 300 veterinarians based on this ratio. At present, there is just one veterinarian for every 166,000 livestock unit in this country. (There are about 80 veterinarians in the country.) The Ministry of Agriculture estimates the need for veterinarians here by 1983 as 612. This profession also needs to be supported by auxiliary staff, partially trained, with about 10 animal health assistants to one veterinarian.

It is clear that there exists a great lack of veterinary manpower in Afghanistan and this ought to be remedied urgently. There is no doubt that increases in number of well trained veterinarians and their deployment among pastoralists and rural small farmers would contribute greatly to the GNP of the country, as well as to the social and economical well-being of the broad masses of people who own and exploit the livestock wealth in this country.

Twentyfive years ago, a faculty of veterinary science was set up in the Kabul University in an attempt to meet Afghanistan's special need for animal health services. This was the first university level veterinary institution established in the country as a result of the

Food and Agricultural Organisation's recommendations to the Afghan Government in 1956 to train Afghan people as veterinarians.

Classes were conducted in the Agricultural Faculty building by two full-time and nine part-time teachers who taught 60 students. The venture was given up in 1963 due to lack of class-room and laboratory space. Twentyfour of the students were sent abroad to complete their studies and now form the core of veterinary services in the country. The others changed to other faculties.

Ten years later, a committee was appointed, and it felt the need for training manpower to take care of the nation's livestock. It was also decided at that time to develop livestock and sheep marketing. In 1974, an IDA-supported livestock development project started. This included financing a four-year fodder production programme and the development of range and technical services.

In the same year, the Faculty of Veterinary Sciences was restarted. This time housed in the Education Faculty, it had 189 students taught by nine full-time teachers and three part-timers. In May 1975, UNDP/FAO assistance to the faculty became operational. At first the faculty was organised loosely into seven departments. A lot of equipment was brought

in and the various laboratories were being built up. By 1979, UNDP assistance to the tune of US \$ 2,664,875 was made available with an addition of 4.6 million dollars last year. Since 1979, a team of international experts led by an FAO officer as project manager has also been assisting in the development of the faculty.

It now has six departments, each with an international expert guiding a national team. These are the animal production, preclinical, paraclinical, preventive medicine, clinical studies and veterinary extension departments. There is also a publication unit producing lecture notes in English and Dari to facilitate teaching and understanding of lessons for the students. An audio-visual unit too aids students. A student's library with 3000 books and a staff library with 400 books and 25 journals has come up. Microbiology and parasitology laboratories have been put up.

A teaching Veterinary Clinic has started functioning in Darulaman where flock animals can undergo treatment and surgery. A state farm at Benihissar has been made available to the students for practical training.

The faculty now has a new mobile clinic to reach teachers, students, veterinarians to the rural areas, primarily to serve those who cannot co-

me to the Darulaman clinic.

## PROGRAMMES

The best graduates are to be recruited as teachers in the future and will receive M.S. level training abroad. The Government's five-year economic development plan also provides for ensuring adequate animal feedstock and pasture improvement, construction of shelters and complete veterinary measures for the winter season. About 30 animal stables, 30 ponds, 30 deep wells and 30 animal feed storages are also to be built. The veterinary sub-clinics will be expanded, two quarantine stations are to be built that will protect 25 million animals by 1983. Poultry and dairy farms are also planned by the state. One animal diseases clinic was inaugurated only last week.

The Government has provided 25 million Afghani as complementary funds to meet the faculty's day-to-day expenses and the salaries of the national staff.

The Faculty of Veterinary Sciences of the Kabul University is a torchbearer in the field and is not only making a significant contribution to creation of urgently needed qualified manpower, but is also a pioneer to other developing nations.



## AGREEMENT OPENS WAY TO HOUSING CONTRACTS

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REFORT & MEMO in English No 42, 19 Oct 81 p 5

[Text]

A memorandum of understanding signed in Algiers last week by Britain's Trade Minister Peter Rees opens the way to detailed negotiations between British contractors and the Algerian authorities for 20,000 housing units worth some £ 200 million sterling (about \$360 million). The memorandum sets out the British government's understanding with the Algerian Ministry of Housing and contains an annex stating that the Algerian government is seeking negotiated contracts for the housing units and their associated infrastructure. The memorandum was considered to be necessary because the Algerians were reluctant to deal with private firms from Britain without some form of official cover.

The figure of 20,000 units is geared to the capacity of British construction firms to supply Algeria with houses under the terms of Algeria's 1980-84 plan. Similar agreements are expected with other European governments shortly, with Belgium expected to be the next EEC country to follow in Britain's footsteps. The Algerian plan calls for construction of a total of 450,000 new housing units.

Negotiations for final contracts are expected to be tough, with Algeria laying down stringent conditions on prices, credits and delivery dates. Algeria is understood to be seeking block contracts rather than have companies tender on individual housing projects. The British companies at present involved in talks with the Algerian authorities are Cementation, McAlpine, Paulings, Wimpey and consultants W S Atkins.

CSO: 4500/28

## CAIRO PAPER DISCUSSES PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY

NC280840 Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 0610 GMT 28 Oct 81

[From the press review]

[Text] In an article entitled "The Autonomy That We Want," the newspaper AL-JUMHURIYAH reports today that Egypt and Israel have agreed to resume the talks on Palestinian autonomy, with U.S. participation, on 4 November. AL-JUMHURIYAH explains that this agreement signifies that all parties insist on continuing the peace process so that it will fulfill its final objectives.

As Menahem Begin stated, the coming tripartite meeting will focus its attention on the method for holding the elections in the West Bank and Gaza to form an autonomous council. If this goal is attained, it will represent a real change in the situation.

The paper emphasizes that we agree with Begin on the importance of this step. In order that this step can succeed, it is imperative for the Israeli side to show a large measure of understanding and cooperation. AL-JUMHURIYAH asserts that we expect the Israeli side to show a real understanding of the nature of the Palestinian autonomous government as called for in the Camp David accords. The paper notes that the agreement, which the whole world has endorsed and supported, stipulates that authority be transferred from the Israeli military government to the elected Palestinian autonomous government council. It adds that the transfer of authority signifies the transfer of all the powers and jurisdictions formerly enjoyed by the military governor to the elected council, including the legislative, executive and judicial jurisdictions. In the absence of such a sound understanding of the Palestinian autonomy issue, a real change will not occur in the situation--a change about which Menahem Begin is talking.

In concluding its article, the newspaper AL-JUMHURIYAH affirms that the solution of the Palestine question is the quintessence of the Middle East problem. It adds that in the absence of a real autonomous government for the Palestinians, peace is a remote target.

CSO: 4504/49

'AL-AKHBAR' DISCUSSES PEACE FORCE FOR CHAD

NC280926 Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 0610 GMT 28 Oct 81

[From the press review]

[Text] The newspaper AL-AKHBAR today comments on the achievement of peace in Chad. It says: The achievement of peace and security in Chad is a matter in which we are very interested for several reasons. First, Chad has a long common border with Sudan and the source of the Nile extends to its well-known lake. Second, Chad is an Islamic state connected to us by ideological and racial ties. Third, Chad belongs to the group of African states that won their independence in the wake of World War II. Therefore, it is imperative that we be concerned about Chad and that we help it protect its independence.

It is imperative that we help Chad so that we can stand by its side to enable it to build itself and to become a base of security and peace, together with the group of African states around it.

The newspaper AL-AKHBAR says: This is the source of Egypt's interest in Chad's affairs and events there. However, in taking this interest we harbor neither designs nor ambitions. This same source spurs the interest taken in Chad by the OAU states and the efforts they are exerting to ensure Chad's independence and the independence of all the African states that face the very dangers posed to Chad.

The OAU states in Chad's area have held several meetings aimed at helping Chad and protecting its independence. It has been natural for Egypt to participate in these meetings and to emphasize its readiness to participate in any action taken to keep peace in Chad.

The paper notes France's official announcement that it has decided to extend its support to the Chadian transitional government. The paper also points to the proposal calling for sending an African peacekeeping force to Chad. It elucidates that the OAU made this proposal and demands that a peacekeeping force be formed for Chad.

AL-AKHBAR adds: It seems that the OAU proposal is now on its way to implementation with serious steps. News agencies have reported that the Nigerian Government has been officially requested to provide Nigerian forces that would play

their role in any force which the OAU might form to keep peace in Chad. A Nigerian spokesman has also announced that four other African states, including Senegal, have received requests in this respect. Furthermore, news agencies have reported from Cairo that Egypt is ready to send forces for this task.

Thus, some six African states have responded to the OAU proposal, guaranteeing its successful implementation. This particularly holds true if we add France to this group in Paris' capacity as extending help within the framework of the African proposal, as a French Foreign Ministry spokesman has stated.

In conclusion, AL-AKHBAR affirms that it is the natural right of any state to ask that it be able to enjoy its independence which it won following a protracted struggle and that it be able to be its own master as far as its domestic affairs are concerned. It is the duty of all free and peace-loving states to help this state achieve this right. This is particularly the duty of the African states connected to such a state with ties of neighborliness, race and common interests. Even more, this is the duty of the United Nations and the very core of its mission. This duty should be discharged to make it possible to eliminate the hotbeds of trouble and to achieve security and peace throughout the world.

CSO: 4504/49



SOCIALIST LABOR PARTY LEADER INTERVIEWED

JN251539 Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 24 Oct 81 pp 26, 27

[Interview with Ibrahim Shukri, Egyptian Socialist Labor Party leader, by AL-MUSTAQBAL correspondent Sulayman Nimr, in Cairo--date not given]

[Excerpts] [Question] How did you voice your support for nominating Husni Mubarak as president of the republic at the time when he announced that he would continue to pursue President al-Sadat's policy which you opposed.

[Answer] The circumstances and implications which accompanied the assassination of al-Sadat could have caused disturbances and chaos in Egypt with unpredictable results. That is why we in the Socialist Labor Party felt that all the sons of this homeland, irrespective of their political views, had to stick together in order to establish stability as soon as possible. This was our main motive in supporting the nomination of Husni Mubarak. Furthermore, we are confident that President Husni Mubarak will be prepared to tackle the mistakes committed by the previous regime and will study thoroughly the criticism which was leveled against the previous regime by the opposition and the majority of the people. Our support for Husni Mubarak's nomination does not mean that we are giving up our views on al-Sadat's policy.

[Question] But President Mubarak asserted that he would continue to pursue the same policy of President al-Sadat?

[Answer] We understand why he announced that he would pursue President al-Sadat's line. He meant that he would work to attain the same pan-Arab objectives for Egypt, but not necessarily by means of the former president's method. We are certain that President Husni Mubarak's policy will bring about something new. There should be an inevitable change due to the nature of the new developments and because the personality of the new president is different from that of the former one. Since I knew what went on during al-Sadat's era, I can say that President al-Sadat had the first and last word in his decisions.

[Question] Does this mean that you will continue to support President Mubarak and that you will give up your role as an opposition party?

[Answer] Our support for the nomination of President Mubarak does not mean that we will not oppose any of his views or decisions that our party might disapprove

of. We will continue to record our criticism and remarks against any conditions or decisions which we believe are against the interest of the public and do not serve the pan-Arab objectives.

[Question] Do you believe that the Egyptian-Arab relations will be restored in the near future following the departure of President al-Sddat?

[Answer] We must admit that the person who is currently in charge of the Egyptian policy is not al-Sadat. Despite President Mubarak's declaration that he will pursue the broad lines of al-Sadat's policy, he still has a big chance to restore the Arab-Egyptian relations to their normal condition. We believe that one of the gravest results of the Camp David agreements was the division of Arab rank and the creation of a wide gap between Egypt and its Arab sisters. I believe that the situation will be different in the near future. The new circumstances make it feasible now to look for alternative solutions other than those contained in the Camp David agreements with regard to the autonomy issue. We also believe that there were ideas and initiatives concerning the Palestinian people's rights much better than those contained in the Camp David [agreements]. Here I refer to Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz's peace plan which we fully support. There was also the Soviet proposal for holding a conference in which all the parties concerned with the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the Palestinians, would participate. Such ideas are much better than the formulas contained in the Camp David agreements. It is expected that the new president, Husni Mubarak, will move within the context of these ideas to obtain better results concerning the Palestinian people's rights.

CSO: 4504/49

'AFP' ON NEW EGYPTIAN CIVIL SERVICE WORK CODE

NC261202 Paris AFP in English 1153 GMT 26 Oct 81

[Report by Ahmed Loutfi]

[Text] Cairo, 26 Oct (AFP)--Tens of thousands of Egyptian civil servants have been warned "no more slacking in the office" in a brand new official work code.

The French-language daily LE JOURNAL D'EGYPTE which published the full text of the new draconian code shocked many bureaucrats by noting that: "40 cases of negligence can mean dismissal."

The "negligence" is mainly sleeping on the job, a favourite bureaucratic past-time.

The new code lays down that: "Sleeping in the office will be punishable by the deduction of one half-day's pay, and if it happens three times, the deduction of two days' pay."

Up to now the civil servant could more or less consider that he was unsackable. In fact dismissal was a very rare administrative measure, and usually only for outstanding incompetence or misbehaviour.

But times have changed and the government has decided to clean up what many members of the public considered "a paradise for bureaucrats and a hell for the ordinary man-in-the-street."

The usual advice which greeted a visitor to a ministry was the refrain "Come back tomorrow."

Not only can lazy officials no longer go to sleep in the office, but they are also barred from using the telephone for their own private calls.

If they do so they are given two warnings, and if caught a third time they will be fined two days' salary.

This is a particularly biting deprivation when one considers that many Egyptians have no telephones at home, owing to a lack of available lines, and wait until they reach the office to make their calls.

The use of the office car for private reasons is also banned--another blow at the civil servant's privileged lifestyle--on pain of dismissal.

The new code, issued by the Central Agency for Organisation and Administration, seems to have been drawn up by a strict disciplinarian, as nothing is left to chance.

Even going to the office and leaving must be done through recognised entrances and exits.

Another blow is delivered to the custom of receiving private visitors in office hours which can now be punished by a fine equal to four days' pay for a consistent offender.

If this is implemented, then a whole epoch of Oriental courtesy and tradition will be broken.

Very harsh punishment is levelled at an official who refuses to carry out a set task, or refuses to work overtime to complete it--he faces a loss of 30 days' pay, and even demotion and dismissal.

It's a dog's life--even for the once hallowed scribe.

CSO: 4500/27



EGYPT

BASIC EDUCATION LAW PROMULGATED

Cairo AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH [The Official Gazette] in Arabic No 34, 20 Aug 81 pp 2147-2164

[Law Number 139 for 1981 Promulgating the Education Law]

[Text] In the name of the people:

The president of the republic:

The People's Assembly has decreed the law whose text follows, and we have promulgated it.

Article One: The provisions of the accompanying Education Law are to be put into operation.

Article Two: The minister of education is to issue the decrees that are necessary to implement this law, while taking into consideration the requirements of developing and modernizing education. Upon the approval of the Supreme Board of Education the minister of education may issue temporary orders as these are called for by the system of education, the syllabi, the curricula or the examination procedures. He may issue other orders that are necessary during the period of transition which he determines in a decree he issues.

Article Three: The following laws are hereby repealed:

--Law No 68 for 1968 Regarding Public Education.

--Law No 16 for 1969 Regarding Private Education.

--Law No 75 for 1970 Regarding Technical Education.

Every provision that violates the provisions of the accompanying law is hereby repealed.

Article Four: This law is to be published in AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH [The Official Gazette], and it is to be put into effect the day following its publication.

The seal of the state is to be affixed to this law and it is to be implemented as one of its laws.

Issued at the presidency on 9 Shawwal 1401 (9 August 1981).

Husni Mubarak

The Education Law

#### Chapter One: Objectives and General Provisions of Education

Article One: The purpose of pre-university education is to mold the emotional, national, intellectual, social, physical, ethical and athletic aspects of a student's cultural, scientific and national character progressively for the purpose of cultivating an Egyptian who believes in God, in his homeland and in the values of good, truth and humanity. The purpose of pre-university education is also to provide that student with an appropriate measure of values and theoretical and practical instruction and fundamentals that would establish his humanity, his dignity and his ability for self-actualization, for making an effective contribution to the operations and activities of production and services or for pursuing higher education for the purpose of developing society and realizing its prosperity and its progress.

Article Two: A Supreme Board of Pre-University Education is to be established and it is to be chaired by the minister of education. This board undertakes the planning activities for this education and devises the plans and programs for it. The board is to include representatives of the sectors of education, the universities, al-Azhar, culture, planning, finance, production, services, manpower and others who are interested in the affairs of education. On the basis of a proposal from the minister of education the president of the republic issues a decree forming this board and defining its areas of jurisdiction.

Upon the approval of the Supreme Board of Education the minister of education is to form categorical boards that grow out of that board and have jurisdiction over a stage or a category of pre-university education. Local boards of education and categorical committees that grow out of these local boards are also to be formed. These local boards and their categorical committees are formed by a decree issued by the authorized governor upon the approval of the minister of education.

Article Three: All citizens are entitled to free pre-university education in state schools. Students may not be asked to pay fees for the educational services that are offered to them.

Fees may be collected for additional services rendered to students, for their use of equipment and tools or for use of an educational [service] that precedes basic compulsory education. The minister of education issues a decree setting those fees and the conditions for them.

Article Four: The term of study in pre-university education is as follows:

Nine years for basic compulsory education.

Three years for secondary education (general and technical).

Five years for advanced technical education and for teachers' colleges.

Article Five: After the approval of the Supreme Board of Education the minister of education issues a decree determining the duration of the academic year, the number of weekly classes in every stage and class, the curriculum, the distribution of lessons to the classes, the determination of courses, the number of students established for each class, the rules of evaluation, examinations, maximum and minimum grades for examination subjects, and the examination dates for the public certificates.

After consulting with the governors and getting the approval of the Supreme Board of Education, the minister of education may add a few courses of study to the curriculum in accordance with the requirements of developing education or in accordance with the needs of local environments.

Article Six: Religious education is a basic subject in all the stages of education. A minimum grade of 50 percent is required to pass religion, but the grade earned in religion is not computed in computing the over-all average.

The Ministry of Education is to organize periodic competitions for those who memorize the Holy Koran, and it is to grant students who excel prizes and incentives in accordance with the rules set by the Supreme Board of Education.

Article Seven: A decree from the authorized governor sets the beginning and ending dates for school in the governorate and the dates for holidays which are required by local conditions. This is to be carried out without violating the provisions of Article Five of this law.

A governor may increase the maximum number of students per class in the various stages of the governorate's schools, if that becomes necessary, provided that the increase does not exceed 10 percent of the number set for the class.

The number of students per class in practical subjects, in drafting and in typing in technical education schools may not exceed 20 students.

Article Eight: After consulting with the authorized governor the minister of education may decide to establish kindergartens that would be affiliated with or attached to government schools. He is to determine their specifications with regard to location, building, capacity, facilities, equipment and sanitary specifications. He is also to determine the rules of instruction, curricula, syllabi, conditions for admission, the supervisory and educational staff and the fees that may be collected in return for enrollment in those institutions.

Article Nine: After the approval of the Supreme Board of Education the minister of education may decide to establish experimental schools and set the conditions and rules of admission in those schools as well as the rules of study and examination. These schools are to be utilized for putting new educational experiments into practice in preparation for their use in all schools.

The minister may also establish schools to educate and care for gifted students so as to develop and polish their talents. He may also establish special schools to teach and look after the handicapped in a manner that is commensurate with their abilities and their inclinations. The decree establishing such schools is to include the conditions for admission, the study plans, the examination systems and other matters.

Article Ten: The minister of education sets the conditions and criteria for admission in every stage of education, provided that admission in the basic stage of education be based on the age [of the student] on the 1st of October of an academic year. Admission in the secondary stage is based on weighing the applicants on the basis of the two factors of age and the over-all average of grades throughout the governorate.

Article Eleven: Taking into consideration the provisions of the Local Autonomy Law, the central agencies of pre-university education are to undertake the task of devising the general policies of education and the functions of planning, evaluation and general follow-up. The governorates are to undertake the [actual] process of implementing education and follow-up functions locally. They are also to establish, equip and manage the schools that come under their jurisdictions, in accordance with the requirements of the national plan of education and within the set limits of the budget.

A governorate may benefit from citizens' spontaneous efforts to implement the local education plan in accordance with an order issued by the authorized governor after the approval of the minister of education. This order may include the establishment of a local fund to finance spontaneous educational efforts.

Article Twelve: A parent-teacher council is to be formed in every school and in every governorate. Councils for students' associations may [also] be formed. The method of forming these councils and [an outline of] their jurisdictions are to be set in a decree issued by the minister of education.

Article Thirteen: After consulting with the Supreme Board of Education the minister of education is to issue a decree setting the qualifications standards for the faculty, the supervisors and the technical guidance counselors in the various stages of pre-university education.

The minister's decision also determines the methods of evaluating their work and the incentives that are to be granted to them as is appropriate to the nature of every stage of education.



Article Fourteen: Pursuant to the special provisions of this law, the minister of education, after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education, sets the conditions of medical suitability that are necessary for admission in the various stages of education; for the examination procedures in the various stages; the rules of passing; how many times a student can fail and repeat a course; incentives for students; student disciplinary procedures; conditions for canceling an examination or denying students examinations; and re-enrollment rules. This system is to include a mandatory fine of 10 pounds for re-enrolling a student who had been suspended.

## Chapter Two

### The Stage of Basic Education

Article Fifteen: Basic education is a right for all Egyptian children who reach the age of 6. The state is obliged to provide them with this education, and parents or guardians are to carry this out for a period of 9 academic years. Governors, each within his jurisdiction, are to issue the necessary decrees to regulate and implement mandatory education throughout the governorate as far as parents and guardians are concerned. Governors are also to issue the decrees that are necessary to distribute children to basic education schools in the governorate. In case of vacancies, a child who is 6 months younger than the required age for beginning mandatory education may be admitted to school provided that the set number of students per class is not disrupted.

Article Sixteen: The purpose of basic education is to develop students' capabilities and inclinations, to satisfy their preferences and to provide them with the necessary measure of values, conduct, knowledge and practical and professional skills that are congruent with the conditions of the various environments. Thus those who complete basic education can resume their education at a higher stage or go out into the work world after intense vocational training. The purpose of that is to cultivate the individual so he can become a productive citizen in his environment and in his society.

Article Seventeen: Instruction in basic education is to be organized so as to achieve the following objectives:

- Emphasize religious, national, ethical and athletic education during the various years of study.
- Emphasize the relationship between education and productive work.
- Strengthen the link with the environment on the basis of diversifying practical and professional fields in accordance with the conditions of local environments and the requirements for developing these environments.
- Integrate theoretical and practical aspects in curricula, syllabi and in courses.

--Tie education with the lives of young people and with the reality of the environment in which they live in a manner that would affirm the relationship between education and the practical aspects [of life], provided that the environment and the modes of social and economic activity in that environment are principal sources for knowledge, inquiry and activity in the various subjects of study.

Article Eighteen: A two-part examination is to be given throughout the governorate at the end of the stage of basic education. Students who pass that examination are to be awarded "A Certificate of Completing the Courses of Study in Basic Education." The minister of education, after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education, issues a decree [outlining] the procedure for this examination. Those who complete the mandatory period of basic education and do not take the examination or fail to pass it are granted confirmation from the Department of Education that they completed the mandatory period.

The minister of education, after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education, issues a decree [regulating] transfer examinations, their procedures, the rules of passing and the times one can fail or repeat an examination.

Article Nineteen: If a child does not report to school on schedule or if he misses school without an acceptable excuse for 10 consecutive or non-consecutive days, the principal of the school is to notify his parent or guardian in writing, as the case may be, and said notice is to be signed by the child's parent or guardian. If the child's parent or guardian is not available or if he refuses to accept the written notice, said notice is to be given to the mayor, the police station, police center or police precinct for delivery to the child's parent or guardian. If the child does not come to school within a week of his parent receiving the written notice or if he is absent from school again without an acceptable excuse, his parent or guardian will be considered in violation of the provisions of this law, and the penalties stipulated in Article 21 of this law will be enforced.

Article Twenty: The principals of basic education schools and persons from the supervisory and technical guidance staff in educational precincts who are appointed by the authorized governor have the capacity to act as court officers in enforcing the mandatory education order.

Article Twenty-One: A child's parent or guardian is subject to a fine of 10 pounds, if the child is absent from school or stops attending school without an acceptable excuse, within 1 week of receiving the written notice stipulated in Article Nineteen of this law.

The parent or guardian is subject to repeated fines or repeated violations if the child's absence from school continues or if the child is absent again without an acceptable excuse after his parent or guardian is notified.

## Chapter Three

### The Stage of Secondary Education

#### Section One: General Provisions

Article Twenty-Two: The purpose of the stage of secondary education is to prepare students for life and to prepare them as well for higher and university education or for participation in public life. At the same time secondary education stresses the consolidation of religious, ethical and national values.

Article Twenty-Three: The duration of study in the stage of secondary education is 3 academic years. A student who is admitted to the first year of secondary education must have a certificate that he completed his basic education, and he must not be over 18 years old by the 1st of October of the academic year. The minister of education issues the decrees that regulate the cases wherein the age [factor] may be overlooked.

Article Twenty-Four: A student may repeat a class once provided that he does not repeat a class more than twice during the entire stage. Anyone who is suspended from school because he has exhausted the number of failures allowed to him, may apply for the examination of the class he attained, according to the rules which are issued by decree of the minister of education. The student is to pay an examination fee of 5 pounds. If he passes the examination, he is re-registered in the following class after paying a re-registration fee of 10 pounds.

Article Twenty-Five: A student may be suspended from school if he is absent for more than 15 consecutive days or more than 30 non-consecutive days without a reason that the school's administrative committee can accept. Absence at any time during the school day is considered absence for a whole day.

A student who was suspended in accordance with the provision of the previous paragraph may register again after paying a re-registration fee of 10 pounds if the school's administrative committee makes such a decision. A student may not re-register more than once in the same academic year and more than twice in the entire stage.

A student must have at least an 85 percent attendance record in order to be admitted to the examination.

#### Section Two: General Secondary Education

Article Twenty-Six: The course of study in the first year of secondary education is general for all students. In the second and third years students choose their specialties in accordance with the divisions and branches that [are outlined] in a decree issued by the minister of education after consulting with the Supreme Board of Universities.

Article Twenty-Seven: The subjects of study, the syllabi, the courses and the examinations in general secondary education are regulated by decrees issued by the minister of education after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education. The subjects of study are to include basic subjects for all students and elective subjects the student chooses in accordance with his inclinations and capabilities.

Article Twenty-Eight: A one-time general examination is to be given at the end of the third year of general secondary education. Those who pass that examination are to be granted "a Certificate of Completion of General Secondary Education."

All those who complete the required courses in all the three years of secondary education in a government or a private school supervised by the state may apply for this examination.

Everyone who applies for this examination is to pay a fee of 2 pounds. Regulations for this examination, application conditions and maximum and minimum grades for the subjects are [outlined] in a decree issued by the minister of education after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education.

Article Twenty-Nine: A student may not apply for the examination for completing general secondary education more than three times. The minister of education, in accordance with rules he lays down in this regard, may allow a student to take the examination a fourth time provided that the student pay a fee of 50 pounds.

### Section Three: Technical Secondary Education

Article Thirty: The purpose of technical secondary education is to cultivate a class of technicians in industry, agriculture, commerce, administration and services and to develop the technical aptitudes of students.

Students are admitted to the various branches of technical secondary education after acquiring a certificate of completing the stage of basic education in accordance with the conditions and the rules set in a decree issued by the minister of education.

Article Thirty-One: The specifications of technical schools, their operating plans and their responsibilities are determined by decrees issued by the minister of education after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education. A farm is to be attached to each agricultural school, and the area of this farm is to be commensurate with the number of students and the kind of study and [number of] departments in that school.

Article Thirty-Two: Each technical school is to have a board of directors in which the concerned sectors of production and services are to be represented. This board assists the principal of the school or its director in managing the school. The authorized governor issues a decree outlining the makeup of this board and determining its jurisdictions.



Article Thirty-Three: The departments of study in the categories of technical secondary education are to be determined in accordance with the requirements of development plans and local conditions.

After the approval of the Supreme Board of Education the minister of education issues decrees [outlining] the subjects of study that are to be included in every group in every one of the categories of technical secondary education and its branches. [The decree also outlines] the method of distributing the subjects of study, the number of lessons allocated to the subjects in the various classes, the necessary courses and textbooks and the evaluation and examination procedures.

Article Thirty-Four: Secondary schools for technical education may undertake production projects that are related to their specialty. These projects are to be financed, managed and audited in accordance with rules set in a decree issued by the minister of education. Authorized local units and production sectors may take advantage of the capabilities of these schools in raising the professional standard of technicians, craftsmen and workers within the environs of the governorate.

Article Thirty-Five: Technical workers in the various sectors of production and services who are not enrolled in a school may apply for the examinations of technical secondary schools. The conditions for applying for said examination and the rules therefor [are to be set] in a decree issued by the minister of education, without violating the provision of Article Thirty of this law.

Article Thirty-Six: A general examination is to be given at the end of the third year of technical secondary education. The examination is to be given in two rounds, and those who pass it are to receive a technical secondary school diploma, according to the 3-year system, defining their area of specialization.

Anyone who has completed the required courses of study in the three years at a government school or at a private school supervised by the state may apply for this examination. Everyone who applies for this examination is to pay a fee of 2 pounds.

The minister of education, after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education, issues a decree regulating this examination, the conditions of applying for it and the maximum and minimum grades for the courses of study.

Students may not apply more than three times for the diploma examination. The minister of education, in accordance with rules he sets in this regard, may permit a student to take the examination a fourth time provided that the student in this case pay a fee of 50 pounds.

Article Thirty-Seven: Students taking transfer and general examinations are required to have a minimum attendance record of 75 percent of the over-all lessons that are assigned for vocational training, regardless of the reasons for the absences.

## Section Four

### Technical Education: the 5-Year System

Article Thirty-Eight: The purpose of technical schools is to prepare individuals for the categories of "chief technician" and "trainer" in the areas of industry, agriculture, trade, administration and services.

Students who have a certificate that they completed basic education in accordance with the conditions set in a decree issued by the minister of education are eligible for admission to these schools. The minister of education may set the rules for boarding students in some or all of these schools as well as the fees for room and board in those schools and the rules for exemption from those fees.

Article Thirty-Nine: The departments of technical education, the 5-year system, are set nationwide in accordance with the requirements of development plans. The minister of education, after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education, issues decrees defining these departments, the courses of study in each of them, the method of their distribution, the number of lessons designated for them as well as the courses, the necessary textbooks and the evaluation and examination procedures.

Article Forty: Each technical school is to have a board of directors in which the concerned sectors of production and services are to be represented. This board assists the principal or director of the school in managing the school. The minister of education issues a decree forming this board and defining its jurisdictions.

Article Forty-One: Technical schools may undertake production projects that are related to their area of specialization. These projects are financed, managed and audited in accordance with rules set in a decree issued by the minister of education. Authorized local units and production sectors may also take advantage of the capabilities of these schools to raise the professional standards of technicians, craftsmen and workers within the environs of the governorate.

Article Forty-Two: Two rounds of a general examination are given at the end of the fifth year. Students who pass that examination receive an advanced technical studies diploma, the 5-year system, defining the student's area of specialization.

Anyone who completes the required courses of study in the 5 years at a government school or at a private school supervised by the state may apply for the examination. Everyone who applies for this examination is to pay a fee of 2 pounds. The minister of education, after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education, issues a decree regulating this examination, the application conditions for that examination, and the maximum and minimum grades for the courses of study.

Students may not apply for the diploma examination more than three times.

The minister of education, in accordance with rules he sets in this regard, may allow a student to take this examination a fourth time provided that the student pay a fee of 50 pounds.

Article Forty-Three: Graduates in the "technician" category and those who have a certificate that they completed general secondary education may complete their education to the level of "chief technician" in accordance with conditions and regulations set in a decree issued by the minister of education.

Article Forty-Four: The provision of Article Twenty-Five of this law regarding absence from school and the provision of Article Thirty-Seven regarding percentage of attendance are to be applied in the case of technical schools, the 5-year system.

Article Forty-Five: A student may repeat a year of study once but not more than three times during the entire period of this stage of education. Anyone who is suspended from school because he has exhausted the times he is allowed to fail an examination may apply once for the examination of the class he had attained, without being enrolled in the school, provided that he pay an examination fee of 5 pounds. If he passes the examination he is registered again in the following class after paying a re-registration fee of 10 pounds.

Article Forty-Six: The faculty and the administrative staff in technical schools, the 5-year system must meet a high standard of qualification and competence in accordance with the rules and conditions set in a decree issued by the minister of education. This decree may include provisions for granting incentives to the school's administrative staff and faculty.

## Chapter Five

### Teachers' Colleges

Article Forty-Seven: Until an adequate number of highly qualified teachers is available to the Ministry of Education to teach in the basic education stage, teachers' colleges are to prepare teachers to teach in the first years of basic education and to provide them with the scientific and professional knowledge as well as the necessary expertise and skills. At the same time these colleges are to be considered centers for educational studies and experimentation in the field of basic education. Such studies and experiments are to be carried out with the cooperation of the colleges of education in the governorate. Teachers' colleges are also one of the ways that lead students to the colleges of education. Graduates of these schools may enroll in the colleges of education in accordance with the rules that are set by the Universities' Law and its executive ordinance.

Article Forty-Eight: The duration of study in these schools is 5 academic years. Those who have a certificate that they completed basic education may be admitted to these schools in accordance with the conditions set in a decree issued by the minister of education, who may set the rules for

boarding students in some or in all of these schools as well as the rules for exemption from room and board fees.

Article Forty-Nine: Specialized branches may be established in these schools to prepare specific kinds of teachers. The minister of education, after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education issues a decree regulating the plans and the courses of study, the rules for transfer examinations, the teachers' diploma examination and the maximum and minimum grades for subjects.

A two-round general examination is given at the end of the fifth year. Those who pass the examination receive a teachers' diploma defining their area of specialization.

Article Fifty: A school for the first classes in basic education is to be attached to each teachers' college. That school is to provide practical training for the students at the college.

Article Fifty-One: The faculty in teachers' colleges must be highly qualified in accordance with the rules and conditions set in a decree issued by the minister of education. That decree may include provisions for granting incentives to the faculty.

Article Fifty-Two: A board is to be formed in each governorate to oversee teachers' colleges, to plan an admissions policy, to set the numbers of students that will be admitted and to determine the means by which these colleges can be tied organically to the colleges of education in the governorate. The authorized governor, after the approval of the minister of education, issues a decree forming this board and determining its jurisdiction and its powers.

Article Fifty-Three: The minister of education may decide to set up studies in teachers' colleges to complete the scientific and educational training of teachers and principals of the first grades of basic education or for other purposes of preparation and training in the field of instruction at this stage.

## Chapter Six

### Private Education with Fees

Article Fifty-Four: Every non-government establishment that is founded principally or secondarily for the purposes of providing pre-university education or vocational and technical preparation is considered a private school. [The following] are not considered private schools:

1. Kindergartens that are under the supervision of the Ministry of Social Affairs.
2. Schools that are established by foreign agencies where education is restricted to non-Egyptians who are the children of those employed in the foreign diplomatic and consular corps and of other foreigners.



3. Cultural centers or institutes that are established by a foreign country or an international agency on the basis of a bilateral cultural agreement with the Arab Republic of Egypt that stipulates special treatment for these centers or institutes.

Article Fifty-Five: Private schools are established to achieve some or all of the following objectives:

--To assist in the area of basic or secondary education (general or technical) in accordance with the plans and courses that are set in comparable government schools.

--To expand in the instruction of foreign languages in addition to the established official courses.

--To offer special courses of instruction in accordance with what is determined by the minister of education after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education.

Article Fifty-Six: Private schools are subject to supervision by the Ministry of Education and the departments of education in the governorates. They are also subject to the employment and insurance laws about which there are no special stipulations in this law.

Article Fifty-Seven: A private school may not be established or expanded nor may supplementary lessons be set up in it unless a permit to do so is first obtained from the authorized department of education. As far as general secondary education schools are concerned, permits to establish or expand those are issued by the minister of education in the context of the national education policy.

The location, building, facilities and furnishings of the school are to be suitable to the requirements of its educational mission in accordance with the conditions and specifications set in a decree issued by the minister of education.

Article Fifty-Eight: The owner of a private school must meet the following conditions:

--He must be a legal person and a citizen of the Arab Republic of Egypt.

--He must be able to meet the financial obligations of the school and the other conditions that are set in a decree issued by the minister of education.

Schools that are in existence at the time this law is enacted and that are not owned by legal persons are considered authorized to operate [as private schools] for the duration of their owners' lives.

Article Fifty-Nine: An application to establish a private school is to be filed on the special form prepared for that purpose by the departments

of education. The application is to be filed with the department of education in the authorized governorate at least 4 months before school is to begin. The department of education is to look into the application in the light of general educational plans and the needs of the governorate. The department is then to notify the applicant within 30 days of the date the application was filed that his application has been accepted or rejected in principle and the reasons therefor. An application is considered accepted in principle if this period goes by without a reply from the department.

Article Sixty: Taking into consideration the provisions of Article Fifty-Seven of this law, private schools are not to begin their operations before the authorized department of education notifies the applicant that his application has received final approval. After his application is approved in principle, the applicant has to provide the department of education within 15 days of such notice with detailed information about the school that he wishes to establish so that the department can form a technical committee to make the necessary on-site examination. The authorized department of education has to notify the applicant about the suitability of the location, the building, the facilities, the furnishings, the employees' data and other conditions and specifications. Such notice is to be provided within a maximum period of 2 months of the date the applicant provided the department with the detailed data or of the date he completed the shortcomings [of the school] in preparation for another on-site examination within an agreed upon period.

Article Sixty-One: After a school is licensed, none of the following actions may be undertaken except after an approval for such action is secured from the agency that issued the license.

--Changing the data on whose bases the license was issued.

--Changing the rules of the school or its curricula or following other rules in admitting students or in setting due fees.

--Changing the organization of the school from one stage to another or adding new stages to the school.

--Suspending operations at the school or refusing to perform the school's mission.

--Changing the location or transferring ownership of the school.

If violation of any of these obligations by the school is established, the authorized department of education may decide to place the school under financial and administrative supervision. In this case the department of education manages the school until the violation is made to cease.

Article Sixty-Two: Considering the provisions of the education, employment and insurance laws, each school is to draw up its operating bylaws and to determine the tuition fees that are collected from students in each stage separately. The authorized governor issues a decree approving these

bylaws, without violating the provision of Article Sixty-Four of this law.

Article Sixty-Three: Each school is to have its own budget that is to include revenues and expenditures. A school's revenues are to be deposited in a special account in one of the banks or post offices in accordance with the rules and regulations set in a decree issued by the minister of education after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education.

Article Sixty-Four: Students' tuition fees, school activity fees, cost of textbooks, school bus service and room and board fees are set in a decree issued by the authorized governor in the light of the school's proposed budget and the general rules which are set in a decree issued by the minister of education.

A governor may re-evaluate the tuition fees that students have to pay and that were approved at the time this law was issued in light of the general rules that are set by the minister in this regard.

Article Sixty-Five: The procedure for instruction and examinations in private schools is to be identical to that which is in effect in comparable government schools.

Article Sixty-Six: The authorized departments of education are to oversee all aspects of private schools, just as they oversee government's schools. They are also to oversee admissions and transfer examinations in those schools, approve their results, audit their books and investigate their administration.

Article Sixty-Seven: Each private school is to have a qualified full-time principal and qualified full-time faculty according to the quota determined for comparable government schools. When necessary the authorized department of education may authorize the private school to hire part-time teachers provided that the number of lessons [they teach] in this case not exceed 25 percent of the total number of lessons for a single subject matter or a single class. The minister of education, after consulting with the minister of manpower, is to issue a decree regulating the work relationship between private school employees and the owner of the school.

Article Sixty-Eight: Private schools may hire government school teachers on a loan basis. Conditions and duration of the loan are determined by a decree issued by the minister of education.

Article Sixty-Nine: Free (subsidized) private schools, which were established in accordance with previous laws, are to continue their mission. The necessary capabilities are to be provided for these schools in accordance with the standards set in a decree issued by the minister of education after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education.

EGYPT

BRIEFS

ELECTRICITY MINISTER TO BONN--Cairo, 25 Oct (MENA)—Engineer Mahir Abazah, minister of electricity and energy, left here before noon today for Bonn with a joint delegation from his ministry and the Foreign Ministry on a six-day visit to the Federal Republic of Germany. The delegation will be signing in Bonn an agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear power in generating electricity between Egypt and the FRG. The Egyptian minister is to head to London after his Bonn visit on November First for a three-day visit during which he will sign a similar agreement for nuclear cooperation between Egypt and the UK. [Text] [NC251022 Cairo MENA in English 1005 GMT 25 Oct 81]

CSO: 4500/27

INTERNAL FOES OF KHOMEYNI DEEMED STRONGER THAN BELIEVED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 231, 5-11 Oct 81 pp 26-27

[Article by Antoine Matta: "The Alternative to Khomeyni: the Army or Tudeh? The Parties to the International Struggle Inside the Country Are Stronger Than the Opposition Abroad"]

[Text] Is the Iranian opposition abroad actually capable of overthrowing the regime of Imam Khomeyni? Does it have the local opportunitites and international conditions to seize power?

Opposition circles themselves think that the statements made by opposition leaders abroad and the public acclaim with which they are surrounded do not change the fact that they have no practical, military and political presence on the Iranian scene to enable them to emphasize that they have the power to secure their control over government. According to these circles the operation of last 28 June was not the work of the opposition abroad. This was the operation to which the offices of the Islamic Republic party were subjected; it led to the death of 74 persons, chief among which was party leader Ayatollah Beheshti. The operation of 31 August also was not the work of the opposition abroad; it led to the death of the president, Mohammad Rajai and his prime minister Mohammad Javad Bahonar.

These circles add that the first operation [was carried out] to settle accounts; they say it was a struggle between the factions of the Islamic Republic party, and specifically between the faction of Ayatollah Beheshti and the faction that opposes him and all his renown among Americans, Soviets and Arabs. This faction insinuated that Beheshti was close to the Americans who lost in him, according to an article in THE LOS ANGELES TIMES by William Sulivan, former U.S. ambassador to Tehran, one of their most important supporters in Iran after the Shah's departure.

The second operation, however--and this is still according to these circles--was not carried out by the Majahedin-e Khalq which is led by Mr Mas'ud Rajavi. It was rather carried out by a military group in the Iranian army that began to take action and to make preparations for overthrowing the regime.

No Hope for the Opposition

On the eve of electing a new president for Iran the same circles think there is no hope for any of the opposition leaders to come to power, beginning with former president Abol Hasan Bani Sadr, to Mas'ud Rajavi, Shahpur Bakhtiar, Reza Shah and all the other figures of less renown.



The struggle that is going on at present in Iran is a struggle between the army and the communist Tudeh party.

Shahpur Bakhtiar closed his military office in Paris, and he is coordinating efforts with Empress Farah Diba. When the military coup he had engineered in July 1980 failed about 1 month before the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war, Bakhtiar found himself outside the game of seizing power. As a result of that aborted coup 400 officers were executed; chief among them were Gen Mahdayun and Gen Muhaqqaqi, the leaders of the coup.

Although Reza Shah travels between Cairo, Morocco and Switzerland for recreational purposes without being engaged in any practical activity to speak of, the Free Iran Movement which is led by Princess Azadeh, the daughter of Princess Ashraf, the late Shah's sister, is the more active royalist movement. This movement was responsible for hijacking of the vessel, Tabarzine, across the coast of Spain. This action was coordinated with the Azadegan Movement—the Knights of Freedom—which is led by 80-year-old Gen Aryana whose command post is located in Ankara. The general had met recently with President Anwar al-Sadat. His influence in the army and within the ranks of the Kurds is widespread. However, the activities of these two movements inside Iran are extremely limited.

With regard to the Majahedin-e Khalq [organization] these circles are saying that Mas'ud Rajavi had 6,000 soldiers before Bani Sadr was deposed last 22 June. So far he has lost more than 3,000 men.

The leadership of Majahedin-e Khalq inside the country is controlled by a young 32-year-old attorney called Musa Khiabani. He is the grandson of Shaykh Mohamed Khiabani of Tabriz. This organization is the most militarily active organization inside Iran.

In addition to these movements there are small military organizations, the most important of which are the organization of Iran's Liberation Army, which is headed by Mo'in Zadeh a young general from Tabriz, and the powerful Naqab organization in Baluchistan. The activities of former navy commander, Admiral Ahmad Madani who is stationed in Germany, and those of Mr Hasan Nazih, former director of the Iranian Oil Company are also worth noting.

Opposition circles are also saying that despite efforts that are being made by former Iranian prime minister, Ali Amini and former minister Hushang Nahavandi to reconcile these various opposition movements there is no cooperation or even coordination between them. In fact movements that either support royalty or the republic do not want to cooperate in any way with former president Bani Sadr. They consider him one of the chief elements of the present regime even though he finds himself today in the ranks of the opposition as a result of the fact that he became a victim of the internal struggle over influence between the various factions inside the regime.

These circles add that the next presidential elections will take place under sensitive international conditions that will place the Iranian question outside Iranian hands. Today Khomeyni is isolated locally and internationally more than he has ever been in the past. In fact, he is forced to cooperate more with the Soviet Union and the communist Tudeh party. The evidence for this lies in the fact

that he chose Ayatollah Ali Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Republic party to be the next president. According to these circles, it is known that Khomeini is very close to the Soviets. His selection accordingly means increased rapprochement with the Soviet [leaning] left inside the country and with Moscow abroad. Hence the West, and that includes the United States, finds it has no choice other than the army as an alternative to Khomeini.

In case the army comes to power, these circles expect the country's leadership to be in the hands of young officers who are unknown abroad but who have broad influence in the ranks of the military, especially in the land forces and the police. These officers will also get the support of moderate clergymen like Ayatollah Shariatmadari, who is under house arrest in Qom. Ayatollah Shariatmadari is capable of mobilizing half the people of Iran and the entire province of Azerbaijan because he is the more popular leader, the one who is more respected in Iran.

These circles finally affirm that a Soviet blow in Iran today is more likely, since local conditions now are conducive to it; since Moscow has begun facing greater embarrassment in Afghanistan, Poland and Angola; and since a Soviet inspired attempt to overthrow President al-Sadat failed, according to President al-Sadat himself. The question of Iran is no longer the question of the opposition abroad; it has become an international struggle whose parties are inside the country. It will not be long before the consequences of that struggle take shape.

8592

CSO: 4604/5

## U. S. SAID TO PURSUE CLOSER TIES

London 8 DAYS in English No 42, 24 Oct 81 pp 26, 27

[Article by Russell Warren Howe]

[Text] WITH EGYPT NOW seen as more able to emerge from isolation in the Arab world, and with 'Camp David' due to grind to a halt in six months — when the last of occupied Egypt is scheduled to be returned — State Department policymakers are recommending that Washington respond more positively to signals from Baghdad for a closer US-Iraq understanding.

Basically, Iraq wants 'elbow room' with its superpower arms supplier, the Soviet Union. Jordan, and especially Saudi Arabia, have been urging Washington to take advantage of the opportunity to improve relations with the area's second largest oil producer, which is also the second largest Arab military power after Egypt.

Recommendations along these lines by the US chargé d'affaires in Baghdad, Bill Lagleton, have been stymied so far by the hopes of some Reagan administration policymakers — including Secretary Haig — for a counter-revolution in Iran that would propel that American-armed country back into the 'western camp'.

Even those who counsel full diplomatic relations with Baghdad acknowledge that America's vacillating position on Palestine, and Iraq's military spare-parts dependency on Moscow, will continue to inhibit Washington-Baghdad ties. But State Department specialists see President Saddam Hussein as ready to follow Saudi Arabia in accepting Israel's existence, in return for Israeli withdrawal from its 1967 conquests.

Haig is studying a report recommending

enhanced relations with Baghdad. Its main points are:

- Iraq has been stereotyped and misunderstood in the US, largely due to Israeli lobby efforts. But it is a stable country with a well-managed, flourishing economy. Its people's average earnings have quadrupled in 15 years, while prices have only doubled. Baghdad is cautious in diplomacy and strategically positioned, having borders with Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Syria and Jordan. War with Iran has united most of the population behind Hussein, although the regime is Sunni and faces Iranian-encouraged opposition from Shia — which groups over half the population.

- Iraq's claim to Kuwait, which dates from Ottoman times when it was part of Mesopotamia, could be eliminated if Iraq were brought into the 'Gulf fold'.

- Self-confident and economically self-sufficient, Iraq has been drawing away from Moscow for some time. It now buys only about 60 per cent of its weapons from the Soviet Union, and France — which has sold Baghdad over \$3bn worth of arms in the past three years — seems set soon to become its main supplier of state-of-the-art weaponry.

Hussein is angry with Moscow for not giving him the extra supplies necessary to defeat Iran, and opposes the Kremlin for its intervention in Afghanistan and its support of Ethiopia against Somalia. Iraq was influential in discouraging North Yemen from accepting large-scale Soviet military assistance, making up the difference from its own armoury.

● Iraq will be spending \$22.5bn on development this year. Its reserves are up, and it is the 'most lucrative market in the Middle East' and an obvious one for US goods and technology. US exports to Iraq are up 70 per cent this year to \$725m. Purchases from the European Community will be over \$3bn, and from Japan nearly \$2bn, while purchases from the entire Eastern Bloc will only amount to about \$700m.

Despite war damage, oil production should be back at 3m b/d within six months of the end of the war with Iran.

The war is stalemated, but a negotiated peace is possible. Iraq is ready to return most occupied territory and submit to international arbitration for the rest, confident that it will be allowed to keep the islands seized by the late Shah and recaptured early in the war. Iraq also wants Iran to grant greater local autonomy to Arabic-speaking, oil-producing Khuzestan. It is not in the US interest for Iran's success in stalemating the war to contribute to a humiliation of Hussein, since a weakened Iraq might present a continued temptation, with its oilfields, to adventurist regimes in Tehran.

The report stresses that Iraq's leaders, like those of Egypt and the US, oppose religious fundamentalism on the Iranian pattern. President Hussein's second-in-command, Tariq Aziz, is a Christian. Iraq is also a 'moderate' on oil pricing, is on frigid terms with Syria, and represses its Communist Party. It can probably not be denied a nuclear-weapons capability in the long term, and US influence against Iraqi use of 'nukes' to solve regional issues would be greater if relations were friendly.

Although Baghdad would not replace Riyadh as America's key friend in the Gulf, Iraq is a much more important nation than Saudi Arabia, the report points out, and a natural 'leader' in the area. Smaller Gulf states, Kuwait excepted, look to Iraq rather than to under-armed Saudi Arabia for protection against Iran. Iraq is the leader of the present Iraqi-Jordanian-Saudi triumvirate. With Hussein due to host next year's non-aligned conference, and to assume its chairmanship for three years, his influence, and his country's, can only grow, claims the report.

What effect will the report have? Under Nixon and Kissinger, the US often took bold foreign-policy initiatives, notably the

opening to China. Carter began boldly — notably in his October 1977 decision to revive the Geneva conference on Middle East peace, in tandem with Moscow. But Brzezinski was less innovative than Kissinger, and more imprisoned in his anti-Soviet rhetoric. Partly for this reason, Carter's objectives lost momentum.

Now, America has an ageing, inactive president — and a secretary of state whose every innovation draws intra-cabinet opposition. So the report is likely to be implemented gingerly, if at all, unless Iraq makes some overt move of its own.

Another problem is that Washington still hopes for a reversal of the situation in Iran, probably through a military coup, or possibly through a return of 'Shah' Cyrus Ali Reza, now in Cairo, as a constitutional monarch. Lobbying for such a development to be taken seriously is conducted by the Shah's twin sister, Princess Ashraf, who lives part of the year in the US, and by her militant daughter Princess Azadeh and General Bharam Aryana, both in Paris. Aryana's group recently hit the front pages by seizing an Iranian missile boat in the Mediterranean. The US appears to have given up hope of a government led by former Premier Shahpour Bakhtiar.

Washington fears that an Iraqi humiliation of Iran may lead to a takeover of power by the leftwing Mujaheddin leader Masoud Rajavi, possibly in a brief and opportunistic alliance with ex-president Abol Hassan Bani Sadr. Washington also fears that an Iraqi victory might lead to the partition of the old Persian empire, with Moscow helping various irredentist regimes.

MIDEASTERN JEWS SEE DISCRIMINATION, SOCIOECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT Weekend Supplement 17, 24, 31 Jul, 7 Aug 81

[Article by Eli Tavor: "Revolt of the Orientals"]

[17 July 81 pp 1, 2, 30]

[Text] A central myth of the state of Israel was shattered in the elections for the tenth Knesset. It is the myth of the integration of the exiles.

The most significant phenomenon of the elections held on 30 June was what is called "ethnic polarization." It means the division of the electorate, principally between the two largest parties, not on the grounds of ideology, and not even on the grounds of interests, but on the basis of ethnic origin.

In these elections there came to a head the process which began in earlier elections, and which became quite apparent in the elections of May 1977, the elections for the ninth Knesset. In these elections the decisive majority of those who voted for the Likud were of the oriental community. Most of the voters for the Alignment were of the Ashkenazic community.

The distribution of voters according to their ethnic background was a slap in the face to those who claimed that ethnic political voting was a passing phase. This time it became apparent beyond doubt that quite the opposite was true. Ethnic voting is an increasingly serious phenomenon, and is becoming more extreme.

This is a warning for Israeli society. Not because the members of one ethnic group vote in particular for a certain party, while the members of another vote for its rival, and not because political confrontation has become ethnic. Rather, red lights should go on and alarms should sound because what is revealed in the political hostility is testimony to the fact that Israeli society is suffering from a chronic disease, which is developing at an accelerated pace.

If the ethnic polarization found expression only on the political horizon, it would not be so bad, but what has happened is in fact that the electoral system has opened a flood gate, in which polarization had been seething.

The outpouring did not reduce the boiling. The seething continues to go on beneath the surface and threatens to erupt in a destructive manner. The polarization should have been a warning of this. It left the writing on the wall and the writing proclaimed: What in Israel is characterized as the "ethnic problem," the "ethnic gap"



or "polarization" is not flickering out, but on the contrary is boiling at higher temperatures than ever. What once was perceived as the problem of marginal groups or of poor neighborhoods is now spreading all over the fabric of Israeli society.

In other words, in contrast to the accepted assumption of conservative sociologists in Israel and the political establishment, that the ethnic problem is temporary and passing, which will be healed in the passage of time, the elections for the tenth Knesset indicate a totally different trend.

In the course of 30 years, the political, social, and economic establishment of Israel has tried to minimize the seriousness of the problem. It knew of its existence. It sought solutions, especially when the problem took radical expression in the form of demonstrations, strikes, and riots. But it took comfort in the belief that the problem was one of the "generation of the wilderness," an interim stage, which would be ended with a complete and total integration of the exiles.

This illusion, which is also held by the present establishment along the whole spectrum from the Likud to the Alignment, was the bubble which was burst in the last elections for the tenth Knesset.

The integration of the exiles has become hostility among the exiles, and it threatens to become, if there is no solution, a war between the exiles.

How did the utopia of the integration of the exiles evaporate?

In his book "Ethnic Relations in Israel" the sociologist Yohanan Peres of the University of Tel Aviv determines: "The series of findings (of research on the ethnic gap in Israel) are most serious, from the point of view of integration of ethnic groups.; it points to a stability in the gap. Israelis generally are informed about inter-ethnic inequalities. But the decisive majority of them believe that the phenomenon is transient, and affects only the transitional generation, and that efforts invested in education, health, welfare, and housing are gradually reducing its scope. The challenge hidden in this data is not that the problem has not yet been solved, but rather that in certain areas in the progress is so slow that the vision of ethnic equality has ceased to be a real goal but is rather an eschatological vision.

"The stubbornness of this gap has far reaching ramifications for ethnic relations in Israel. It appears that the tolerance of oriental ethnic group members for ethnic inequality is tending to decline, and their responses in the level of individual and political conduct is becoming sharpened. There are several causes of this process: The rising seniority of oriental ethnic groups, and the increase within them of children born and educated in Israel, reduces the difference between them and the Ashkenazim. The similarity in culture and way of life, and especially the common service in the IDF, constitute a basis for the demand for equality in the distribution of resources.... The strength of the ethnic gap, its appearance in so many spheres, its constancy, and the sharpening reaction to it will continue to occupy a more central place in ethnic relations in Israel."

Yohanan Peres adds in the summary of his research: "The coming together of ideas and values among various ethnic groups has both prospects and dangers. As people become more similar to one another, the demand for equality will be heightened. Success in integration in the spheres of culture and education in particular makes the ethnic gap intolerable.... In the coming years, years of gradual implementation

of the change from a generation of immigrants to a generation of native born Israelis, a choice will be made between complete and total integration and an increasingly intense struggle."

The thesis of Yohanan Peres and other sociologists who deal in research on ethnic relations in Israel is that ethnic alienation is several times stronger among the children of those born in Asian and African countries than among their parents who came to Israel from those countries, particularly because they come into contact with the children of those who come from Europe and America, and study together with them, spend time with them, and serve together with them in the IDF. By virtue of the strategy of integration of exiles, they are more aware than their parents of inequality in all spheres of life in Israel among orientals and Ashkenazim.

Another school of Israeli sociology maintains that the alienation and racialization in inter-ethnic relations in Israel stem in particular from the fact that the ethnic struggle in Israel has become a class struggle.

Heading this school which developed in the Faculty of Sociology at the University of Haifa, is Dr. Shlomo Savirski. A few months before the elections, Dr. Savirski published a profound and original sociological analysis of oriental and Ashkenazic relations in Israel. His book "Not Failures But Foiled" is the most up-to-date and stunning research of the ethnic problem in Israel, in which the accusing finger is pointed at the true roots of the problem.

Dr. Savirski's research, which was published by Makberot Le-Mekhqar u-Viqoret, is required reading for anyone who studies and is interested in the central problem of Israeli society. In his work, he states:

"In Israel there is a class based division of labor, as in every society having a capitalist means of production, but it is a peculiar class structure, stemming from the peculiar character of Israeli economic development.

"The Israeli bourgeoisie is essentially Ashkenazic, while the Jewish proletariat in Israel is essentially Oriental. The bourgeoisie is essentially Ashkenazic because the Ashkenazim were the founders of the political Zionist movement; because in the pre-state period it was the Ashkenazim who created the economic, organizational, and political foundation, which they control; because the Ashkenazim directed and regulated the flow of immigration and integrated the immigrants in an accelerated development effort; because this development formed the basis and expanded their dominant position in Israeli society.

"The Jewish proletariat in Israel is Oriental because the Orientals, most of whom emigrated from their countries under conditions of emergency, abandoned their economic foundation in the country of their origin; because the foundation, since they had come within the framework of a national movement of which some of its members had already established a general basis for the whole nation; because the Orientals supplied this economic basis with that thing which it needed most in its development effort--cheap manpower subject to monopolization; because the processes of production in a capitalist system in Israel work in such a manner that the principal alternative facing the second and third generation of Orientals is to be workers on low level bureaucrats, while the administrative and controlling positions are open to the second and third generation of Ashkenazim.

"The Israeli bourgeois is an Ashkenazi because he is for the most part a son of parents who were not bourgeois, and his "goal" or their "goal" as bourgeois became apparent only in the encounter with Oriental workers; he is an Ashkenazi because most of the processes and symbols of bourgeois control--in economic, political, educational, and communications activities--are known to him from birth, from his home, from his family, from his neighborhood; he is an Ashkenazi because he is accustomed to find--and already expects to find--Ashkenazim in positions parallel to his own, and Orientals in positions lower than his own; he is an Ashkenazi because he sees it as his mission to transmit the values of an achievement of oriented-competitive ethic of the West which his parents encountered a generation or so ago, and which he acquired on his own advancement track, to the Orientals--in the army, in schools, and at work, and he views the nonsuccess of Orientals in acquiring that ethic as a justification for their low position, and for his higher position.

"The Israeli Jewish worker is for the most part Oriental because he is the son of parents who for the most part were not workers if they had remained there or had gone to other countries--and therefore he links the fact that he is a worker to the fact that he is an Oriental in Israel.

"He is an Oriental because everywhere he turns, his social conditions is presented as the product of characteristics peculiar to Orientals--a large number of children, low education level, origins in an undeveloped country, and the like. He is an Oriental because he is accustomed to find, and already expects to find, Orientals at levels parallel to his, and Ashkenazim at levels above him; he is an Oriental because in his contacts with the ruling apparatus, he feels a sense of alienation, because he does not find in it any of the symbols known to him from his home and environment; he is an Oriental because when he does reach positions of seniority, the attitude towards him is not only towards his personality and deeds, but also to him as a representative of his ethnic group.

"The specific development process of Israeli economy and society did not create a general class division, but an ethnic division of labor; therefore, the class struggle is not just a struggle of "workers" in general, but a struggle of Orientals."

The conclusion of Dr. Savirski--that in Israel there has developed a division of labor which is ethnic, in which Orientals fulfill the role of manpower while the Ashkenazim hold the positions of control and administration in all branches of the economy--is based on the analysis of employment distribution in Israel.

This distribution points to the fact that the ethnic division of labor is increasing and becoming more serious. With the passage of years it appears that the rate of advancement among Ashkenazim from the lowest rungs of the employment ladder to its higher rungs is much greater than the rate of advancement among Orientals.

In 1972, 375,000 of all those employed in the economy were natives of Europe and America; 25.8 percent of them were scientific and academic workers, as well as professionals and administrators--the highest rung on the employment ladder; 39.1 percent of those born in Europe and America were on the second rung, that of office, commercial, and service workers; 5.2 percent worked on the third rung--agriculture, and 29.9 percent were industrial trade workers in transport, construction, and unskilled areas--the lowest rung.

In that same year, 316,000 of those employed in the economy were natives of Asia and Africa. Only 9.7 percent of them were on the academic and administrative rung of the ladder; 38.9 percent were commercial and service workers; 7.8 percent worked in agriculture, and 44.9 percent were on the lowest rung of the employment ladder.

With the passage of 5 years, in 1977, there were already 30.9 percent of those born in Europe and America at the highest rung, while the rate of those born in Asia and Africa had risen from 9.7 percent to only 12.9 percent. At the lowest rung, there were employed among those from Europe and America 26.8 percent as compared to 40.9 percent of those coming from Asia and Africa.

This gap in rung of employment is much wider among native Israelis as between those from European-American parents and those from Asian-African parents.

In 1972, 38.7 percent of Ashkenazim born in Israel were at the highest rung, as compared to 9.3 percent of Orientals born in Israel. In 1977, 45.6 percent of native Israeli Ashkenazim were at the highest rung, as compared to 14.6 percent of native Israeli Orientals.

At the lowest rung of the employment ladder, that of industrial and construction workers and unskilled laborers, there were in 1977 only 6.9 percent of all employed Israeli born Ashkenazim, as compared to 37.5 percent of Israeli born orientals.

Dr. Savirski says: "Most of the studies of employment distribution in Israel tend to attribute employment differences (gaps) between Orientals and Ashkenazim to seniority in Israel or to education. The conclusion sought is obvious: If these two variables explain the gap, then the gaps are not linked to structural ethnic differences. Moreover, as seniority in Israel grows, along with possibilities for education, the employment gaps will be reduced.

"It appears to us that work differences are of such a proportion that neither changes in education for the foreseeable future nor seniority in Israel can make significant changes. The race for employment does not change from year to year, and participants who lack resources do not have any prospect of improving their abilities from year to year.

"The data which we have collected shows that to a great extent the Orientals have taken "greater control" of the lower rungs of the employment ladder, while the Ashkenazim control the higher rungs. Changes in educational level in the foreseeable future or during the stay in Israel can bring about only marginal changes in the structure of employment.

"In order to understand why changes in level of education or duration of stay in Israel will bring about only marginal changes in the structure of employment, two additional factors should be noted: First, control positions, ownership and administration, are for the most part in the hands of Ashkenazim. It is unreasonable to assume that this class will surrender its positions willingly. Secondly, government work patterns which are generally acknowledged to be decisive in the Israeli economy, tend to strengthen the position of the currently preferred classes."

Savirski believes that the gaps in Israeli society are first and foremost the result of the ethnic distribution of labor within it.



The accepted sociological school in Israel, that of the sociologist S. N. Eisenstadt and his students at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, views the solution of the "ethnic problem" in Israel to be "integration through modernization." It assumes that the ethnic gap in Israel stems from gaps in the level of modernization of the two groups--Oriental and Ashkenazic.

Yet Savirski and followers of the other sociological school reject this assumption. In an article published by Dr. Savirski and the sociologist Sarah Katsir in the periodical of the unit for Bridging Gaps at the University of Haifa, it was argued: "The structure of relations between the two ethnic groups is not passing and temporary. The distribution of labor in time strikes roots.... The approach of 'gaps' would argue that the situation is as it was according to the initial data indicating an inferior position for Orientals when they arrived in Israel; when the data improves, then they will be able to rise above their present position and spread out through the whole employment structure."

Opposite the school of "integration through modernization" is the school of "dependence" which argues: "Today, the structure of relations between the two ethnic groups is a structure of dependence; the senior positions in the employment structure, control of capital, control of political institutions, the ability to make decisions which will direct the development of Israeli society as a whole--all of these are essentially in the hands of the Ashkenazim.

"The Orientals, for the most part, are lacking in capital, supply labor at the lowest rungs of the employment ladder, and have relatively little representation in the corridors of political power. It may be said that the central aspects of the lives of most Orientals--scope of employment, quality of employment standard of living, and in a more general way the prospects and directions of their development, depend upon decisions made by organizations and institutions in which the senior positions are held by the Ashkenazim. Their development is a dependent development. It depends upon the development plans of the general society--a society cloaked in the values, aspirations, and patterns of conduct of the Ashkenazim."

"In light of what is said above," say Savirski and Katsir, "we are inclined to doubt the central assumptions of the school of 'integration through modernization' with respect to ethnicity and its future in Israel. As far as that school is concerned, ethnicity is a heritage of the past, which with increasing modernization will gradually disappear.

"The assumption is that ethnicity is a temporary and passing phenomenon. This approach emphasizes the past--from which ethnicity is nourished--and the future, in which it will disappear. Consequently, it ignores the present, which is conceived of as only a transition stage.

"In contrast to this approach, we think that emphasis should be placed on ethnicity especially in the present.... The process of 'modernization' is not totally a transitional phase: 'Modernization' means the development of ethnic division of labor and ecologic divisions.

"It seems to us more correct to speak of ethnicity as a phenomenon rather than a remnant of the past.... In contrast to the school of 'integration through modernization' which believes that Oriental ethnicity is waning, we believe that its fullest expression has not yet been realized."



These words were written many months before the elections for the tenth Knesset. What occurred in those elections strengthened the assumptions of the school of "dependence." The positioning of most Orientals in the camp of one political party which does not consider itself to be a representative of Orientals in particular, was the first public expression of an attempt by the Ashkenazic establishment to defend its position of control and management in Israeli society and economy.

The slogan "Anything but the Likud!" which led many Ashkenazic voters to support the Alignment expressed perhaps, unconsciously, more a fear of an Oriental revolt than of the political conceptions of the Likud.

Even if the ethnic gap in Israel is not just the result of only the ethnic division of labor, nevertheless all of the components of it--the psychological, cultural, social, and economic--stem from the same source.

The original sin, from which the process of ethnic polarization began, occurred during the first years of the state, during the absorption of mass immigration. It was not committed intentionally. It was the result of direct pressures which were dictated by the mass immigration. Within a period of 3 and one-half years, the Jewish population of 700,000 in Israel had to absorb a population of 750,000.

The early streams of immigration were housed in immigrant camps. From there the immigrants were supposed to gradually move to the Jewish population centers in Israel. But when the stream increased, another solution was discovered--the ma'abarot (transit camps).

The ma'abarot, which were first instituted in 1950, were supposed to respond to the negative phenomena of the immigrant camps--a life of rotting and idleness. They were supposed to be stations on the way to permanent housing. Their residents were supposed to receive employment so that they would be able to support themselves and not live on welfare.

By the end of 1950, there were already 123 ma'abarot throughout Israel, with 180,000 new immigrants living in their tents, tin shacks, huts, and canvas huts. Pursuant to the government policy, the ma'abarot were spread out in distant places so as to constitute a basis for the establishment of new settlements. At the height of the period of ma'abarot, their number was 140.

The ma'abarot were not intended particularly for Oriental immigrants. In the first years, there was an almost even balance between European and Afro-Asian immigrants. But the Ashkenazic immigrants succeeded in shortening their stay in the ma'abarot. Family ties, and their acquaintance with the veteran Jewish population, the large majority of which was Ashkenazic, made their absorption into the older population centers easier.

The Oriental immigrants remained in the ma'abarot for a more extended period, sometimes for years. In the middle of the 50's and the earlier years of the 60's, the large waves of immigration came from North Africa, and the number of immigrants from European countries declined. Then the Oriental immigrants constituted the majority of the population of the ma'abarot.

In 1957, when there were still 140,000 people living in 80 ma'abarot, the operation to eliminate the ma'abarot was announced. But the actual elimination stretched over many years. Six years later, in 1963, the then Minister of Housing, Yosef Almogi, proclaimed: "We are approaching the blessed moment when we will be able to proclaim that the period of the ma'abarot in Israel has ended." Two more years passed, and the director general of the Housing Center proclaimed: "The operation to eliminate the ma'abarot has ended." In 1971 there were still tens of thousands of people living in ma'abarot.

David Shalem was born and grew up in ma'abarot. His stay there was indeed due to objective forces. The resources and manpower then available to the country did not make possible the building of housing or new settlements for all residents of ma'abarot within a short period of time. But the results were destructive.

The period of ma'abarot was a traumatic time for all those who were forced to spend an extended period in them, under conditions of deprivation, next to veteran Israelis who lived in real homes. It was there that for the first time was born a justifiable sense of neglect.

In fact, ma'abarot were never eliminated.

Camps of tents and tin huts, which were called ma'abarot, were physically dismantled. Their residents moved into agricultural moshavin which were built for them, or into houses in development cities, or into Arab homes in abandoned Arab towns. Living conditions were improved. The standard of living rose. But the original sin, which was contained in the very establishment of ma'abarot and from which their way of life stemmed, remained.

The "culture of ma'abarot," if one can call it that, was transferred to the settlements to which ma'abarot residents moved. All of the economic, cultural, and social distortions which were the legacy of the residents of ma'abarot were transferred with them to their new homes.

The policy of population dispersal then dictated the establishment of settlements in far flung and desolate places in the country. Almost all of the new towns which were built, all of the border settlements and new moshavim, whose populations were composed of prior ma'abarot residents, were far flung and cut off just like the ma'abarot themselves. Just as the ma'abarot were homogeneous in terms of their population, so were the new settlements. Most of the Oriental immigrants were settled in development towns and new moshavim. The Ashkenazic immigrants flowed to the older population centers.

This phenomenon was called by the sociologists the "ecological gap"--a kind of apartheid in which each ethnic group lived in separate settlements or neighborhoods.

In the ma'abarot there was a collapse of the community and family frameworks of the Orientals and the whole scale of values and concepts which they brought with them from their lands of origin. Shmuel Vankin, who is 20 years old and a native Israeli, born to parents of the ma'abarot generation, and who now heads the Institute for the Study of Ethnic Gaps in Israel, opened this week at the initiative of the Sephardic World Federation. says: "In the ma'abarot there was a collapse of religious and family authority. All of the old hierarchy of the North African Jews, which had served them as a framework and representative, collapsed and was replaced. The Moroccan Jews, for example, had a religious leadership and a leadership which

represented them to the king. In Israel, the religious leadership became worthless, because religion ceased to be a tool of existence. The family authority also collapsed, mainly because the father ceased to play his role as provider for the family.

"The ethnic group was not able to substitute from within itself the leadership which had existed in the country of its origin. An external leadership was imposed upon it. Their support was provided by an outside-establishment person, usually an Ashkenazi. They did not take an elite economic group, to serve as an intermediary. There was no far-sighted sociological consideration. For what are intermediaries? They are the pipeline linking the sustenance provided by the government and the ethnic group, and they would naturally acquire leadership."

"Another thing which was done was the replacement of one set of educational forms for another set. The earlier set was that of the religious people, rabbis, teachers, cantors, ritual slaughterers. This set was treated like the dust of the earth. The set which was substituted in consisted of people from the Jewish Agency, the bureaucrats, or the young ineffectual teacher. When the substitution was made, the whole scale of values collapsed in several spheres: Religion, family, and sex."

"Thus, for example, there was a challenge to the ideas of the status of women, which in the past had been determined by the status of men. She had been inferior, because he had been superior. Now he was not at all superior. He did not bring home the money to support the family. He became the poor fellow who hangs around the house. He was powerless to impose his authority on his children."

"This led to a complete breakdown of frameworks. You could no longer trust in your father, because he was not someone you knew from the old country. He was a suppressed and depressed person who suffered all day long. In the evening he cried in the corner. You could no longer trust in your mother. She was no longer the woman to whom you could go to cry in time of trouble. She became a woman who went outside to work and yelled at your father, and they quarreled at night. This is what is called a broken family. The effect persists even today. And then, after a man acquired a pattern of conduct from 8 years in a ma'abara, do you think he would change the set once the gates were opened?"

"The trauma of most Orientals are the memories of our childhood," says Asher Edan (30), a native of Moshav Sharsheret in the northern Negev, where his parents were brought from the ma'abara at Lod, having come from Tunis.

Edan, who today is a lecturer in philosophy at the University of Tel Aviv, relates: "In the ma'abarot, our parents came up against the foremen and the bosses, while we had a totally negative encounter with the ways of thought of our parents. When many parents were taken from the ma'abara, they were told they were being taken to Beer Sheva. They took them into the desert. They did not want to get off of the truck. They were surrounded and removed by force in the moshav. In the first years they lived off of a few cows. A kibbutznik from Moshav Sa'ad ran the whole show. In nearby moshavim there were people who told how they had been brought to their moshav, how when they did not want to get off, the driver simply raised the lift on the truck and dumped them on the ground.... This is part of our psychological frustration!"

To the distortions which were transferred from the ma'abarot were added the economic distortions.

The ma'abarot residents were cheap manpower. They found employment in industrial plants nearby, or in agriculture at nearby kibbutzim and moshavim. The women found work as housekeepers. For those who found no work, the government supplied busy work.

The magic words in those years were "full employment." To prevent unemployment, the government spent large sums to supply work to ma'abarot residents. But it did not supply them with the means of production.

This dependence for employment and economic support on outside factors persisted even after the ma'abarot residents moved to new housing. In development towns, many people worked in agriculture for nearby kibbutzim, or in their factories. In new moshavim, farmers were forced to support their families by doing busy-work supplied by the government.

During the tenure of Pinhas Sapir as finance minister, enormous sums were invested in the building of factories to supply employment for residents of development towns. They did supply work. But the resources flowed to the enterpreneurs and private industrialists, or to large corporations. The Folgat factories of Yisrael Falk in Dimona, or the Carmel factories of Avraham Shapira in a number of development towns, are clear examples of this. The Oriental residents had no ownership in them.

The Orientals were given employment. The resources were given to the Ashkenazim. Thus, was created Oriental dependence upon the Ashkenazim, which exists even today principally in industry, agriculture, and services. Thus the ground was prepared for economic inequality between the ethnic groups.

The original sin which started in the ma'abarot, which were supposed to be a transitional phase on the road to complete integration of the mass immigration of Orientals, was perpetuated and took root and has become a permanent feature of Israeli society.

The political establishment of the country has always known of the dangers inherent in the existence of an ethnic gap. At a convention for North Africans, held in 1972, the Director General of the Histadrut, Yitshaq Ben-Aharon, said: "The guilt is on the leadership of the country, which conducted an economic policy which created poverty and social polarization.... Weak points from the Agency may destroy the country!"

At the same convention Prime Minister Golda Meir said: "The state of Israel cannot exist and carry out its mission if there is an ethnic gap.... Concern to eliminate that gap is not a matter of charity, but rather is incumbent upon the whole country!"

In spite of all the pronouncements, nothing has been repaired. Again, not because of lack of intention and good will, but because of a tragic series of mistakes, and a distorted perception of the problem. This will be dealt within the next article.

[24 Jul 81 p 11]

[Text] Shmuel Vankin warns: "There may arise groups who will want to burn down the homes of Ashkenazim!"



"Sub-culture groups are adopting violence and anarchism as a mode of operation. This has happened in Israel in the past. I have absolutely no doubt that if there is no change in the situation with respect to ethnic polarity in Israel, such a thing could happen. A group of Moroccan immigrants, for example, could attack the home of Ashkenazim and burn them down, just because they are homes of Ashkenazim. Not just because not enough is being done to prevent the development of this sort. Israeli society is not even aware of the existence of this danger."

Asher Edan says: "Perhaps they will not burn the homes of Ashkenazim. But they may select as targets of violence those institutions which are perceived by Orientals as being representative of Ashkenazim. Habimah House, for example, or the Workers Council building, or Metsudat-Ze'ev. If Orientals despair of any other means of achieving equality, they will have no way of avoiding the path of violence...."

Vankin and Edan are native Israelis, children of parents who came from North Africa. Both of them are young and educated, academics, having broad perspective. Vankin's principal preoccupations are mathematics and physics; Asher Edan is a lecturer in philosophy. Perhaps because their high intellectual level does not fit the stereotype of the Oriental, they are more sensitive to the psychological suffering of their generation--the first generation of Oriental immigrants. Because they are involved in problems of the ethnic gap and because they are part of it, they are aware of the dangers stemming from it.

Asher Edan relates: "Four months ago, at Kfar Yaroq, there was a convention of Oriental intellectuals. There were about 200 students, academics, organized within the framework of a program for public activists, intended to train a young leadership among Oriental ethnics. Most of the speakers at the convention recommended violence as a mode of operation. The organizers were shocked. They did not plan this, and of course they were opposed. But the people burst out with calls for violence...."

Manifestations of violence which appeared in the last elections were not the result of subversion or political plotting. What led to the political violence this time was the accumulated frustration of young Orientals. In the future, such violence could break out in another area. Violence is no longer the mode just of socially marginal groups. It has received legitimization among educated circles of Orientals, at the upper levels of the social class.

Little is said about this openly.

But in candid conversations, without fear of exposure which might have social or economic negative consequences, the same theme is heard repeatedly from Orientals throughout the country in all sectors of Israeli society.

A team of interviewers, some of them sociologists and some of them active in organizations and movements to change the ethnic alignment in Israel, conducted over an extended period, from 1978 to 1981, a series of interviews with about 100 persons, who were defined as the "potential elite" of the Oriental ethnic community. Those interviewed were members of the three largest groups of Oriental origin: Moroccans, Iraqis, and Yemenites. Some of the recorded interviews were published by the sociologist Shlomo Savirski in his book "Not Failures But Foiled," which recently appeared.



In all of the interviews there is a sense of neglect and discrimination expressed by those interviewed. The recurring motif in the interviews is the sense of belonging to a group which is controlled, a sense of economic and cultural subjection, and the recognition that the present situation of the ethnic group in Israeli society is not improving; and that the solution will not come of itself, but that one must work to bring it about.

This is a discussion among middle class persons in Beit Shean, as it is quoted in the book:

Rafael: You remind me of the Wadi Salib incident.

Aharon: Here people recall that incident. One thinks twice before going out to demonstrate, or in direct confrontation against. Example--today we cannot go out in indirect confrontation against the kibbutzim.

Menahem: Good, we screwed the leaders of that time....

Aharon: Even today we say they are bought. Today we say that they do not serve the interest of Beit Shean, as they do serve the interest of the surrounding area.

Moshe: You only pose problems, but they must be solved...

Menahem: Nu, what do you suggest?

Moshe: What do I suggest? I say to you: I for one do not want there to be a civil war here, I do not want it. And I know, only by one will we succeed....

Menahem: Nu, then why not? Why not?

Moshe: If all of the people would succeed in rising up, and we would do a Wadi Salib ten times, a thousand times, then we would know how to succeed!

Following is part of what was said by Ezra, a native Israeli, of Iraqi parents, and a member of the Workers Committee at a state run factory:

"...There is an ethnic group in this country which has taken total control of this country, and I am not ashamed to say it, and that group is the polish group--people of the first immigration, or the second immigration. If you consider the government offices, and I visit a lot at the offices of the government and the Histadrut, take them one by one--all of them are polish. And one appoints the other to the senior positions. One pulls the other after him. The Orientals, of which I am one, are never included. They do the dirty work.

"He feels this strongly when he goes to an office, and I will give you an example from the university--where he did not go. He saw that the Ashkenazim are accepted immediately, but not him. He was in the paratroopers, he is smart, but wherever he goes they close the door in his face....

"The Histadrut is all polish. No doubt! Who are you talking to? You think there is a dispute between Begin and Mashal? Is that for the outsiders? Between Ehrlich and Mashal? Who is this Ehrlich and who is this Mashal? Like the idiot Moroccans, I say to them: Mashal is polish, idiots. You don't know Begin--he is not a Moroccan. He is polish? If there is one Moroccan, it is David Levy--and they close his mouth! They tell him: 'Shut up. If you don't, you will be kicked out of the cabinet.' He can't do anything. Why did they put David Levy in the government? For the votes! Folks, maybe I have illusions--but this is what I think, and I will die with these thoughts.

"A Sepharadi will never be in power. Never. He is bought and sold. You know what--they say that in Poland the Ashkenazim bowed their heads and went to the slaughter. But, if it had been Sepharadim, I think that they would not only have bowed their heads, they would have put them inside. They are sold people, used to going with their heads bowed, like the blacks in America. The blacks in America today raise their heads. Perhaps there will have to be a revolution here. That's all...."

Gabi, a resident of Kiryat Shmoneh, a hired worker at a kibbutz factory, says:

"I say one thing--I say that the ethnic gap and the discrimination were created by the government. I want to speak right to the heart of the matter. Why do I have to be a wretch, because I live in Kiryat Shmoneh? Why does the government build houses in Kiryat Shmoneh for a half a million pounds, and in Tel Aviv for 3 million pounds? Why don't they bring the employment and the higher education to the development regions? Every development region that you hear of is Oriental. Ofakim--a development region, Oriental; Kiryat Gat--a development region, Oriental; Ma'alot--a development region, Oriental. Let them build the factories we need in Kiryat Shmoneh, in Kiryat Gat, in all of the development areas. Let them bring the higher education, let them build those expensive houses. Let them build the cheap houses in Haifa, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and then you will see the gap close!

"But we don't have the education. Every teacher who doesn't have the money to buy an apartment in Tel Aviv comes to a development region. He gets himself to a development region, does good, and gets all kinds of benefits. I, who live in Kiryat Shmoneh, who was born there, I don't get one-fourth of his benefits. Why does it have to be this way?

One thing I do not expect--there will not be a Jewish war in Kiryat Shmoneh, because we are Jews. A Jew will not fight a Jew with weapons, but it could develop into a situation of civil war--a situation of despair, of suicides. Why are there suicides only among Orientals? Why is there prostitution only among Orientals? Why are there thieves only among Orientals?

"My answer is that the government is guilty. The state of Israel, whether it is the Alignment or the Likud, every government creates the ethnic gap and the discrimination. Only they, and they alone! Today I am not only thinking about leaving Kiryat Shmoneh, I am thinking about leaving Israel!"

This is what several of the hundred persons interviewed have to say. Almost all of them express the sense. It stems from accumulated personal and collective experience, covering about 30 years, in which there has been created an almost exact congruence between social status and ethnic background. Social status is for the most part determined by the level of income.

Since 1965, the Central Bureau for Statistics has been conducting ongoing surveys of income. In these surveys, the base index is the average cash income of a household of those born in Europe and America--the Ashkenazim.

In 1965, the average cash income of an Oriental household was only 71.1 percent of the average income of an Ashkenazic household. In 1978, the average income of an Oriental household was 80.3 percent of that of an Ashkenazic household. But while the Orientals who had come to Israel before 1947 had achieved an income of 99 percent of that of Ashkenazim, the income of those who had come after 1961 was only 76.1 percent of the average Ashkenazic income. The income of those who had come from Europe and America after 1961 was 93.5 percent of the average Ashkenazic income.

In a survey of standards of living conducted by the Central Bureau for Statistics in 1975/76, households, and not net income percapita, were studied. The population of the sample was divided into ten groups. The lowest tenth, included families whose average monthly income at that time was 1900 pounds per month. The upper tenth, number 10 (see the accompanying table) included families whose average monthly income was 9500 pounds per month.

The results of the survey clearly demonstrated that Orientals constituted the majority of the lowest tenth with the lowest income (55.5 percent). Their proportion in the upper tenth was limited to 5.7 percent, while Europeans and Americans constituted 70.2 percent of that tenth.

As one approaches the upper tenth, the proportion of Orientals declines.

In every country there are classes who are better off, who have higher incomes, and lower classes, whose income is lower. But when there is an exact congruence between income level and ethnic background, the problem becomes explosive. What has happened in England in recent weeks, where riots have spread like wild fire, is a clear indication of the danger involved in an ethnic gap of this sort.

In Israel, there has not only been an ethnic division of labor, but also an ethnic division of resources.

It was in particular the attempt to aid the hundreds of thousands of immigrants who came in a mass immigration from the Oriental countries, it was in particular the consciousness of the danger of an ethnic-social gap, which expanded, deepened, and paradoxically perpetuated this gap.

The road to the hell of the ethnic gap is paved with good intentions. Every Israeli government has recognized that after the problem of security, this was the most acute problem for Israeli society. They devoted enormous resources to absorb the Oriental immigration and to integrate it into the veteran community in Israel; by supplying employment, housing, welfare, and education so that these immigrants would be led to the goal of western modernization.

In order to supply mass employment, it was necessary to develop a broad economic base of industry, agriculture, and services with the help of government financing. This foundation was established by public bodies, companies, and entrepreneurs, who were already established in the field. These were mostly Ashkanazim. The resources flowed to them so that they would supply places of work. The Orientals received

the employment, the Ashkenazim received the capital, with the help of which they expanded and grew--and they expanded the gap.

Dr. Savirski's study determines the following: "The government cannot do everything by itself. Direct initiatives constitute only a small part of the government's investment. Most of the capital flows to private and public entrepreneurs in Israel. As in most other countries, this means not an infinite number of private entrepreneurs, but a relatively small group which concentrates in its hands control of most of the capital.... The large groups, including various Histadrut enterprises, at the center of which stands Bank Hapoalim; the Bank Leumi group, which is officially under the control of the Jewish Agency; the Bank Discount group, as well as various other groups such as Klal, the Israel Company, and the Sakharov Group. To these groups and the like are directed the financial aid of government investments in development towns. These groups are the owners of the largest enterprises which were set up in the development towns.

"From the foregoing, the principal conclusion regarding the capital investment structure in the development towns is that the Orientals in those towns have very little control. The plant managers and their senior teams are mostly Ashkenazim, and most of them live in the large cities, or live temporarily in the development towns, and then in special villa neighborhoods.... The patterns of investment and industrialization in the development towns do not work to the advantage of the inhabitants. They give special benefits to the groups which own the plants."

Similar processes have occurred in welfare, education, and housing. Savirski says: "The unequal development in the economic sphere was accompanied by the creation of a large 'social' apparatus, whose purpose was to bring Orientals into the circle of labor, to establish them within it as reasonable standards and conditions.... This apparatus included many workers, such as vocational teachers, social workers, counselors at labor bureaus and schools, and probation officers and street club leaders. This apparatus was composed essentially of Ashkenazim, with its activity directed principally towards Orientals."

"The growth of the educational system stemmed first and foremost from the growth of the student population. The proportion of Orientals in that growth was much greater, both because of their larger proportion in the mass immigration and because of the greater number of youngsters among them. But in terms of those employed, the expanded educational system supplied many new positions in particular to Ashkenazim."

The Orientals constitute the majority of consumers of welfare services in the country. But, welfare budgets are not transferred directly to the consumers. Educational services are provided by teachers: Health services are provided by nurses and doctors; welfare services are provided by social workers. This is the large apparatus, manned in particular by Ashkenazim. Every increase in the social service budget means an expansion of this apparatus. Every program to renovate neighborhoods means sources of income for the contractors, sociologists, and architects. Social services can solve the social problems of Orientals only through the increase of the profits of the Ashkenazim. Social services, which are supposed to reduce the gaps, contribute to their widening and perpetuation. This is the view of Savirski.



Asher Edan says: "The Chinese legend tells about the very rich man who used to give out free fish to the poor people of his city. They said to him: 'What a good man'. but the poor people of the city said: 'We don't want fish. Give us the net.' This is also the problem of Orientals in Israel. Instead of giving them nets, the government gives them fish. The nets remain in the hands of the Ashkenazim."

[31 Jul 81 p 11]

[Text] Dodo Topaz: "Chakh-chakhim," and the whole country was shocked, especially the Ashkanazic segment of it.

The history of insult, which follows this expression, was the clearest articulation of a bad conscience. "Chah-chahim" (mocking the way North Africans pronounce French) is insulting, racist, and almost as bad as "Frenk" or "schwartz khaye" which preceded it, despicable expressions.

On the other hand, "needing special help" is an academic cultured respectable expression. One does not feel a sense of guilt when he utters it. On the contrary, he is showing understanding, an open mind, a partnership in destiny, and a readiness to help.

But a thousand "chah-chahim" does not equal in negative value one "needing special help." Because "chah-chahim" is at worst an adjective. "Needing special help" is an operative term. It covers the educational oversights of a complete generation.

The term is not an Israeli invention. It exists wherever one ethnic groups seeks to perpetuate its superiority over another ethnic group. In Israel it was adopted by the political and educational system, and perhaps it unconsciously helped the veteran Ashkenazic community perpetuate its superiority over the new immigrants, the Orientals.

Lurking behind the term "needing special help" is a whole social educational philosophy, based on myths which many modern sociologists feel are lacking any basis. This philosophy maintains that in every society, in addition to primary disadvantage, which is from birth, there is secondary disadvantage, which is the result of social or cultural neglect. This disadvantage is the result of environment.

When the secondary disadvantage applies to children of an outer directed nature, who are affected by external conditions of life and are out off from internal factors such as sensitivity or values, the result is those who are characterized as "needing special help." Those needing special help are deficient in their ability to perceive and to abstract, and qualities such as rationalization and responsibility are weak, in comparison to regular children.

Even if this concept is not fundamentally rejected, as it is by many experts throughout the world, its very application in a general way to one population group, in comparison to a neighboring population group, is a type of social distortion. This is what has happened in Israel.

From the day that the social establishment became aware of the existence and seriousness of the problem called the "ethnic gap" it tried to solve it by means of the educational system. In 1968, after 2 years of consideration, the Interparliamentary Committee for Study of the Educational Structure decided upon an educational reform, which was passed by the Knesset.



It was explicitly determined then that the goals of the reform were "raising the level of instruction and educational achievement; reduction of the gap existing between children in the country in the level of education and the prospects of integration into society and a progressing economy."

At that time, in the Ministry of Education and Culture, a committee was set up to carry out the reform, which decided that one of the targets of the reform was: "acceleration of the processes of integration of members of various ethnic communities and classes into society."

Orientalism were defined as "needing special help" and the way to raise their educational and cultural level and abilities to adapt to Israeli society was the magic word-- integration.

By marking a whole ethnic community with the label "needing special help" it was assumed from the outset that members of that ethnic group were inferior, failures, suffering from secondary disadvantage, having limited ability to perceive, primitive, but not of their own fault but rather because of the environmental conditions under which they were raised.

The identity which was created between the term "needing special help" and the Orientalism was a sign of identifying failure, just as the term "ethnic group" was identified only with Orientalism. The Ashkenazim, coming from Poland or Germany, are not an ethnic group. This identification mark was angering and destructive. It angered those who were defined as "needing special help" as opposed to those who sought to help them and bring them up to their level, by an absolute denial of their tradition, culture, ideas, and way of life.

It defeated integration, since integration means unification. But unification can only occur between equals. Integration between inferiors and superiors is only a word which covers the desire of one component to swallow up the other component. In this way it creates a negative self image among those who are unjustly characterized as "needing special help."

Today there is almost complete unanimity among educators and sociologists that reject the reform in education, because integration by means of the educational system has failed.

The Public Committee for Study of Reform of the Educational System, which published its report in April 1979, determined among other things: "The second target of the reform--an acceleration of the processes of social integration--was not in practice dealt with, both organizationally as well as pedagogically...."

An inter-university seminar, in which most of the educationists of the country participated, spent 2 years in analyzing integrationist education. In November 1979 its conclusions were published:

"It appears to us, that in spite of the expanded use of the term "integration" it is not possible to find a clear definition or formulation of the goals of integrationist education." This is what the team of Israeli educators determined. "In our opinion, it is possible to deal with integration in the two following ways: As a goal in itself, or as a means of achieving national and educational goals which are defined."

The goals of the approach which viewed integration as a means were: Granting equal opportunity in education, improving the achievement level of students requiring special help and closing the gap between them and others, and improving positions through nurturing sound social relations between various population groups.

In spite of the fact that here and there it was possible to point to certain successes, in general national terms not one of these goals was achieved.

"We found that the almost sole educational solution within the integrationist framework is to divide the class into levels to enable each student to advance according to his ability. But most of the programs and educational materials prepared until now have been directed towards the students in the highest levels, while for the students in the lower levels--who are the ones needing the special attention--very little has been devoted to developing techniques, means of instruction, and special methods of study. The damage which may be caused to the prospects of integration because of this neglect is great, and places in doubt the success of the whole program, and perhaps even its continuation.

"...Not enough has been done to discover the potential which can be gotten from integrationist education. In fact, the term "not enough has been done" is an understatement, and the truth is that those people involved in the issue believe that it is satisfactory to achieve physical integration--seating students who need special help with students who have developed... so as to achieve the expected results. It is necessary to achieve integration but this is not a sufficient condition! Additional conditions must be maintained so that integration will yield positive fruits."

These are the conclusions of the experts who said from the start that integration was necessary.

Instead of integration being a meeting between cultures, of reciprocal enrichment, of mutual encouragement, it has become a tool of oppression and absolute negation of the values, traditions, worldview, and thinking of one ethnic group--that characterized as 'needing special help'. This type of integration cannot succeed.

In spite of the fact that apparently integration did open a way for giving equal educational opportunities--it increased the inequality. The most palpable example of this is perhaps what happens today in academic institutions in Israel.

The proportion of Orientals--native Israelis born to parents from Asia and Africa--among the student population in Israel was for many years extremely small; around 12 percent. In order to encourage interest in institutions of higher learning and to increase the number of Orientals studying in them, a series of steps were devised to give them preference.

Within the framework of a special program of the Hebrew University--"the Program for Public Activists"--last year about 3000 Oriental students studied at academic institutions. In the coming academic year their number will rise to 4000. The tuition for these students is paid by the Sephardic Community Department of the Zionist Union and the Jewish Agency.

The director general of the department, Eli Artsi (39), born in Morocco, who immigrated to Israel with his parents in 1952, living in the Kastel Ma'abara, sent from there to the boarding school Nitsanim, where he later became the educational director of that institution, relates: "At the beginning the goal of this project was to train cadres of leaders from the Oriental community. We took leaders from the development towns who had already reached senior positions but who lacked formal education, and we sent them to study at the universities at our expense and at the expense of the Department for Rehabilitating Neighborhoods.

"Later, needs dictated a change in the character of the project. We take in students from development towns and poor neighborhoods, who have the cognitive ability to progress but who do not have the ability to finance their education. We push them to continue and complete their academic studies.

"From the moment that a student begins this program, we track him. So that his involvement with the program will be real, he is required to contribute so as to participate in various programs. He does tutoring in development towns. He participates in prisoner rehabilitation programs. There are seminars and study days at which we discuss topics such as political and social problems of the country. We do not want the student to live in a hot house, but to become involved in what is happening on campus, in his town, and neighborhood, as well as in the whole country."

"But," says Eli Artsi, "I don't want this program to exist at all. I weep over it. Because what happens in actuality? A student from the Oriental community comes to register at the university. Lacking the means, he tries to clarify the conditions of study, immediately he is sent to the Department for Sephardic Communities in the Agency, which means: All of those state budgets which the university gets are intended only for the Ashkenazic and Arab communities. For the Sephardic community there is a Department for Sephardic Communities in the Agency.

"And not only that--for the students which we send, the university collects from us tuition of 120 percent of the regular tuition. Because we are a financing institution. If I were to give the money directly to the students so that they could register and pay the regular tuition, I would be able to increase their number by 20 percent. Because we pay directly to the institution, we pay 120 percent. This is robbery! This must be stopped! I am always complaining to the Agency about it.

"Why does there have to be a Department for Sephardic Communities in the Agency? So that it will be a solution for the Oriental students? This is absurd. This is a national problem, which the state of Israel has to confront, and not just the Agency. Why doesn't the Agency have a Department for Ashkenazim, which would bear the heavy educational burden for those from Europe and America?

"I am rebelling against this absurdity! I see it as part of the general system which was created to give the Sephardim cover in all of the systems. I am revolted by the name which they have given to the department which I head. First, they create the problem, and later they complain--what do you want? Look you are getting and receiving. This is how they fulfill their obligation.

"When I hear the expression 'you and we' or 'they and we' I shudder. The leaders of the country do not understand that this seemingly innocent expression contains the seed of fragmentation and even civil war."

Eli Artsi sees the root of the problem in the conception which has been perpetuated since the beginning of the mass immigration from the Oriental countries.

"No one has yet studied and investigated which communities come to Israel, and which culture is behind them. What is their mentality? They simplify it and say: These people come from Islamic countries which are technologically backward. They make the analogy that technological backwardness means being backward developmentally and culturally. No one here has noted that the culture which is being labeled as backward is the culture of Maimonides, Yehuda Ha-Levi, Haim ben-Atar and others.

"That magnificent culture, which was rooted in the Jewry of North Africa, has lost its originality here. They have asked us to be swallowed up. But they have not given us a substitute. When they saw the results of this approach, it was already too late.

"The same educational-cultural crisis which began in the first years of the state have persisted until today, and it is leaving its mark in the political sphere. The coming earthquake will be a very severe one.

"I personally have witnessed a new phenomenon recently: Families of Orientals are trying to organize, in groups of 20-25, so as to emigrate from the country as a unified group. More than once I have confronted them and debated and tried to convince them. Because I know that if this process begins--God forbid--no one will be able to stop it."

[7 Aug 81 pp 11, 28]

[Text] The atmosphere in the office of the chairman of the administrative committee of the Broadcasting Authority is tense. The chairman is professor Reuven Yaron. Representatives of a group of intellectuals and humanists of the Oriental community who have met with him spoke in loud voices. They demanded that he cancel the showing of a television series on Zionism called "The Pillar of Fire." They claim that the series has ignored the contribution of Orientals to Zionism. Their demand was rejected with formal justifications.

When the meeting ended and the representatives of the group remained alone, one of them burst out in a shout. He was the young poet and lyricist, a Yemenite whose family was third generation Israeli. The frustration and despair broke forth without stop.

He called upon his colleagues: "Let's decide now to occupy this television building. Five thousand people! There will be blood, weapons, a few bombs, a few grenades, a few killings, but brutal! Real brutal! By force! This is the only power we have in this country!"

It is doubtful that he really meant the things which he said. There was no echo to them. The series "The Pillar of Fire" was shown without the Orientals storming the Bastille of television. But the fact that this poet and lyricist, who considers himself a humanist, could say such extremist things, indicates the seriousness of the thinking among Oriental humanists. Even if not to the same degree of extremism, this cry characterized the sense of anger shared by writers, lyricists, singers, actors, and communications people among Orientals, who are forced to live in what is an Ashkenazic culture, and to deal with it.



In a series of personal interviews, where identities were not revealed and those interviewed were able to express themselves freely, several of these Oriental humanists gave expression to this sense of cultural seige which they have, in which they believe they live in Israeli society. All of the segments quoted below are taken from those interviews, which are published in the book by the sociologist Shlomo Savirski, "...Not Failures, But Foiled."

Uzi, the Yemenite poet and lyricist, who made the call for war against television, said: "If I never experienced exile in the Diaspora, I have felt it here in Israel. I am a Sabra but I feel as though I am in exile. This is a lousy feeling. Sometimes I propose radical solutions, because I have had it, I am no longer patient...."

"When you talk about culture, it never has anything to do with the East. In every way, it is an Ashkenazic conception: We must undergo a re-education to know what true culture is--and the true culture is that of Europe. Anything which we brought with us must be destroyed...."

Haim, who is a writer and playwright, born in Morocco, says: "You feel it all along the way, at every step.... You simply feel emasculated, orphaned, isolated, and depressed. You are an undesirable, a stranger, unneeded--uninteresting in your culture. Your music is not their music, your songs are not their songs, and of course your values are not their values...."

"All the television heroes are Ashkenazic.... The communications media formulate experience, they create the images, and if you will, they create the psychology of the people.... The people which is created, or the psychology which is created, the images and the heroes which are created--all of it is Ashkenazic. I am waiting to see when they will create a Moroccan hero, or a Tunisian or Algerian hero.... Sometimes you listen and get the feeling that they are broadcasting with antennae in another country, and you seek shelter in another country. There is no communication...."

Says David Hamo, who in 1977 was the founder of a group at the University of Haifa, called "Yated", which worked towards the goal of establishing an enlightened, just, unalienated society with the values of which all Israeli citizens would be able to identify: "When I see a Naomi Shemer program on television, I call my Ashkenazic wife and say: 'Look, an Ashkenazic television program.' I do not find myself in any of Naomi Shemer's songs. Every holiday eve, every Friday evening, I sit in front of television of the Ashkenazim. An Ashkenazi speaks about my problems in an Ashkenazic context, not that of an Israeli.... Or when there are songs by Naomi Shemer, or "Songs of Grass", I always see very specific faces on the lawn, a very specific experience in which I have no part or interest."

In the heat of the last elections, a new expression came into use: Two cultures, or according to another form: "They-us. One can understand the negativity of the situation from these expressions. It is as though there is a national fault in the existence of two cultures under one nationality, or as though one culture is preferable over another.

Both the determination and the significance attached to it are in error. Central schools in modern sociology not only do not reject cultural diversity in one society, but they affirm societies in which there are various ethnic groups which respect one another and which develop their own special cultural qualities.



The sociologist Yohanan Peres of the University of Tel Aviv, says in his book "Ethnic Relations in Israel": "A pluralistic ideology is based not only on the pursuit of justice, but also on a certain conception of national culture. By vain efforts to achieve acknowledged achievements in society, the minority group member casts off his culture, substitutes and "imitation" for the original, and thus "contributes" to the impoverishment of the sources of cultural creativity.... Only a group having a collective memory formed over generations can serve as a fruitful soil for artistic creativity. Moreover, a homogeneous culture, because of an internal or external crisis, can run into a blind alley, while a pluralistic culture is able to overcome such a situation by forming new foundations from its many sources."

By nature, there should exist in Israel, side by side, two cultures, that of the Orientals and that of the Westerners. Each of them brought its own cultural heritage with it. It is not expressed only through literary or artistic works, but also through a different system of ideas regarding the world view and relations between people, or in a different order of priorities regarding the realization of goals.

But in Israel there are not two equal cultures each nourishing the other. There is a dominant culture and alongside it a dominated culture. Yohanan Peres says: "While the Ashkenazic communities drew together so that by the second generation there was a complete blend, the Oriental communities have been united only in their sense of neglect. The similarity in the ways of life of these communities is recognizable when they are compared, but it does not serve as a basis for collaboration in patterns of culture."

In an article which was published in "Makhbarot Le-Mekhkar u-Vikoret", the sociologist Deborah Bernstein argues that the rejection of a cultural program, or the rejection of the very existence of a culture among the Oriental communities was accompanied by a dehumanization, with the negation of their very existence as human beings. Leaders, sociologists, humanists, and officials viewed the Oriental communities which immigrated to Israel en masse as to people in absolute need of culture, as though they were primitives lacking in the ability to make independent judgment, lacking an identity and maturity. These deficiencies were supposed to be filled, as Ben Gurion claimed in his time, with "a deep and pure love," by the absorbing Ashkenazic culture, which would convert this "human dust into a cultural nation."

As a result, Oriental culture was repressed. Western culture, represented by the Ashkenazim, dominates all spheres of cultural creativity as well as the communications media. Isolated attempts to foster cultural creativity among the Orientals are judged and criticized according to the standards of Western cultural values.

One of the clearest examples of this is the "Festival of Oriental Music," which is held separately from the "Festival of Israeli Music." The Israeli festival, or as it is called "in the style of the Oriental communities," represents a community. Oriental music and song are given expression so that no one will level accusations of intentional discrimination. But they remain not belonging, or at best, they represent at most a sub-culture.

Official statistics confirm the claim. Orientals are not consumers of culture. This leads to the conclusion that they are culturally inferior.

At the beginning of the year, the Central Bureau of Statistics published the results of a survey on the reading and entertainment habits of the adult Jewish population. The survey, which was made between January and May of 1979, at the request of the Ministry of Education and Culture, testifies to substantial differences in the consumption of culture between African-Asians and European-Americans.

Among Orientals, 57.4 percent attended a cultural event outside of their homes at least once a month, as compared to 60.3 percent of Ashkenazim, and 77.7 percent of native Israelis who were the children of native Israelis. While attendance at movies was almost equal between the two groups, light entertainment was attended by only 7.2 percent of Orientals as compared to 15.6 percent of Ashkenazim; only 7.2 percent of Orientals attended the theater, as compared to 15.6 percent of Ashkenazim; 15.9 percent of Orientals visited a museum, as compared to 23 percent of Ashkenazim, and concerts were attended by only 1.3 percent of Orientals, as compared to 9 percent among Ashkenazim.

Even in listening to radio programs and reading the newspapers, the rate is lower among Orientals than among those from Western countries. On the other hand the rate of watching television was almost equal between the two communities.

For example, while 91 percent of those from Western countries read a daily newspaper, among Orientals only 69.6 percent read a daily paper. Among those from Europe and America 62.3 percent read at least one book a month, while among Orientals the rate is only 38.2 percent.

But one cannot conclude from the findings of these surveys the true rate of consumption of culture among Orientals and Ashkenazim. Since in most cases, what is considered is to supply of the dominant culture, the Ashkenazic culture, the surveys at most show the degree of consumption of Ashkenazic cultural products among the consumers of culture who are both Orientals and Ashkenazim. The index of consumption which was measured was for the most part clearly Western. When one measures consumption of concerts, theater, museums, and even radio, one is talking about cultural products which are controlled by the Ashkenazim.

If there existed in Israel, side by side, two cultures, responding to the specific needs of the various communities; if there existed Oriental theater, concerts of Oriental music, and Oriental radio--it is doubtful if there would be a gap in cultural consumption between Orientals and Ashkenazim.

There is also an economic reason for the present gap in cultural consumption

Since there is a congruence between ethnic origin and level of income, property, and allocation of national resources, it is only natural that there would be a congruence between ethnic origin and cultural consumption. Cultural products are not given away free. They cost money. As available income per capita increases the spending for consumption of culture rises.

So, there exists another official survey which proves that among Orientals, the average expenditure for educational needs and culture is higher than that among Westerners.

In June of this year, the Central Bureau for Statistics published the results of the "Survey of Family Spending" which was conducted in fiscal year 1979-1980. Among other things this survey showed that the average income of Ashkenazic families--coming from Europe and America--was 8.5 percent higher than the average income of those born in Asia and Africa.

A shocking detail: The survey finds that the income from wages of an Oriental family was greater than that of an Ashkenazic family, but since in the average Ashkenazic family income from capital was almost double that of the average Oriental family, the sum total of all its income exceeded that of the Oriental family.

The survey indicates that while the largest expense of an Ashkenazic family is for housing, the largest expense for an Oriental family was for food. But in the category of spending for education, culture, and entertainment, the spending of an Oriental family was 6.2 percent greater than that of an Ashkenazic family. The highest expense stems, apparently, from the difference in the average number of persons per family. In an Ashkenazic family, the average number of persons is 2.5, while in Oriental families it is four.

The difference in the average number of persons per family explains why the average Oriental family spends about 55 percent more than an Ashkenazic family for educational service. But in the rest of the categories of expenses for education and culture, the differences do not always stem from family size.

Thus, for example, it appears that the average Oriental family spends 67 percent more for cultural and entertainment events, and 23.8 percent more for cultural products and current entertainment than the average Ashkenazic family. On the other hand, the average Ashkenazic family spends about 15 percent more on newspapers, books, and writing equipment, and 78 percent more for recreation and trips.

In sum, expenditures for education, culture, and entertainment constitute 7.6 percent of the income of an Oriental family and only 6 percent of the total income of an Ashkenazic family.

The figures show that when one measures consumption of culture by spending, and not by the number of visits to cultural and entertainment events, or frequency of reading books and newspapers, there are no significant gaps between the two ethnic groups.

The gap exists in supply, not in consumption. The lack of expression for the culture peculiar to Orientals is interpreted among many of them as a negation of their honor and a blurring of their independent identity. When this factor is added to other factors, such as the gap in income and distribution of resources or the imbalance in political representation, it fans the flames of frustration and enmity.

In his research on ethnic relations in Israel, the sociologist Yohanan Peres states: "With the improvement of living conditions, educational possibilities, with vocational training, a whole class of Orientals is forming which is able to hold senior positions in many fields.

"But the thorn is this: With the coming together, the lower classes take over the middle or even upper class characteristics. But their inability to realize in theory and practice the desired way of life creates a sense of being neglected, which in turn causes a series of phenomena: Cheap imitation, flight from reality, and the attempt to take by unorthodox means what is beyond one's reach....

"Indeed, if the ethnic gap is not reduced, the sense of neglect may lead to a destructive outburst."

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CSO: 4323/57



SUCCESS OF INTEGRATION ANALYZED

Tel Aviv DAVAR 31 Jul 81 p 16

[Article by Yehuda Gotthelf: "Ethnic Integration in Theory and Practice"]

[Text] The storm of the 10th Knesset elections has subsided, and public life has returned to normal. But one cannot ignore the ethnic tension which left its mark on the election system, and which left us years behind in the process of ethnic integration. Have we failed in the principal mission of Zionism? Or is the pessimistic evaluation wrong in that it was only developed to exploit political differences?

Any objective comparison made not in the heat of an election will reveal that among countries of the world which contain ethnic differences, Israel has in a very short time and under emergency conditions achieved an impressive national unity, which other countries have not achieved even after hundreds of years of existence. It is Israel which in one generation increased its population five-fold; which absorbed immigrants from dozens of countries speaking various languages, and which shaped one people speaking one language. India, which gained its independence at about the same time as Israel, today speaks several hundred languages, and only the language of the colonial rulers has become the common language of all Indians. Ireland, which broke away from Britain, did not succeed in reviving its national language, and still the Irish speak English. In the language of Bernard Shaw: "two peoples, whose common language separates them." This is the case in dozens of "developing" countries on various continents, who do not have one common language, but find themselves in the generation of Babel.

In spite of the burden of security and poverty of natural resources, Israel, which numbered only 600,000 at its birth, undertook to assure employment, housing, and education for all those who came to it. The mass immigration occurred in the first years of the state's existence at a time when it lacked means despite the aid from Jews in the diaspora. It is no wonder that the conditions of absorption were such as to cause concern. Lack of administrative experience, which gave rise to a bureaucracy, did not improve the situation.

The truth is that the immigrations from before the establishment of the state did not experience very good integration. In fact, they encountered hostility on the part of the foreign rulers (Turkish and British), and rigidity on the part of

the Jewish community (the old and the new), which did not make easy the integration of the immigrants in work, housing, and social life. Each wave of immigration had to overcome the tendencies of conservatism and egoism of the preceding wave, which looked down upon those who came after it. The Sephardis of the old community did not look with favor on the Ashkenazim. The Russians, the Yemenites, the Poles, the Germans, the Rumanians, and others all served as a target for the arrows of criticism and mockery on the part of the veterans.

Even during the pre-state period there were certain signs of a socio-cultural differentiation. But it was limited. "East" and "West" went their separate ways, and there were only a few exchanges, because there was no contact between them and therefore there was no talk of "ethnic problems." Indeed, the national-historical conception which prevailed in most of conscious society, left no doubt that the differences and contradictions between the immigrants from various countries were commutative. Without exaggerating the "racial purity" of the people of Israel over the generations, in general there was no substantive genetic difference between Jewish groups in the Diaspora, because of the Jewish heritage, common Jewish fate, and the longing of all for redemption. So, the geopolitical and social background of the Diaspora changed from time to time. During a certain period the cultural level of the Islamic countries was higher, and the Jews of those countries in those times were at the pinnacle of Jewish culture and left us an important heritage. At a later period, the center of gravity of civilization shifted to other regions, and the Jews of more enlightened countries became the bearers of spiritual renaissance and the pioneers of the national and social movements of the Jewish people.

In spite of the differences in cultural level of the Jewish groups in the Diaspora, which were influenced by their various environments, our battle for existence and the study of Torah in all of the Diasporas "sharpened" the minds of the children of Israel, and this provided the basis for settlement of the generations in days gone by--on a high shared cultural level for all of the ethnic groups of Israel. The Zionist-socialist conception strengthened faith in this positive process: even if there is still a difference in the conditions of existence (either as a result of historic background or as a result of the pangs of absorption at the beginning of the state) and even if there are differences in class corresponding to a certain degree with the ethnic background (there are extremely wealthy persons among non-Ashkenazim), social progress will reduce these differences to the point of ending them. Thus the Labor Movement believed that the workers of the various ethnic groups would constitute a single working class, and this class would lead to the formation of a single people, a working people.

The progressive process of integration had an effect, for since the 1950's, almost no attempt to form an ethnic party has succeeded. But in the elections for the 10th Knesset we witnessed a sorry attempt to turn back the wheel of development and deepened the rift, both in the religious camp and the labor camp--against an ethnic background. No longer "from class to people" but "from a people to ethnic classes." Is there any justification for this?


The integration of those who came from various Diasporas is still not complete. And the reasons are known. There was "reality of deprivation," the result of hundreds of years of dispersion among peoples of various cultural levels, and it

JPRS 79404

9 November 1981

# Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2429



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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9 November 1981

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No. 2429

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# IRAQ, BRAZIL TO FORM DEVELOPMENT BANK

London 8 DAYS in English No 39, 3 Oct 81 pp 38, 39

[Article by Piers Montondene]

[Text] ONE OF THE FIRST casualties of the Gulf War was trade between Iraq and Brazil, as the Shatt al Arab was effectively closed to traffic. However, in the last nine months efforts by both nations to restore two-way trading links have been successful, and have culminated in the announcement that Iraq and Brazil are to establish a joint trade development bank, to be based in Rio de Janeiro.

The formal agreement will not be signed until a Brazilian delegation arrives in Iraq towards the middle of November. Even then the bank is unlikely to begin operations until mid-1982. Nonetheless, the announcement of the bank's formation, released only days before the first anniversary of the Gulf War, is a good measure of the progress made in restoring commercial activity between the two countries.

At the start of the war in September 1980, Brazil was heavily dependent upon Iraq for its oil supplies — between 40–50 per cent of all imported oil products came from Iraq, or 350,000 b/d out of 700,000 b/d. In spite of a rigorous programme to convert Brazilian cars to run on gasohol — a mixture of petrol and alcohol distilled from locally-grown sugar cane — and a continuing oil exploration drive deep into the Amazon basin, 80 per cent of all Brazil's oil needs were still being supplied by imports.

The reasons for this overwhelming dependence on Iraq went back to 1977. Braspetro (the overseas branch of the Brazilian state oil company, Petrobras) had been providing the Iraqi government with technical expertise in searching for new oil

reserves in Iraq. It discovered a major oil formation close to Basra: the Majnoon field, which proved to be one of the largest oil deposits, producing 350,000 b/d.

Under the terms of their bilateral agreement, Brazil had the right to purchase all the crude lifted from Majnoon. This special purchasing arrangement was terminated by mutual agreement in 1980 with a once-off sale of oil to Brazil at substantially below market rates to ease the country's balance of payments problems. From the start of 1980, Brazil was to be supplied with the same quantities of oil as in the past, only no longer on a preferential basis.

Since 1977 Brazil had been balancing its trade with Iraq — in part at least — by arms sales to Baghdad. Brazil's chief arms manufacturer, Engesa, supplied a variety of armoured vehicles and troop transporters until the start of the war. Brazil had also agreed to supply Iraq with nuclear technology.

The impact of the Gulf War was felt in Brazil from the first day: Iraqi oil supplies ceased immediately and a virtual state of emergency was declared. Western bankers, already concerned about the massive external debt which Brazil was running at the time — estimated at \$55bn in October 1980 — stopped lending money to Brazilian institutions, fearing that the economy was on the point of collapse; senior Brazilian ministers described the country's predicament as 'very, very difficult.'

A rescue mission was organised by Venezuela to find alternative oil supplies for Brazil, while Iraq attempted to divert its



exports through Lebanon and Syria — successfully. Since the second quarter of 1981, Brazil's trade balance has been in surplus, with an overall break-even being forecast for the year end. In the last week, a new oil find has been reported off the coast of Rio de Janeiro which is expected to raise the country's oil reserves by nearly 10 per cent.

Now trade links with Iraq have been restored sufficiently to warrant the formation of a special trade development bank with an initial capital of \$40m. But why start a bank? While Iraq has apparently resumed its position as Brazil's largest single oil supplier, the establishment of a commercial bank was not considered necessary in the last five years.

The answer is the desire for secrecy. At the time of the Tammuz bombing, the Iraqi government was unhappy at the publicity surrounding the nuclear cooperation treaty between the two countries, as well as the reports that Brazilian contractors were working in Iraq on a number of major projects. Brazil has been supplying arms to Iraq for the last five years, moreover, and there was speculation in the western press that Brazil's involvement with Iraq might extend further than trade links.

A specialist organisation run by the two countries will enable Iraq and Brazil to keep their trading operations private and their government-to-government deals under one roof.

CSO: 4400/31

RELATIONS BETWEEN SYRIA, LIBYA DISCUSSED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI No 27, 7-13 Sep 81 pp 18-19

[Article by Wadi' Helou: "Unity and Military Coordination Discussions Beset by Obstacles"]

[Text] Arab diplomatic centers in Damascus were puzzled by the absence of a joint communique at the end of the Libyan-Syrian discussions. This conspicuous omission is all the more puzzling in view of the great importance attached to Colonel Qadhdhafi's 3-day visit by the Syrian news media, and amidst rumors that the visit might be followed by a summit meeting of the Steadfast Front upon Qadhdhafi's return to Tripoli, a meeting that would coincide with celebrations commemorating the September Fatih Revolution. Qadhdhafi's Arab tour had taken him to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Syria. The 11-day tour included the Aden Tripartite Conference and coincided with the American-Libyan confrontation over the Gulf of Sirra.

While the Aden 3-nation conference which brought together President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad [al-Hasani], Mengistu Haile-Mariam, and Colonel Qadhdhafi marked one of the major accomplishments of the Libyan president's tour, his visit to Damascus and the ensuing negotiations were of greater importance to Arab diplomatic circles.

In connection with the Summit meeting at Aden, Col Qadhdhafi's action in joining the Yemen-Ethiopia-Soviet Union alliance was clearly seen as his response to America's act of aggression against Libya [the downing of 2 Libyan planes over the Gulf of Sidra]. That incident served to push Qadhdhafi closer to the Soviet axis, and the move was seen as an act of further increasing the ire of the United States.

Arab diplomatic circles claim that Africa, not the Gulf states, is now the focus of attention of the Yemen-Ethiopia-Libya axis. This claim was supported by pointing to Qadhdhafi's stops in the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, as well as to his telegraphed greeting to King Khalid of Saudi Arabia as his [Qadhdhafi's] plane passed through Saudi airspace, all of which were interpreted as Qadhdhafi's way of dispelling Gulf nation fears that his joining the Yemen-Ethiopia alliance might threaten their security. This assurance, Arab diplomatic sources claimed, was made at the behest of the Soviet Union.

According to one rumor in Arab diplomatic circles, former South Yemen President 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, by his own account, was once on the verge of invading North Yemen, and that his decision to go through with the plan was abandoned only after the Soviets summoned him and convinced him of the folly of his plan. According to Mr Ismail,

his plan to invade North Yemen, was ultimately responsible for his removal from office in favor of a leader who would carry on a more realistic policy [as viewed by the Soviets] toward the Gulf nations. In view of this assessment, Africa is now the target of both the Soviets and the regional alliance consisting of Libya, South Yemen, and Ethiopia. It is not far fetched, but rather expected, that this new alliance will soon be knocking on Sudan's doors in response to South Africa's recent attack against Angola.

On the Damascus scene, attention is now pivoted on Libyan-Syrian unity negotiations. When his plane stopped for refueling at Damascus International Airport, where he was welcomed by Prime Minister 'Abd al-Rauf Qasim and Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam, Col Qadhdhafi was careful to request meetings with government and national leaders, as well as with leaders of people's organizations. His request received a positive response and he met with leaders of the Ba'ath Socialist Party in Damascus as well as with representatives of labor unions and people's organizations. In addition, Col Qadhdhafi met with Syrian President al-Assad, PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat and other Palestinian leaders, as well as with representatives of the Lebanese National Movement. At all of these meetings, Col Qadhdhafi emphasized the need for unity.

According to informed sources, the discussions went beyond the Libyan slogan "He who calls for division on party lines is a traitor," a clear reference to obstacles that prevented unity in previous talks. The fundamental issue now appears to hinge on reconciling Libya's Jamahiriyyah [masses-based] government with Syria's party-based government. Qadhdhafi reportedly insisted that power be vested in the people, and that the government be an instrument for implementing the will of the people. It is noteworthy that this was precisely the issue on which earlier unity negotiations had stumbled, and this despite the preparatory work of joint committees, which preceded President al-Assad's last trip to Libya approximately one year ago to take part in the celebration marking the September Fatih Revolution, the occasion on which President Qadhdhafi declared Libya's readiness to unite with Syria.

The lack of agreement on ways to bring about unity, despite agreement in principle on the need for such a union, has not prevented Syria from standing beside Libya in its confrontation with the United States. In fact while Col Qadhdhafi was still in Damascus, the chief of staff of the Syrian army, Gen Hikmat al-Shahabi returned from Tripoli, where he had met with Lt Col Abu Bakr al-Yunis [of Libya] and declared Syria's solidarity with Libya. After a meeting with Col Qadhdhafi in Damascus, Gen al-Shahabi left for Aden to coordinate military planning with South Yemen, one of the members of the Steadfast Front. It is well known that Syria maintains an air force contingent in Libya. It is reported that agreement has been reached to increase the number of Syrian pilots stationed in Libya to counter the threat posed by the massing of Egyptian troops on the Egyptian Libyan border.

The question now is whether the Libyan-Syrian dispute over the means for achieving unity--despite agreement on military coordination--is behind the absence of a joint communique on the Qadhdhafi-al-Assad talks.

Official sources in Syria claim that Libyan-Syrian relations are strong, much stronger, in fact, than could be described in a communique. There is no pressing need for a communique according to these sources. The absence of a communique should not be interpreted as signalling a deep rift between the two countries. Arab diplomatic sources in Damascus simply say that the Syrians and Libyans have agreed to hold more meetings on the unity proposal. They maintain that the existing military coordination plan is an old one and does not require the issuance of a joint communique.

LIBYAN INITIATIVE STRESSES LEBANESE RECONCILIATION

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 242, 10 Oct 81 p 17

[Text] On 11 June, Col Mu'ammr al-Qadhafi said in his speech on the anniversary of the American evacuation of Wheelus Base, "I shall propose an initiative to restore peace and harmony to Lebanon." This was the first sign of an Arab-Libyan initiative to end the war in Lebanon. On 1 September, the Jamahiriyyah's Revolution Day, al-Qadhafi reaffirmed the initiative, and he said that the time has come for the Muslim rifle to stop fighting the Christian rifle and for all rifles to be united against the enemy.

Because Colonel Qadhafi's words were not just talk, they have been accompanied by energetic political activity during the past few months, in both Arab and Lebanese spheres. According to an informed and reliable Arab source, al-Qadhafi conferred with President al-Asad on the initiative each time they met (in Damascus and Tripoli), and al-Qadhafi got al-Asad's approval of his initiative. This initiative contains the following broad political lines, without going into details which are still subject to positive changes as the initiative is worked out:

1. Syrian forces participating in the Arab Deterrent Forces will withdraw from the Lebanese cities which they are now in, and security matters there will be handed over to whoever is authorized by the legitimate authorities, normally the Lebanese army.
2. Syria will receive political and military guarantees (through security agreements) of protection, since Lebanon has such strategic importance for Syria and is the crucial buffer through which it is possible to strike Syria.
3. Palestinian resistance forces will withdraw from Lebanese cities and will increase their presence in other appropriate places.
4. The Palestinian resistance will be given political guarantees assuring it freedom of movement, politically, in communications, and militarily, in emergency circumstances. The resistance will also be strengthened with arms (as was the case during the 15-day war) to confront any developments which are hostile to it.
5. Parties having dealings with Israel will break off their relations with it without delay.



6. The Lebanese National Movement will be strengthened as a prelude to a "balanced dialogue" so that "an agreement of the strong, not subject to violation or exploitation" can be reached.

7. A roundtable of all Lebanese forces will be convened for mutual understanding, without intervention by anyone, so that a final agreement can be reached, bringing about peace, stability, and the continued integrity of Lebanon--with regard to land and people--in a different system from the old sectarian system.

After clarifying these broad outlines, Mr Salih (al-Duruqi), head of the People's Bureau, and Mr 'Abd-al-Qadir Ghawqah, member of the People's Bureau (formerly Libyan ambassador to Lebanon for a number of years), were active in explaining the aims of the initiative to all Lebanese parties. Within this framework, they held repeated meetings with all Lebanese forces in the west Beirut area or in the north ([former] President Sulayman Franjiyah). Also, the performance given by the [Libyan] Folkloric Troupe at Casino du Liban last Sunday constituted an important first step in building bridges for dialogue with former President Camille Sham'un and Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil. A far-reaching political dialogue was to have taken place between (al-Duruqi) and Ghawqah and the leadership of the Lebanese Front by the end of this week.

CSO: 4504/45

# REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL ISSUES DRAFT LAW ON LOCAL ORGANS

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 3, 4, 5, 6, Oct 81 pp 2, 3

[Text] Part I

Following is the Decree of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan concerning the draft law of the local organs of state power and administration of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan:

Kabul city,

22 September 1981,

The Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, after the assessment of the draft law of the local organs of state power and administration of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, in pursuit of the order of article 37 (paragraph 13) of the Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan approves that—

I.—The draft law of the local organs of state power and administration of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, in nine chapters and 87 articles, is confirmed in principle and in general, and this draft law is placed before the public for

their views through the mass media for further deliberations.

II.—The Presidium of the Revolutionary Council is duty bound to collect and coordinate the peoples views and suggestions concerning this draft law and taking that draft into consideration, prepare the final law of the local organs of state power and administration and submit it for assessment to the session of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Babrak Karmal,  
President of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA.

In the name of God, the Compassionate and Most merciful,

The draft law of the local organs of state power and administration of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan,

## CHAPTER—I

### General Order

#### Article One:

This law is passed in pursuit of the article 51 of the Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan toward the realisation of the aims of the

national, democratic Saur Revolution, for the following purposes.

I. stability of democratic principles of the organisations and activities of the local organs of state power and administration.

II. To widely attract the toilers toward the state administration and to expand and promote the principle of collective activity in the local organs of the state power and administration.

III. To regulate relations between the local organs of the state power and administration and the higher organs of the state power and administration, the ministries, departments and their related organs.

#### Article Two:

In pursuit of the Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, in the provinces, cities, precincts, districts, sub-districts and villages the relevant jirgahs are considered as the local organs of the state power.

#### Article Three:

The local organs of the state power are formed for a period of four years.

#### **Article Four:**

The local organs of the state power on the basis of the authorities embodied in this law will solve all the problems having local importance having in view the interests of the state and citizens residing at their related localities.

#### **Article Five:**

The activity of the local organs of the state power will take place under the guidance of the Revolutionary Council, the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council and the Government of Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in cooperation with and by relying on all patriotic, progressive and democratic forces and social and political organisations of the country which are united in the National Fatherland Front.

#### **Article Six:**

The local organs of the state power will perform their activities on the basis of the following principles:

I. Consistent and unbiased realisation of the policy line of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan toward the consolidation of the gains of the Saur Revolution, implementation of its ideals and aspirations, further strengthening and development of the progressive regime in the country, abolition of the remnants of feudalistic and pre-feudalistic relations, backwardness, unemployment, illiteracy, poverty and disease.

II. Respect and observance of the sacred religion of Islam, all-sided aid to the lawful activity of religious organisations and institutes.

III. Revolutionary and democratic legality of justice, protection of rights and legal interests of the citizens of Afghanistan.

IV. Wide attraction of all strata of toilers including workers, farmers, craftsmen, nomads, intellectuals, women, youth, religious figures, democratic and progressive forces and representatives of all nationalities, peoples and tribes in the running of the affairs of local state organs of the state power.

V. Protection and safeguarding of state, combined, cooperatives, private and personal property.

VI. Giving help to the legal undertakings and activity of the national traders and capital holders.

VII. Serious respect and observance of the historical, national, cultural and religious traditions and customs of the people.

#### **Article Seven:**

Any kind of limitation of the participation of the citizens in the activity of the local organs of the state power and administration directly or indirectly with the creation of conditions of privilege and racial, tribal, national or religious supremacy is prohibited.

#### **Article Eight:**

The local organs of the state power and administration will perform their activity on the basis of the orders and values of the Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the order of this law and other laws and decrees of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic

Republic of Afghanistan and the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council, resolutions of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the decisions of the supreme local organs of the state power and administration. (To be continued).

## Part II

### CHAPTER — II METHOD OF FORMATION OF LOCAL ORGANS OF THE STATE POWER

#### I. Village Jirgah

##### Article Nine:

In any village having at least fifty families village jirgah (council) can be elected. The villages with less than fifty families would join the bigger neighbouring villages.

The Council's elections can be held in the case of participation of at least half of the village voters.

The number of the people's candidates to be elected in the village council would be determined by the election commission of the village according to law.

#### 2. Sub-district jirgahs:

##### Article Ten:

The sub-district council is elected by the representatives of the village councils situated within the area of the sub-district. The number of the people's representatives to be elected for the sub-district council would be determined by the election commission of the sub-district according to the law.

#### 3. District Jirgah (Council).

##### Article Eleven:

The district council would be elected by the representatives of the sub-district councils and the village councils which are under the administrative jurisdiction of the district.

The number of the people's representatives to be elected to the district council will be determined by the election commission of the district according to the law.

#### 4. Precinct Council

##### Article Twelve:

Where there are precincts in the set-up of a city, a precinct council will be elected for each precinct.

The number of the people's representatives to be elected for the precinct council would be determined by the elections commission of the precinct according to the law.

#### 5. The city council.

##### Article Thirteen:

The city council will be elected by the citizens of a city. The elections will be held if at least half of the city voters participate in the elections.

The city council the set up of which envisages the precincts is elected by the representatives of the precinct councils.

The number of the people's representatives to be elected for the city council would be determined by the city elections commission according to the law.

#### 6. The Provincial Council

##### Article Fourteen:

The provincial council is elected by the representatives of the districts' and cities' councils of the related province. The number of the people's representatives to be elected for the provincial councils would be determined by the provincial election commissions according to the law.

#### 7. The Kabul Province Council and the Kabul city Council

##### Article fifteen:

The Kabul province council will be elected by the

representatives of the related district councils.

The number of the people's representatives to be elected for the Kabul province council would be determined by the provincial election commission according to the law.

The Kabul city council will be elected by the representatives of the related precinct councils.

The number of the people's representatives to be elected for the Kabul city council would be determined by the elections commission of Kabul city according to the law.

##### Article Sixteen:

Every council would hold its first session within one month after the election date.

### CHAPTER — III THE METHOD OF ELECTING PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVES

##### Article Seventeen:

The date of the elections of local organs of the state power will be fixed by the decree of the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan within forty five days after the termination of the preceding term of authority of the local organs of the state power.

##### Article Eighteen:

Every citizen of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan who has completed 18 years of age, regardless of any racial, nationality and tribal, relations, language, sex, place of residences, religion and sect, education, ascription, property and social status



will have the right to elect the people's representative to a local council.

**Article Nineteen:**

Every citizen of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan who has completed 21 years of age, with the observance of the principle embodied in article seven of this law, can be elected as the people's representative in the local council.

**Article Twenty:**

The right to recommend the candidates of the people's representatives to the local councils belongs to the organisations of the people's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the National Fatherland Front, and the Cooperatives, social and political organisations.

**Article Twentyone:**

In order to organise and hold elections for local council and to control the procedures, election commissions, will be established by the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council in the provinces, cities, precincts, districts, sub-districts and villages. The members of the election commission will be suggested by the collectives and organisations mentioned in article 20 of this law. The number and composition of the commission will be determined by the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

**Article Twentytwo:**

The election commission should be formed thirty days before the holding of the elections of the local organs of the state power.

**Article Twentythree:**

The Presidium of the Revolutionary Council of

the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan appoints from amongst the members of the election commission, the Chairman, the vice-chairman and the secretary of the commission.

**Article Twentyfour:**

The election commission will have the following duties:

1. General guidance, preparations and holding of elections of local councils.
2. Registration of the names of the candidates of the people's representatives in the local councils according to the regulations.
3. Study the petitions and complaints of the citizens with regard to the preparatory work and holding of elections.
4. Registration of the names of representatives elected for the local councils and arrangement of related documents.

**Article Twentyfive:**

The result of the elections will be submitted by the commission to the high commission for approval.

The election commissions of the provinces and the election commission of the Kabul city will present the documents related to the results of the elections to the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan for approval.

**Article Twentysix:**

The complaints concerning the executions of the election commissions will be submitted to the higher commission, which will be considered according to the law.

**Article Twentyseven:**

The introduction of candidates of the people's re-

en people of Palestine.

He caused the intensification of the plots, provocations and shameful and anti-human-rights aggressions of the Zionists of Israeli against the territorial integrity, independence and national sovereignty of Lebanon.

He has thrown away his masks and revealed his shameful anti-Afghan face for all the world to see. He shamelessly admitted that he has provided weapons to counter revolutionary Afghan bands and continues to do so.

The Government of the DRA has repeatedly made it clear that imperialism headed by unharnessed and discredited US imperialism, in collusion with the renegade leadership of China, the militarist ruling coterie of Pakistan and traitor Sadat, are continuing as



## Part III

### Article Thirtyone:

Those persons who have been deprived of political and civil rights, and those who are affected by psychological diseases cannot be elected to the local councils and cannot vote for it. Persons affected by diseases which prevent them from performing their duties cannot be elected to the local councils.

### Article Thirtytwo:

Cooperation in the preparations and holding the elections for the local organs of the state power will be undertaken by the general department of the local organs and the state administration.

## CHAPTER-IV

### DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LOCAL ORGANS OF THE STATE POWER

#### Article Thirtythree:

The councils of the provinces, the Kabul city, cities, precincts, districts and sub-districts will have the following duties and authorities:

1. To maintain, observe and implement the laws, decrees, resolutions and other regulations and decisions of the higher organs.

2. To maintain and preserve the social order, and to protect the rights and freedoms of the citizens.

3. Cooperation with the judicial, police and judicial organs in the advancement of their activities.

4. Protection and support of the activities of the heads and elders and all others related to the tribes in the

maintaining of peace, fraternity, security, safety, and welfare, and in safeguarding the frontiers of the country.

5. To organise the implementation of social and economic development plans of the state.

6. To approve the annual budget of incomes and expenditures.

7. To guide the private and cottage industries and to help in the activity of the state enterprises situated in their related regions.

8. To take measures towards the promotion of democratic changes in agriculture in the interest of the vast masses of farmers with their all-sided participation, cooperation toward obtaining machine tools, sowing seeds and chemical fertilisers and in selling the agricultural products, protect, encourage and develop the production and consumer cooperatives as well as other forms of cooperatives in agriculture.

9. Cooperation with the state organisations in the task of purchasing crops, products of industrial herbs and other agricultural yields.

10. To solve the disputes emanating from the use of water in accordance with the orders of the law.

11. To supervise the usage of agricultural land, the water resources, forests and other natural assets.

12. Cooperation in the development of the activities of combined and private enterprises and craftsmen and to encourage their voluntary unification with the cooperatives.

13. Deliberation and approval of the master plan of the cities and residential towns, to choose the sites for building residential buildings and social establishments, commercial projects and public services and to issue permissions in the field.

14. Construction, protection and maintenance of roads and streets in the related regions.

15. To control the activities of transport organisations and to help toward the development of public transportation.

16. To solve the problems related to the construction, repair and distribution of residential buildings.

17. To control the observance of regulations of hygiene in the commercial establishments and food provisions and public services.

18. To issue trade license and permission letters for the establishment of organisations for public services.

19. To take measures toward the further development and completion of the system of education, abolition of illiteracy, expansion of the network of schools and libraries.

20. To inform the citizens about the most important events in the country and the world.

21. To take measures toward the development of sports and physical fitness, especially the development of various national sports.

22. To take measures towards the development of public health and protection from contagious diseases.

23. To help in the drafting of the draftees for the military service and consolidation of the defence force of the country and, in case of necessity, to take direct part in the defensive measures.

24. To help in the activity of social and political organisations who are united in the National Fatherland Front.

25. To organise the building works of the residential areas, to take measures to prevent natural calamities and to remove their consequences.

26. To protect and repair the mosques, the Takya-khanas, shrines and other holy places and historical and cultural relics.

27. To take measures to protect and maintain the wells, sewers, lakes, the sources of reservoirs of drinking water, to plant trees and take care of them.

28. To organise and encourage voluntary activity of the citizens toward the execution of socially useful works.

29. To examine and solve the complaints and petitions of the citizens at due time.

30. To help preparation of general statistics among them statistics of manpower, and to take measures to maintain work for the citizens.

31. To collect the taxations according to law.

32. To help in the development of vocational education.

33. To control the prices.

34. To help in the development of communications.

35. To help in the provision of facilities for the nomads, tribes and cattle-breeders in the task of using

the grazing areas in a just manner, to help in the development of cattle-breeding and selling of their products, to raise the material welfare and cultural level and to improve the living conditions of nomads, tribes and cattle-raisers.

36. To help the families of those persons who are martyred or crippled in the defence of Saur Revolution or are engaged in the military service.

37. To organise the convention of elections of the local organs of the state power and performance of other authorities according to the law.

#### **Article Thirtyfour:**

The village council will have the following duties and authorities:

1. To all-sidedly help in maintaining progressive social and agricultural transformations in the village.

2. To help in the advancement of activity in campaign against illiteracy.

3. To take measures towards establishing schools and improve their activities.

4. To inform the village peoples about the events in the country and the world.

5. To help with the families of the persons who are martyred or crippled in the defence of the Saur Revolution or are serving in the military.

6. To help in the conscription of the draftees for the military service.

7. To take measures toward maintaining the primary materials for the farmers.

8. To take measures toward the building and maintenance of buildings, bridges and dams on stream-

waters, wells, sewers and other sources and reservoirs of drinking water.

9. To take measures toward the repair and maintenance of mosques, Takya-khanas, shrines and other holy places and graveyards.

10. To take measures toward the maintenance of roads and in case of necessity, the construction of new roads.

11. To take measures toward the plantation of trees in the related region.

12. To issue permit letters for the opening of shops, cafes and tea-houses.

13. To control the observance of regulations in the public services and commercial organisations.

14. To take measures to prevent contagious diseases,

15. To participate in the preparation of the village development draft plan.

16. To mobilise the farmers toward the performance of socially useful works.

17. To help collection of the taxes according to law.

18. To organise the work of guarding the social order, security and tranquillity in the village area.

19. To help toward the voluntary unification of farmers in the cooperatives.

20. Other duties and authorities anticipated by the law.

#### **CHAPTER—V**

#### **EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES OF THE LOCAL ORGANS OF THE STATE POWER**

##### **Article Thirtyfive:**

The executive committee of the council belongs to the executive organ of the local

organs of the state power.

#### **Article Thirty-six:**

The executive committees of the local councils are formed and approved by the higher executive committees from among the people's representatives who are elected in these councils.

In the executive committees, on the basis of the recommendation of the general department of the Islamic Affairs, the representatives of the ulama and religious figures can be included.

#### **Article Thirty-seven:**

The executive committees of the provincial councils and the Kabul city council will be formed and approved by the council of Ministers of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan from amongst the people's representatives who are elected in these councils.

#### **Article Thirty-eight:**

The executive committees of the provincial councils and the Kabul city council will be formed with the following composition:

- 1—A president,
- 2—A vice president,
- 3—A secretary
- 4—Members from nine to eleven persons,

The executive committees of the city councils, precinct councils and districts councils will have the following composition:

- 1—A president
- 2—A secretary
- 3—Five to seven members.

The executive committees of the subdistrict councils will have the following composition:

- 1—One president
- 2—One secretary
- 3—Three to five members.

#### **Article Thirty-nine:**

The executive committees will be responsible before the related councils and the higher executive committees and will report to them on their activities.

#### **Article Forty:**

The executive committees will continue with their duties until the formation of the new executive committees.

(To be continued).

### **Part IV**

#### **Article Forty-one:**

The executive committees will report about their activities to their councils at least once a year.

#### **Article Forty-two:**

The executive committees will have the following duties and powers:

1. To guide the affairs of economic, social and cultural structure in the related area on the basis of the decision of the council and decision of the higher organs of state power and administration.

2. To prepare and convene sessions of the local councils.

3. To lead the activities of the administrative organs under them.

4. To solve the complaints and to justly care for the petitions of the toilers in a definite time and to control the implementation of resolutions in the field.

5. To implement the laws, decrees, decisions and resolutions of the higher organs.

6. To help the people's representatives in the execution of their duties.

7. To perform other duties and authorities according to the law.

#### **Article Forty-three:**

The executive committees of the councils of subdistricts, districts, precincts and cities will suggest to the higher organs the award of medals and decorations of Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the executive committees of the provincial councils and the Kabul city council will make such suggestions through the higher organs.

#### **Article Forty-four:**

The president of the executive committee of the local council will have the following duties and authorities:

1. To take measures toward the implementation of the resolutions of local council and its executive committee and the resolutions of the higher organs of state power and administration and its supervision.

2. To convene and preside over the sessions of the executive committee.

3. To preside over the sessions of the council excepting the sessions in which the report of the executive committee is heard.

4. To administer financial affairs according to law and the signing of financial documents.

5. To control distribution of material aids to the needy persons.

6. To appoint and to dismiss the officials and employees of the body of the executive committee in accord with the orders of law.

7. To lead and regulate the activity of the heads of the executive committees under him.

8. To issue orders to the members of the executive committee, heads of the departments and sections and offices under the executive committee concerning the execution of the entrusted duties and its control.

9. To issue orders on other matters within the authority.

10. To give authority to the vice president or, in case of the absence of vice president, to one of the members of the executive committee, in cases of sickness, duty, day off or other reasons.

#### **Article Fortyfive:**

The performances of the heads of the executive committee of the councils of provinces and the Kabul city council will be guided and supervised by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan or his deputies or by the chairman of the general department of the local organs of state administration.

#### **Article Fortysix:**

The secretary of the executive committee of the local council will be at the same time secretary of the related council.

The secretary of the executive committee will have the following duties and authorities:

1. To arrange documents related to the activity of the local council and its executive committee.

2. To prepare the draft of the work plan of the local council and the executive committee and to propose it for approval.

3. To convene meetings, seminars, conferences and other gatherings toward the raising of the level of activity of the local council and its executive committee.

4. To execute the orders of the president and vice-president of the executive committee.

5. To control the execution of the resolutions of the local councils and their executive committees.

#### **Article Fortyseven:**

The resolutions made by the executive committee of the local councils will be signed by the president and secretary of the executive committee.

#### **Article Fortyeight:**

The resolutions of the executive committee issued within the limit of authority will be applicable for all the organisations responsible included in the area of ens included in the area of the council.

#### **Article Fortynine:**

The resolutions of the executive committee of the local council can be cancelled by the related council or the higher executive committee.

#### **Article Fifty:**

The resolutions of the executive committee of the provincial councils and the executive committee of the Kabul city can be cancelled by the related councils or the Council of Ministers of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

#### **Article Fiftytwo:**

The meetings of the executive committees can be held when required.

#### **Article Fiftytwo:**

The meetings of the executive committee can be held with the presence of two-thirds of its members.

#### **Article Fiftytthree:**

The decisions of the executive committees will be adopted by a majority of votes of the members present in the meeting.

#### **Article Fiftytfour:**

The presidents of the executive committees, vice-presidents, secretaries and members of the executive committees will have individual responsibility before the higher executive committees for the activities of the executive committees.

### **CHAPTER — VI**

#### **THE OFFICES OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES OF THE LOCAL COUNCILS**

#### **Article Fiftytfive:**

The councils of provinces, cities, districts and precincts of the Kabul city will establish the related offices, when required, toward the guidance of economic, social, cultural and constructional affairs.

A list of these offices and the method of their establishment will be determined by the Council of Ministers of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

#### **Article Fiftyt six:**

The regulations of the offices of the executive committees will be approved by the Council of Ministers of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.



**Article Fiftyseven:**

The executive committees of the precincts and sub-district councils can employ officials and other employees for the accomplishment of duties in the related fields within the limit of the set-up determined by the Council of Ministers of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

**Article Fiftyeight :**

The appointment and dismissal of the heads of the offices will be carried out by the executive committees on the basis of the agreement of the upper organs of the state administration according to the law.

**Article Fiftynine:**

The heads of the offices of the executive committees of the council of provinces, the cities, districts and precincts of the Kabul city, within the limit of their own authorities will issue the required orders toward the execution of the resolution of the councils and the related executive committees and the resolutions and decisions of the higher organs.

**Article sixty:**

The offices of the executive committees will be under the higher executive committees and organs of the state.

**Article Sixtyone:**

The heads of offices of the executive committees will have individual responsibility for their undertakings before the executive committees, the Ministries and related offices.

## CHAPTER—VII TO REGULATE THE ACTIVITY OF THE LOCAL ORGANS OF THE STATE POWER

**Article Sixtytwo:**

The local councils will deliberate and solve in their meetings all the issues which the law has placed within the limit of their authority.

**Article Sixtythree:**

The executive committee shall call the sessions of the related council at least twice a year.

**Article Sixtyfour:**

The local councils in their first meeting will choose the commissions of credentials and the said commissions will consider the authorities of the representatives elected in the council.

**Article Sixtyfive:**

The meetings of the councils can be held with the presence of two thirds of its members.

**Article Sixtysix:**

The first session of the council will be opened by an elderly representative and will continue under his chairmanship.

The following sessions will be opened by the president of the executive committee and will continue under his chairmanship.

**Article Sixtyseven:**

During the submission of the executive committee's report to the council session, the sessions will be presided over by an elderly representative.

**Article Sixtyeight:**

The councils will hold open sessions and in case of

necessity they can hold closed-door sessions.

**Article Sixtynine:**

The council session shall be held according to the approved agenda.

**Article Seventy :**

The council's resolutions will be made through free voting with the majority of votes of the members present in the session.

**Article Seventyone:**

The council's resolutions will be made through the council's voting and signed by the secretary of the council.

The resolutions will be recorded according to the law.

**Article Seventytwo:**

The council's resolution will be cancelled by the higher council in case they are against the law.

The resolutions of the provincial councils and of Kabul city council, in case of being inconsistent with the law, will be cancelled by the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

**Article Seventythree:**

The council in its sessions will solve all the issues within the limit of its power according to the law.

**Article Seventyfour:**

In the council sessions, persons who are invited by the executive committees and also the responsible officials of the General Department of the local organs of the state administration can attend.

**Article Seventyfive:**

The procedures of the



council sessions will be recorded, and signed by the president and secretary of the council.

#### **Article Seventysix:**

The resolutions of the council will be conveyed within ten days by the executive committees for the information of the related offices, incharges of the affairs and the citizens of the related area.

#### **Article Seventyseven:**

In the regions where tribes are residing, the related administrative organisations are to respect their customs and historical traditions.

#### **Article Seventyeight:**

The state flag of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan should be hoisted on the building where the local council's sessions are convened during the session and on the headquarters of executive committee permanently according to the law.

### **CHAPTER—VIII**

#### **THE POPULAR REPRESENTATIVES OF THE LOCAL ORGANS OF THE STATE POWER**

##### **Article Seventynine:**

To represent people in the local organs is considered an honourable duty.

##### **Article Eighty:**

The authority of the people's representative begins from the date of his election

in the council and terminates with the election of the next term of the council.

##### **Article Eightyone:**

The people's representative will have the following rights:

1. To take part in the solution of the problems submitted to the session.
2. To propose the issues for deliberation to the council.

##### **Article Eightytwo:**

The people's representative will have the following obligations:

1. To consistently cooperate in the implementation of the resolutions of the local council.
2. To honestly fulfill the orders of the local council.
3. To meet regularly with the clients and to report the resolutions of the council to them and to carry out the propagatory works among them.
4. To make efforts to implement the decisions of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the Revolutionary Council and the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

##### **Article Eightythree:**

The representatives of the people to the local jirgahs will perform honorary duties.

During participation in the meetings of the jirgah, travel allowance and lodging expenses are paid to the representatives of the people to the local jirgahs.

##### **Article Eightyfour:**

Whenever the manners of the people's representative in the local council cause damage to the prestige of the people's representation, or if he does not perform his duties in a worthy manner, he will be stripped of his authority by the organ which has elected him.

##### **Article Eightyfive:**

The authority of the people's representatives of the local councils will be ended in the case of death or movement to another locality or in the case of lack of possibility to execute it, and another person will be elected in his place according to this law.

### **CHAPTER—IX THE FINAL ORDERS**

##### **Article Eightysix:**

Organisational and methodic help for the local organs of the state power and the arrangement of material provisions of the local organs of the state power and administration will be provided by the general department of the local organs of state administration.

##### **Article Eightyseven:**

The executive committees of the local councils and the offices of the executive committees of the councils of the provinces, cities, districts, and precincts of the Kabul city will have a corporate personality and will possess a stamp inscribed with the insignia of the state of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the name of the executive committee and administration. (Concluded)

## MEASURES FOR RESURGENCE OF INDUSTRIES UNDERTAKEN

### Government Plans

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 19 Oct 81 p 2

[Editorial: "For Reactivation and Resurgence of Industries"]

[Text]

Development of industries has been a prime objective of the DRA Government. Since the victory of the Saur Revolution, especially its new phase, constructive measures have been taken to achieve growth of national industries. Appropriate plans have been drawn and implemented to raise the output of industrial plants in the country. Special attention is being paid to reorganisation and improvement of the managerial set-up of industrial complexes to ensure efficiency in work and increase in production.

Some of the factories, which were compelled to shutdown due to bad organisation and inappropriate management, have been reactivated to avoid loss to national economy. Unlike under the past Governments, the industrial plants in the country now enjoy full support and

protection of the DRA Government and every efforts are being made to further develop these plants to the benefit of growth of the national economy.

Added incentives and facilities as well as fringe benefits are now provided for the workers as part of the drive to increase industrial production. Better working conditions, rise in salaries for industrial workers and other privileges introduced by the DRA Government have been very effective in raising the industrial production in the country.

Many major industrial plants in the country have undergone renovation and modernisation, a major factor in boosting production recorded by many industrial plants in the country. Plans are also underway to expand the output of some industrial plants, specially those which were on the verge of closure and stagnation.

With the wise and timely action of the DRA Government, not only one of the important industrial plant that is the Kabul Ceramic Factory was saved from total shut down and liquidation, but plans are being drawn up to further develop and expand its production to meet part of the requirements of our people for chinaware. Economic and technical feasibility studies are being made and ways and means sought on how to increase and expand the factory's production.

Another major industrial complex, which the Government plans to expand, is the Jangalak Factories. A Soviet expert team has already begun to prepare technical and economic feasibility studies on expansion of the complex. The expansion and scope of operations of these factories, to be made with the technical and economic assistance

of the friendly country, the Soviet Union, will enable it to enlarge its motor repair and casting shops.

The reconstruction plan of the Jangalak Factories, being completed with the help of Soviet designers, is scheduled to be finished by mid-1982 and the actual reconstruction will be carried in 1983 and 1985, according to a report of the factories' management.

Another major and successful factory, the Aho Shoe Factory, has also reported increase in production due to improved management and hard work of its workers. The Aho management, reporting increase in daily output, adds that at the beginning, the factory produc-

ed some 55 pairs of shoes a day. However, after the victory of the Saur Revolution, especially its new phase, the daily output of the factory has reached 155 to 855 pairs of shoes.

These are but a few examples of the success of the wise and principled economic policy of the Government in achieving economic and industrial development.

The increased activities of the Afghan Industrial Bank have also been instrumental in encouraging industrial development and productions. The bank has been providing loans on easy and favourable terms to private and public sectors, helping them develop their plants and achieve rise in their productions.

Recently, the Government launched a work emulation drive in the industrial plants as part of its efforts to further encourage the workers to increase production. The drive has been widely welcomed by all workers and productive firms. It has already scored marked achievements.

It is hoped that, with continued efforts by the Government and the appropriate plans drawn up or to be drawn up, the country will achieve impressive successes in development of national industries to meet the essential needs of the people and save a considerable amount in hard currency.

#### Loans to Enterprises

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 5 Oct 81 p 3

[Text]

The net profit of the Industrial Development Bank of Afghanistan during 1359 amounted to Afs. 38,815,628, showing an increase of some 60 per cent compared to 1358. The bank's loan towards the end of 1359 amounted to Afs. 639 million which, compared to 1358, shows some 11 per cent increase. In addition to carry-over loans, the bank made some Afs. 420 million new loans in 1359 to industrial organisations in the country.

This was stated by Eng Timor Shah Surkhabi, caretaker president of the

bank, in an interview with the Kabul New Times.

Talking of the activities of the bank, Surkhabi added: "During 1359, the bank's revenues amounted to Afs. 71,268,690 and its net profit to Afs. 38,815,628, while these figures in the previous year of 1358 were Afs. 52,578,458 and Afs. 24,215,040 respectively. Thus, during the 1359 the Bank's revenues shows some 34 per cent increase and that its net profit some 60 per cent, compared to the year 1358".

The bank's activity, in the light of the lofty ob-

jectives and useful goals of the liberating Saur Revolution and especially its new phase, has been very satisfactory compared to previous years both in credit and non-credit areas.

In addition to loans carried over from the previous year, some Afs. 420 million of new loans were extended by the bank during 1359 which, in view of number and the volume of the loans extended, shows an increase of some 24 per cent compared to 1358.

The balance of the bank's loans, which were

carried over from 1358 to 1359 amounted to Afs. 574 and in the course of 1359 an additional Afs. 420 million new loans were made and Afs. 355 million loans was retrieved during the same period. Thus the balance of loans of the bank towards the end of 1359 amounted to Afs 639, showing an increase of some 11 per cent compared to 1358.

"This figure indicates the interest and confidence of people in investment in accordance with the developmental projects of DRA, as well as the zeal, enthusiasm and untiring efforts of the employees of the bank", noted Surkhabi.

Answering a question, he said: "During 1360 the bank has furnished financial assistance to 107 industrial projects and as envisaged in the five-year financial plan, these loans will cover 137 projects by the end of the current Afghan year and towards the end of 1364 the number of projects to be financed by the bank are anticipated to reach to 254".

#### LOANS

"The bank extends loan for creation and establishment, expansion and revitalisation of industrial projects, both in public and private sectors and mixed sectors. These loans are made available after technical and economical feasibility studies of a certain project against guarantees", he pointed out.

The minimum duration of the loan can be one

year and that maximum more than ten years.

The bank was established in 1972 with a capital of Afs. 240 million to help development and growth of industries in the country as well as granting financial, technical, consultative, administrative and accounting services to industrial enterprises. At the outset 40 per cent of total capital was shared by foreign shareholders and the remaining 60 per cent belonged to local, public, private sectors and individual shareholders. However, since 1976, the Government owns the total capital. The value of shares held by foreign shareholders were paid to them by Da Afghanistan and that of individual and private shareholders were paid by the Finance, Ministry.

Since its inception, the bank has been in the service of national industries. At present the bank has 150 industrial projects, both public and private, as its clients.

"The bank has rendered useful services in development of industrial sectors through providing loans on favourable terms. Following the Saur Revolution, especially its new phase, the Bank's terms under which loans are extended were reviewed and it has become very easy and favourable", recalled Surkhabi, "so that, in accordance with the DRA Government's objectives, the pace of development of industries in the country is accelerated through use of national cap-

ital in the industrial sector".

The bank plans to establish centres of small industries and handicraft in other provinces.

The bank at present has set up a pilot small industries centre and, when such small industries are developed to medium industries, they will be transferred to other centres such as industrial parks.

"The bank also plans to set up provincial branches shortly for coordination of industries in the country", Surkhabi added.



## Increase in Ceramic Production

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 19 Oct 81 p 3

[Text]

The survey and preliminary studies for development of the Kabul Ceramic Factory continues. In pursuance of the policy of the Government in developing productive industries of the country, recently it was resolved to carry out an all-sided study for seeking more effective and better ways and means to increase the production of the factory.

This was said to our reporter by Eng Abdurahman Qazikhani, head of the factory.

Recalling historical background of the factory, Eng Qazikhani said: "The factory was established in 1956 through private investment under the name of Shaker Ceramic Factory. In the early stage of operation the processed raw materials was being imported from Japan, and its primary products included ceramic wares which were of good quality and to the satisfaction of the customers. However, the use of already processed raw materials did not last long as it was becoming too expensive for the owner of the factory to import such raw materials. Thus, the management of the factory decided to make use of the locally available raw materials like ballclay which was found in Takhcha Kahan sale mine field of Taluqan, Kaolin, obtained from Talao Barfak and Feldspath from Dare Noor of Jalalabad."

Due to lack of modern and sophisticated technical facilities, the locally available raw materials were not properly processed within the factory, and this led to the quality of the products becoming inferior and at the same time the cost of production becoming higher than the similar foreign goods imported into the country. Thus, the factory's products lost their marketability and remained unsold at the warehouses. This state of affairs compelled the factory owners to change the system of production and their machinery to produce insulators and shimoot tiles for steam furnace, and coal stoves, instead of china wares. The insulators were used for power lines and that shimoot tiles, for stove and furnaces.

By changing the production line, the factory was able to sustain itself financially. But, unfortunately, this operation also did not last long and finally, in 1966, the factory came to standstill and its shutdown continued until 1974. "The Mines and Industries Ministry decided to reactivate the factory. And, it began a trial run and at the same time the study began on ways and means to increase the production, as part of the policy of the Government's drive to develop the productive industries in the country", said Qazikhani.

The factory was visited personally by the Mines

and Industries Minister as well as an authorised expert team of the ministry which made a study of ways to reactivate and further develop the factory. It was also visited by an expert team of the Soviet Union. The team, after a study, presented a detailed report to the authorities of the Ministry.

The preliminary survey, including geological and constructional, is under progress at present and, in the near future, marked changes will be made at the factory with the Soviet assistance, he noted.

The factory was purchased by the ministry at the repeated request of its owner. Now that the factory operates as an industrial state institute, constant efforts are being made to develop the factory and it was decided to secure the Soviet advisers' help in achieving this end, he said.

Now eight experienced Soviet experts help in further development and expansion of the factory, who have already carried out preliminary studies for its future development. The cooperation of other Government organisation is also sought for completion of the technical and economic feasibility studies. If this proves fruitful and justifies an expansion of the factory, it is possible at the following production capacity:

Production of chinaware up to some 500,000 pieces —141,66 tons. production of insulator up to some 110,000 or 49,50 tons, production of plumbing equipment up to some 5400 pieces or 72 tons which will come to a total of 263.16 tons.

As of now, some of the products of the factory such as insulator and shimoot tiles, are sold to various ministries and government organizations. The chinaware of the factory is sold through cooperative sale outlets at reasonable prices and to Government officials on instalment.

"Due to the increasing demand for chinaware, it is hoped that, in the near future, the production of the factory will be increased and the quality improved to meet international standard", said Qazikhani.

CSO: 4600/75

## CONSUMER SUPPLY FACILITIES OPENED

### New Bakery for Kabul

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 14 Oct 81 p 3

[Text]

The second bakery of Kabul, commissioned recently, has been completed six months ahead of planned target. This is attributed to the hard work and preserverence of the workers and employees of the Afghan Construction Unit and sincere cooperation of the Soviet engineers and technicians.

With a capacity of producing 72 tons of bread and cookies in 24 hours, the Kabul second bakery will supply 25 per cent of the baked bread required by the Kabul inhabitants.

This was stated by Eng Mohammad Aziz, president of the food procurement and cooperative department, in an interview with the Kabul New Times.

"The completion of the second bakery, equipped with modern facilities, is of vital importance for the people of Afghanistan", he pointed out the new equipment means that most of the manual

works is now replaced by machine work, and the workers only supervise and watch the operations of the machinery.

Due to increasing demand for baked bread the production capacity of the first bakery was raised from 50 tons to 62 tons in 24 hours. Though the final production capacity of the second bakery is 72 tons in 24 hours, in view of the reconstruction and substitution of old with the modern machinery at the first bakery, the total output of the two bakeries will be 72 tons in 24 hours until the end of the current Afghan year.

The construction work on the second bakery began in Saratan 1358 and took two years to be completed. The survey, and design of the building were carried out by Soviet firms. The new bak-

ery covers an area of 7.7 thousand square metres.

The total expenditures of the second bakery, said Eng Aziz, amounted to over 260 million. "The Afghan personnel, actively participated, with the help and technical assistance of the Soviet Union, in installation of machinery". The bakery employs over 178 workers.

Referring to the future plans of the department, he said: "Presently, work is in progress for construction of a mill in Mazare Sharif with the storage capacity of 20,000 tons, a mill with the capacity of 60 tons in 24 hours and a bakery with the baking capacity of 25 tons in 24 hours. The new project is scheduled to go into operation in the first quarter of the Afghan year 1361".

Similarly, the establishment of a mill in Pule Khumri with the capacity of 200 tons in 24 hours has also been undertaken

and is scheduled to go into operation by the first quarter of Afghan year 1361, thus "removing totally the difficulties in view of the shortage of flour", he added.

Likewise, the construction of a mill with the capacity of 60 tons and a bakery with the capacity of 25 tons are planned in Herat. The survey work, design and the drawing are ready and "soon work will begin for the construction" he said.

The setting up of a rice processing plant and a silo for storage of rice with the storage capacity of 20,000 tons in Baghlan, development of the Pule Khumri silo capacity from 20,000 and the Mazar Sharif silo capacity from 20,000 to 50,000 tons each and installation of a plant to provide for confectionary plants, are also envisaged in the future plans, according to Eng Aziz.

#### New Sugar Outlets

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 18 Oct 81 p 3

[Text]

"With the opening up of new sugar sale outlets in various parts of the city, the Kabul citizens' requirement for daily consumption of sugar is fully ensured. The new sale outlets run by the Government are well organised, ensuring normal sale of sugar to consumers".

This was stated by Lemar Ahmad Lemar, president of the petroleum and sugar department, in an interview with the Kabul New Times.

The sale of sugar on commission basis continues from the time the Government Monopoly was established, he recalled. However, in an effort to provide added facilities for the Kabul citizens and to serve them better, the department recently decided to open up a number of new sale outlets in various sections

of Kabul. Presently there are some 1,100 shops, along the Government-run sale outlets, where sugar is sold to the public at subsidised price, he pointed out.

If assessed in view of the supply of sugar and size of the population, one can say with certainty that the requirements of inhabitants of Sayyed Noor Mohammad Shah Mena, Rahman Mena and Khairkhana Mena for sugar is fully met through the four sugar sale outlets established by the Government in these areas. Similarly, the inhabitants of Share Nau Microroyan and Mirwa-is Maidan are meeting a greater part of their sugar requirements from the new sale outlets there, Lemar Ahmad said. There is a plan to open up more of these outlets in other parts of the city so that the consumers can

easily and without wasting much time obtain their required amount of sugar.

The working programme of the new sale outlets are organised in such a way that the consumers can receive their quota from 7 in the morning to 6:30 in the evening. Through those new sale outlets, the sugar is directly supplied to the consumers, according to their needs. Earlier many shops sold sugar on commission basis and created difficulties for the consumers through hoarding and were thus able to sell sugar at higher prices.

The Petroleum and Sugar Department, keeping in mind its responsibility, has always tried to import the required amount of sugar in the country and distribute it on a normal way so that no shortage is felt, Lemar said.



In pursuance of this policy, the department has concluded an agreement with the friendly country of the Soviet Union for purchase and import of 100,000 tons of sugar for the current year. Compared to the last year an increase of 30 per cent is taken in consideration in the new agreement.

The delivery of the sugar has already begun without interruption, he added.

#### Automated System for Coal Railway

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 19 Oct 81 p 3

[Text]

An automated control system has been installed at the station of Osnova, the main sorting station of the Southern Railway.

This will speed up the passage of trains carrying coal from the Donbass coal fields, ore from the Dnieper valley, and engineering products from Kharkov.

The system replaces a complex of operations which were previously carried out by a large staff of railway operators. Gathering information

about the cargoes which have arrived, the computers immediately issue orders for the most rational distribution of the trains. All the necessary information is reproduced on display panels, while machines automatically print and produce all relevant documentation. The electronic dispatcher has reduced the time that rolling stock has to spend in station's yards and 1,500 spare trucks will thus be released for additional loading operations.

(MN)

CSO: 4600/78

# CAMPAIGN TO INCREASE AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT ACTIVATED

## Government Efforts

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 20 Oct 81 p 2

[Editorial: "A Productive Campaign"]

[Text]

Afghanistan is an agricultural country, where the majority of the population is engaged in farming. However, for long years, the farmers in this country tilled their land under the most arduous conditions and with very simple and primitive means, and what they produced could hardly meet the people's daily requirements.

The meagre land productivity caused by social and economic factors, could not sustain the farmers and their families the year round, compelled them to resort to borrowing, especially at the sowing season. The heavy burden forced them to sell their products at low prices in order to repay their debts.

They borrowed money to pay for the improved seeds, chemical fertilisers, and other essentials, but the back-breaking loans never allowed the farmers

to improve their miserable economic condition and that of their families. This state of affairs also caused an increasing deficit in the total agricultural production of the country.

With the victory of the Saur Revolution, especially its new phase, having realised all these difficulties and hardships of the toiling farmers in the country, the DRA Government has undertaken effective and specific plans aimed at helping the farmers, augmenting the land productivity and agricultural output as a whole.

The Government has exerted and is exerting all possible efforts to encourage the toiling peasants to enhance their per unit land productivity by providing technical guidance, improved seeds, chemical fertiliser and modern agricultural tools on most favourable and easy terms.

To help the farmers and enable them to increase the land productivity, the Government decided to reduce the selling price of chemical fertiliser, seeds, and agricultural tools and machinery to farmers. The prices of industrial crops such as cotton to be purchased by the Government, enterprises and companies, have been considerably increased.

As part of the effort to increase the land productivity and help the farmers, the Government has stepped up its activities for further popularisation of use of fertiliser and modern agricultural means. With the enlarged network of sale outlets for fertiliser, improved seeds and other essentials, the Afghan farmers now have an easy access to what is needed for them to increase land productivity.

Among the most constructive and effective plans undertaken by the Government are the campaigns for spring and autumn sowing, which are drawn up on the basis of a resolution of the DRA Council of Ministers. These plans and programmes have already yielded fruitful results, as the experiences of the autumn sowing of 1359 and spring sowing of 1360 show.

The autumn sowing campaign this year has begun on Sunbula 1 and will continue until Jaddi 1. Over 10,000 tons of improved varieties of wheat seeds have been supplied for distribution to Afghan farmers to be used in the autumn sowing of 1360. In the same proportion, other essentials are also made available to the farmers to make use of them for the autumn sowing.

In order to implement the autumn sowing program-

me, meetings are being held in various provinces to ensure the full and satisfactory fulfilment of the programme.

In Afghanistan, the majority of the farmers are in need of improved seeds, chemical fertiliser, agricultural chemicals, improved irrigation schemes, agricultural tools and better markets for their surplus produce. Yet, individual farmers find it difficult to market their surplus products and secure desirable prices as the farms are located far away from the market places.

Agricultural cooperatives provide a solution to most of these problems. Through the cooperatives, the farmers can easily establish contact with the interested organisations such as the Agricultural Development Bank, the Afghan Chemical Fertiliser Company and the Afghan Seeds Company, in order to meeting their essential needs.

#### Improved Wheat Seed

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 15 Oct 81 p 3

[Text]

Over 10,000 tons of improved varieties wheat seeds have been supplied for distribution to Afghan farmers by the Improved Seeds Company to be used in the 1360 autumn sowing campaign.

In an interview with our reporter, president of the company Mirdad Panjsheri said that the company sold 5,352 tons of the seeds worth Afs

59,000,000 to the farmers all over the country for the spring sowing during 1360. The company also provided over 10,000 tons of the seeds worth Afs. 121,000,000 for sale to the farmers in the current year, which constitutes a total of 15,352 tons worth Afs 180,000,000.

The campaign begins at different times in different regions of the co-

untry, but generally it starts in mid-Sunbula and continues till mid-Jadi. Already, a large number of farmers in the country have been organised in such cooperatives. Now, the toiling farmers in this country find it easier to seek the necessary assistance and continuously augment the land productivity. They can be better helped in successful implementation of spring and autumn sowing through the technical guidance and facilities provided by their respective cooperatives.

With the impressive arrangements and facilities provided for the farmers and on the basis of the experience gained from the successful implementation of the last year's autumn sowing, it is hoped the campaign of 1360 will also prove a success benefiting the farmers as well as improving the overall agricultural production of the country.

untry, but generally it starts in mid-Sunbula and continues till mid-Jadi.

About 5,000 tons of such seeds for spring sowing and 5,000 tons for the autumn sowing have been imported from the USSR as a grant-in-aid. Import of 10,000 tons of the seeds is envisaged from that country in 1361.

He added that, according to the plan, sowing of

2,300 hectares of lands comprising the extension farms of the company in Kandahar, Marja, Helmand and Ghazni has been envisaged for the autumn sowing. "If we estimate the average yield per hectare two tons, approximately 4,000 tons is expected from the above land in 1361.

Panjsheri said that, realizing that improved seeds are the major factor for growth and development of the agricultural production in the sector, the company as a producer of the improved seeds cooperates in devising development plans in agriculture and coordinating the programmes with the concerned departments. Provision of the seeds from various sources according to its planned allocation and putting them at the disposal of the Afghan Fertiliser Company at the appropriate time according to the protocol are the measures adopted.

He stated that, with the victory of the glorious Saur Revolution, especially its new, evolutionary phase, major changes were introduced in all aspects particularly in the production sectors in the country. One of these is RC Decree 8 and its appendix 1. With the completion of land reforms, over 350,000 landless and deserving families will receive land.

Building of new state farms is another step in development of agriculture in the country and boosting agricultural yields.

"In view of the major changes in different fields and the land reforms in the country, our duties have become more and heavier. For better utilisation of the land by the farmers, provision of appropriate improved seeds, chemical fertilisers, pesticides and insecticides and other chemicals is necessary.

Though fertilisers and agricultural machinery and implements are imported from abroad, the improved seeds should be produced in the country".

Considering the present situation of the farms and the demand for distribution and production of the improved seeds, in addition to development of 6,460 hectares of land in the farms of the company, 3,600 hectares of land is envisaged to be allocated for the new extension farms for improved seeds in the Herat, Balkh and Takhar provinces.

Building of such farms will prevent the unnecessary transport expenses. Rice, paddy, maize, beans, seeds of vegetables and fruit-bearing seedlings will be supplied in the farms.

In reply to a question, Panjsheri said that, at present, sale and distribution of seeds are carried out by the Afghan Fertiliser Company. "If our programme expands, a marketing and distribution section will be required to function in the framework of the Improved Seeds Company".

Moreover, to meet the demand for storage faci-

lities, the company envisages building of godowns with a capacity of 1,000 to 5,000 tons in Kabul, Kunduz, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Herat and Mazare Sharif.

Since the extension of the improved seeds requires specialised vocational knowhow, the company plans to send a number of its technical and vocational cadres to the friendly countries for training.

The president of the company added that the better-yield specifications of the improved seeds are the results of the persistent activities of research institutions and experts. Necessary measures have to be adopted to supply improved seeds according to international standards.

To achieve this, the company has started work on a draft law for improved seeds with the cooperation of the UN experts. The law has been drafted, and will be enforced after finalization.

By enforcement of the law, the improved seeds will be produced and distributed according to international standards all over the country. With the implementation of the law, further facilities will be provided for the farmers.

"To further assist the farmers with improved seeds and for controlling the quality of the seeds, the company envisages construction of well-equipped laboratories in the capital and provinces", he added.



## Expanded Raisin Exports

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 20 Oct 81 p 3

[Interview with A. W. Saighani, president of the Raisin Export Promotion Institute]

[Text]

Some 37,428 tons of raisin worth \$ 53,746,608 have been exported abroad during the last six months of the current year.

In an interview with the Kabul New Times, president of the raisin export promotion institute Ahmad Wali Saighani said that a 162 per cent increase has been recorded in the volume of raisin export in the last six months of 1360 compared with the previous year. Raisin has been supplied to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Britain, India, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Finland, Denmark, Holland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Japan. But the major importers of the Afghan raisin are the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Britain and Ireland.

Saighani said that, from among the three kinds of raisin—red, green and black—the red raisin attracted the most purchasers.

Of the total exported, it accounted for 35,182 tons.

The average price of raisin in the free markets was \$1,472 and in the barter region \$ 1,390. The raisin is exported to the European countries via Hairatan port and via Chaman to India and Pakistan.

In reply to a question, Saighani said that, since the institute is a non-profit organisation, it has no direct role in purchase of raisin. It only controls and supervises the export of raisin by the export institutions and individual merchants.

Speaking on prospects of the total income of raisin export from the 1360 produce, he said that, due to the price fluctuations in the international market, the total can not be estimated. But due to increase in the raisin production in the producing countries in the current year and limitations of the international markets, a decrease in the price is envisaged.

According to reports from the grape-producing regions in the country and in view of the favourable weather conditions, the current year's grape production will be satisfactory. It can be

estimated at between 110 to 120,000 tons.

### GRAPES

To guide the producers and boost raisin production in the major grape-producing areas—the Kabul, Parwan, Balkh, Kandahar and Herat provinces—the institute has established experimental farms and is willing to introduce modern methods to the viniculturists. To achieve this goal, the institute envisages a new system of viticulture with the technical cooperation of the concerned authorities of the Agriculture Development Bank, the Agricultural Cooperatives and the general directorates of agriculture.

Experienced experts in the institute are ready to serve the producers. To assist the viniculturists, the institute cooperates in fixing the minimum price of raisin to prevent the malpractices of the middlemen and creating a direct relation between the exporters, producers and other institutions purchasing the raisin at a set price.

Saighani said that the

institute, according to the provisions of its charter is in direct contact with the viniculturists, providing them information on improving the quality of raisin, changing the drying system and proper picking of the raisin. It has also put at the disposal of the viniculturists a publication, 'Guide on picking and drying of grapes', through the provincial agriculture and cooperatives departments which will considerably contribute in improving the quality of raisin.

The institute also su-

pervises the processing and packing of raisins in the raisin-cleaning factories and has issued necessary instructions to them to help improve their performance. To achieve this goal, samples of raisin are checked by the concerned officials before export so that it should be according to the set standard of the institute.

Otherwise, export certificates are not issued and the raisin will be returned to the processing factory. This procedure has proved very useful he added.

#### More Use of Fertilizers, Medicines

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 3 Oct 81 p 3

[Interview with G. S. Akbari, president of the Afghan Fertilizer Company]

[Text]

Distribution of 30384 tons of urea fertiliser, 30651 tons of phosphate and agriculture and veterinary medicines worth Afs 20,000,000 has been envisaged in the current year's autumn sowing campaign.

In an interview with the Kabul New Times, the president of the Afghan Fertiliser Company, Ghulam Sakhi Akbari, said that to successfully implement the 1360 H. S. autumn sowing programme, the company has made necessary arrangements. According to the plan, the company will provide different kinds of chemical fertiliser, pesticides, insecticides and me-

dicines for animal diseases through its retail selling outlets and the company's agricultural medicines depots to the country's farmers and livestock owners.

The farmers and livestock breeders can obtain different chemical fertiliser, medicines and improved wheat seeds by cash payment or with the credit coupons prepared for the farmers through the Agricultural Development Bank branch offices or from the retail selling outlets.

To provide further facilities for the farmers, in addition to 26 agriculture medicines depots, the nu-

mber of Afghan Fertiliser Company retail selling outlets have been promoted from 1,040 to 1,100.

In reply to a question Akbari said that although the autumn sowing campaign begins early in Sunbula and continues till late Jaddi, until the end of the sowing campaign in the current year a total of 66,212 tons of urea fertiliser worth Afs 529,696,000,; 40,142 tons of phosphate fertiliser worth Afs 585,670,800, agricultural veterinary medicines and small agricultural equipment worth Afs 49,000,000 will be distributed.

He noted that since the beginning of the current

year a total of 45,548 tons of fertiliser worth Afs 374,000,000 and agricultural and veterinary medicines worth Afs 33,570,000 has been sold to the farmers and livestock owners.

The Afghan Fertiliser Company will produce 60,000 tons of phosphate and will put it at the disposal of the farmers, he said. It also envisages production of agricultural and veterinary medicines and small agricultural tools worth Afs 90,000,000. The president added that every year 18 to 20 per cent increase is envisaged in selling of fertiliser and agricultural and veterinary medicines. Necessary measure for storage and distribution of these items are also envisaged.

CSO: 4600/76

## LIVESTOCK HEALTH CARE PROGRAMS EXPANDED

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 13, 14 Oct 81 p 3

[13 Oct 81]

[Text]

Afghanistan is a country of about 15.54 million people dependent mainly on 37-million livestock population and land produce to keep its economy on the move. The population of pastoralists, nomads and semi-nomadic tribes (1.65 million Kuchis and 11.10 million rural people) have, over thousands of years, organised their lives in and around their cattle and livestock flock, so much so that their summer and winter habitats depend on the needs of well-being of their stocks. Clothing in this severe climatic condition is also provided by livestock produce, housing (tents and carpets) and their food too (dairy product and meat) come from the animals they own or from the wild animals they hunt.

**VITAL**

Agriculture thus plays the major role in the country's economy. Eightyfive to 90 per cent of the agricultural production accounts for 50 per cent of the

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and supports almost 13 million people living in the rural areas who are exclusively dependent upon it for their livelihood. About 1/3 of this total agricultural produce comes from livestock. Therefore livestock industry in Afghanistan is of vital importance to the national economy, and it is this special man-and-his-domestic-flock relationship that governs the economic and social wellbeing of the rural and pastoral population.

In modern times livestock also contributes to 30 per cent of Afghanistan's exports with the sheep industry alone providing, by value of national livestock production, 90 per cent. The value of recorded exports, excluding substantial non-recorded exports of live sheep for slaughter and wool, are:

Product	1969-70	1973-74
	(In US\$ millions)	
Karakul pelts	13.1	16.8
Hides, skins	2.6	5.6
Wool	6.7	5.8
Casings	1.0	1.5
Other skins	0.4	1.4
Carpets, rugs	6.2	14.5
	<hr/> 30.0	<hr/> 45.5

Although the livestock number in the country was drastically reduced in 1970-72 years of drought, in 1975 the Ministry of Planning estimated the livestock population to be:

Sheep—14.9 million  
Karakul sheep—6.5 m.  
Goat—3.2m  
Cattle—3.6m  
Buffalo—23,000 heads.  
Camel—299,000 heads.  
Horses—403,000 heads.  
Donkey—1.3 million.  
Mule—413,000 heads.  
Poultry—6.3 million

In 1357 H.S., the GDP for agriculture and forestry was 82 billion Afghani while for the year 1358 it was estimated at



84.0 billion Afghanis. The value of gross agricultural production was 81,487 million Afghanis in 1357 and in 1358 it was estimated at 83,427 million Afghanis. The target for 1359 was 87,082 million Afghanis.

Out of this the total gross products of livestock with comparative prices were: 22,565 million Afghanis in 1357, 23,414 million Afghanis was the 1358 estimate and the target for 1359 was 23,903 million Afghanis.

The number of cows and buffaloes at the end of 1359 was planned as 3820 (per head). The total sheep population was planned at 19,500 (per head). These are figures related to the private sector while in the public sector, total sheep population was 8,000 (per head), milch cattle was 500 heads and cows and buffalo was 2,000 (per head), while that of Karakul sheep was also 8,000 (per head). Gross livestock production planned for 1359 was worth 16.9 million afghanis. For 1359 the planned export was worth 187 million dollars of which 30 per cent or more was animal produce.

Out of the total area of 64.90 million hectares of land in the country, only 5.31 million hectares (8.1 per cent) is suited to cultivation, with about 2 per cent of forest land and meadow. Therefore, there is about 85 per cent of land with vegetation growing on it which remains useless unless livestock graze it.

### INSUFFICIENT

While the countryside is tailored to grazing, a survey of actual livestock utility

shows that in the northern provinces it is the Karakul sheep breed that provide wool while the Arabi variety is used for meat in the villages. In the west sheep production is sedentary, with a few semi-sedentary production in winter bases near a village. The milk yield is higher for goat. In village communities, cattle receive priority allocation of grazing and supplementary feed. Calf crop is 50 per cent and milk production amounts to 400 kgs per lactation. There are very few commercial poultry units near Kabul, in neighbourhood villages there is also a low scavenger yield, and a great scope of improvement exist in this area.

Although 90 per cent of the population of Afghanistan are dependent on livestock in the first two 5-year development plans (1955-1960 and 1961-1966) the main emphasis was laid in transport and communication and in the third 5-year plan, emphasis was on industry and agriculture. Since 1973 there was an annual investment planning that recognized the urgent need to stimulate livestock production but did not provide any capital fund to support the plans of livestock improvement. The need for properly trained personnel at all levels from university graduates to the producers themselves to ensure the survival and improvement of livestock in the country was not sufficiently felt or overlooked. Centralised administration of livestock and veterinary services impedes their extension to the countryside where it is most needed. Livestock services

are allocated only about 3 per cent of the total Government budget.

Today, the main constraints against increased livestock industry development and animal productivity are: (a) virtual absence of animal disease control services, particularly of annual vaccination services arising from a lack of qualified staff, regional centres, transport, vaccines and finance.

(b) Low level of animal nutrition, particularly during winter and early spring. Contributing factors are shortage of irrigated land, distribution of rangeland winterpoints for drinking, declining rangeland area and productivity, unavailability of adequate winter feed supply (hay, straw, feed, grain, crop by-products), lack of knowledge required for increased pasture production.

(c) Poor communication. This results in poor distribution and availability of agricultural production inputs, poor marketing with exaggerated seasonal ups and downs in volume and price, livestock weight losses and mortality between production and consumption areas, lack of information and responses to the market demand.

(d) Social constraints of land tenure, land usage and maintenance resulting in, fragmentation of irrigated land, multiple ownership of productive areas, common use and abuse of state grazing, difficulty in obtaining security for credit from the Agricultural Bank.

Facing such heavy odds and harsh physical and seasonal environment, the Af-

ghan farmers and pastoralists are found to be alert to the needs of their flocks and have evolved a viable and sophisticated, indigenous system of husbandry. They also show willingness to spend flock inputs from limited financial resources and make immense efforts to protect and feed their flocks.

As such, it is apparent, farmer-pastoralist responses to any efforts to improve livestock quality and productivity and increase production and marketing facilities is not a constraint in any livestock projects in the country.

[14 Oct 81]

[Text]

It is probably a mutualistic relationship that once co-existed between wild canines and flocks of wild sheep and goats over large areas of the eastern hemisphere that were also inhabited by man. This early man, a berry, nut and snail gatherer who developed a liking for meat by sharing, as wolverines and foxes do, in the canine pack's kill.

Once man's taste for flesh was acquired, he found that he too could kill for meat.

In the beginning perhaps, man's inclination was to kill as many as he could whenever he chanced on a wild flock of sheep or goat. But much meat spoiled this way as not all of the kill could be consumed at one go. So he began following the wild flock. Later he learned to domesticate and stock animals, to be killed when the need for food arose. To stock live animals, it became necessary to breed a domestic flock, look after the herds, feed them adequately during severe climatic changes and prevent them from dying of diseases. That is how animal health sciences must have developed. It was in Egypt that veterinary sciences really found foothold. Eventually, from studies on animals rose human health services.

The volume of livestock production was expected to be increased in 1359 by 2.1 per cent that is, to the tune of 25.903 million Afghanis. The total gross agricultural product (with comparative prices) of livestock target for the same year was for 63,179 million Afghanis. Of this, total butchered meat would be of 205,000 tons, milk 850,000 tons, sheep wool target was 23.4 thousand tons and 1,400,000 Karakul pelts. However, reference to these target figures show a relatively slow growth for livestock. The actual achievements for the year are not

yet available. However, the number of cattle, at the end of the year was expected to be 3,820 heads of cows and buffaloes, 1,176 heads of cows, the total sheep population was expected to reach 195,000 heads and the Karakul sheep 4700 heads.

In the public sector the gross livestock production target was worth 16.3 million Afghanis, the total sheep (including Karakul population) target was 16,000 heads, milch cattle 500 heads and meat cattle (cows and buffaloes) 2,000 heads.

In distribution of domestic resources, the investment in the agriculture and irrigation sector including livestock was 28 parts compared to the total allocation of 1.7 billion Afghanis. The expenditure target for last year was to the tune of 326.7 million Afghanis.

## SERVICES

At present, the Government services the stock raisers and pastoralists through two institutions: Department of Veterinary Services and Department of Animal Husbandry of the Ministry of Agriculture. Staff

complement of the Veterinary Department is 43 Animal Health and Production officers and about 350 auxiliary workers. The Animal Husbandry Department has only 30 Animal Science graduates and about 136 auxiliary workers. Further, the compartmentalisation and centralisation of the two services may lead to further neglect of the rural stock owners and pastoralists,

What is needed most is extension of veterinary services to the provinces by decentralisation and by strengthening of staff, equipment and supplies at the decentralised units. At present, throughout the country there are only 30 veterinary subclinics. Soviet veterinarians man seven of these clinics, the Food and Agricultural Organisation five and the remaining are manned by nonprofessional staff. There are six veterinary diagnostic laboratories in the areas of livestock concentration operated by Soviet veterinarians. The central veterinary diagnostic laboratory and the vaccine production laboratory are run by the FAO. In all these clinics, subclinics and in the provinces, what is most felt is the need for trained Afghan personnel. Afghan graduate veterinarians are also required to man all the future animal health clinics planned by the Government.

An international experts group meeting has not long ago determined that the number of graduate veterinarians required to serve a livestock enterprise in a

developing country is—one veterinarian for every 30,000 livestock units.

At least developed country depending primarily on livestock produce, like Afghanistan needs at least 300 veterinarians based on this ratio. At present, there is just one veterinarian for every 166,000 livestock unit in this country. (There are about 80 veterinarians in the country.) The Ministry of Agriculture estimates the need for veterinarians here by 1983 as 612. This profession also needs to be supported by auxiliary staff, partially trained, with about 10 animal health assistants to one veterinarian.

It is clear that there exists a great lack of veterinary manpower in Afghanistan and this ought to be remedied urgently. There is no doubt that increases in number of well trained veterinarians and their deployment among pastoralists and rural small farmers would contribute greatly to the GNP of the country, as well as to the social and economical well-being of the broad masses of people who own and exploit the livestock wealth in this country.

Twentyfive years ago, a faculty of veterinary science was set up in the Kabul University in an attempt to meet Afghanistan's special need for animal health services. This was the first university level veterinary institution established in the country as a result of the

Food and Agricultural Organisation's recommendations to the Afghan Government in 1956 to train Afghan people as veterinarians.

Classes were conducted in the Agricultural Faculty building by two full-time and nine part-time teachers who taught 60 students. The venture was given up in 1963 due to lack of class-room and laboratory space. Twentyfour of the students were sent abroad to complete their studies and now form the core of veterinary services in the country. The others changed to other faculties.

Ten years later, a committee was appointed, and it felt the need for training manpower to take care of the nation's livestock. It was also decided at that time to develop livestock and sheep marketing. In 1974, an IDA-supported livestock development project started. This included financing a four-year fodder production programme and the development of range and technical services.

In the same year, the Faculty of Veterinary Sciences was restarted. This time housed in the Education Faculty, it had 189 students taught by nine full-time teachers and three part-timers. In May 1975, UNDP/FAO assistance to the faculty became operational. At first the faculty was organised loosely into seven departments. A lot of equipment was brought

in and the various laboratories were being built up. By 1979, UNDP assistance to the tune of US \$ 2,664,875 was made available with an addition of 4.6 million dollars last year. Since 1979, a team of international experts led by an FAO officer as project manager has also been assisting in the development of the faculty.

It now has six departments, each with an international expert guiding a national team. These are the animal production, preclinical, paraclinical, preventive medicine, clinical studies and veterinary extension departments. There is also a publication unit producing lecture notes in English and Dari to facilitate teaching and understanding of lessons for the students. An audio-visual unit too aids students. A student's library with 3000 books and a staff library with 400 books and 25 journals has come up. Microbiology and parasitology laboratories have been put up.

A teaching Veterinary Clinic has started functioning in Darulaman where flock animals can undergo treatment and surgery. A state farm at Benihissar has been made available to the students for practical training.

The faculty now has a new mobile clinic to reach teachers, students, veterinarians to the rural areas, primarily to serve those who cannot co-

me to the Darulaman clinic.

## PROGRAMMES

The best graduates are to be recruited as teachers in the future and will receive M.S. level training abroad. The Government's five-year economic development plan also provides for ensuring adequate animal feedstock and pasture improvement, construction of shelters and complete veterinary measures for the winter season. About 30 animal stables, 30 ponds, 30 deep wells and 30 animal feed storages are also to be built. The veterinary sub-clinics will be expanded, two quarantine stations are to be built that will protect 25 million animals by 1983. Poultry and dairy farms are also planned by the state. One animal diseases clinic was inaugurated only last week.

The Government has provided 25 million Afghanis as complementary funds to meet the faculty's day-to-day expenses and the salaries of the national staff.

The Faculty of veterinary Sciences of the Kabul University is a torchbearer in the field and is not only making a significant contribution to creation of urgently needed qualified manpower, but is also a pioneer to other developing nations.



## AGREEMENT OPENS WAY TO HOUSING CONTRACTS

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 42, 19 Oct 81 p 5

[Text]

A memorandum of understanding signed in Algiers last week by Britain's Trade Minister Peter Rees opens the way to detailed negotiations between British contractors and the Algerian authorities for 20,000 housing units worth some £ 200 million sterling (about \$360 million). The memorandum sets out the British government's understanding with the Algerian Ministry of Housing and contains an annex stating that the Algerian government is seeking negotiated contracts for the housing units and their associated infrastructure. The memorandum was considered to be necessary because the Algerians were reluctant to deal with private firms from Britain without some form of official cover.

The figure of 20,000 units is geared to the capacity of British construction firms to supply Algeria with houses under the terms of Algeria's 1980-84 plan. Similar agreements are expected with other European governments shortly, with Belgium expected to be the next EEC country to follow in Britain's footsteps. The Algerian plan calls for construction of a total of 450,000 new housing units.

Negotiations for final contracts are expected to be tough, with Algeria laying down stringent conditions on prices, credits and delivery dates. Algeria is understood to be seeking block contracts rather than have companies tender on individual housing projects. The British companies at present involved in talks with the Algerian authorities are Cementation, McAlpine, Paulings, Wimpey and consultants W S Atkins.

CSO: 4500/28

## CAIRO PAPER DISCUSSES PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY

NC280840 Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 0610 GMT 28 Oct 81

[From the press review]

[Text] In an article entitled "The Autonomy That We Want," the newspaper AL-JUMHURIYAH reports today that Egypt and Israel have agreed to resume the talks on Palestinian autonomy, with U.S. participation, on 4 November. AL-JUMHURIYAH explains that this agreement signifies that all parties insist on continuing the peace process so that it will fulfill its final objectives.

As Menahem Begin stated, the coming tripartite meeting will focus its attention on the method for holding the elections in the West Bank and Gaza to form an autonomous council. If this goal is attained, it will represent a real change in the situation.

The paper emphasizes that we agree with Begin on the importance of this step. In order that this step can succeed, it is imperative for the Israeli side to show a large measure of understanding and cooperation. AL-JUMHURIYAH asserts that we expect the Israeli side to show a real understanding of the nature of the Palestinian autonomous government as called for in the Camp David accords. The paper notes that the agreement, which the whole world has endorsed and supported, stipulates that authority be transferred from the Israeli military government to the elected Palestinian autonomous government council. It adds that the transfer of authority signifies the transfer of all the powers and jurisdictions formerly enjoyed by the military governor to the elected council, including the legislative, executive and judicial jurisdictions. In the absence of such a sound understanding of the Palestinian autonomy issue, a real change will not occur in the situation--a change about which Menahem Begin is talking.

In concluding its article, the newspaper AL-JUMHURIYAH affirms that the solution of the Palestine question is the quintessence of the Middle East problem. It adds that in the absence of a real autonomous government for the Palestinians, peace is a remote target.

CSO: 4504/49

'AL-AKHBAR' DISCUSSES PEACE FORCE FOR CHAD

NC280926 Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 0610 GMT 28 Oct 81

[From the press review]

[Text] The newspaper AL-AKHBAR today comments on the achievement of peace in Chad. It says: The achievement of peace and security in Chad is a matter in which we are very interested for several reasons. First, Chad has a long common border with Sudan and the source of the Nile extends to its well-known lake. Second, Chad is an Islamic state connected to us by ideological and racial ties. Third, Chad belongs to the group of African states that won their independence in the wake of World War II. Therefore, it is imperative that we be concerned about Chad and that we help it protect its independence.

It is imperative that we help Chad so that we can stand by its side to enable it to build itself and to become a base of security and peace, together with the group of African states around it.

The newspaper AL-AKHBAR says: This is the source of Egypt's interest in Chad's affairs and events there. However, in taking this interest we harbor neither designs nor ambitions. This same source spurs the interest taken in Chad by the OAU states and the efforts they are exerting to ensure Chad's independence and the independence of all the African states that face the very dangers posed to Chad.

The OAU states in Chad's area have held several meetings aimed at helping Chad and protecting its independence. It has been natural for Egypt to participate in these meetings and to emphasize its readiness to participate in any action taken to keep peace in Chad.

The paper notes France's official announcement that it has decided to extend its support to the Chadian transitional government. The paper also points to the proposal calling for sending an African peacekeeping force to Chad. It elucidates that the OAU made this proposal and demands that a peacekeeping force be formed for Chad.

AL-AKHBAR adds: It seems that the OAU proposal is now on its way to implementation with serious steps. News agencies have reported that the Nigerian Government has been officially requested to provide Nigerian forces that would play

their role in any force which the OAU might form to keep peace in Chad. A Nigerian spokesman has also announced that four other African states, including Senegal, have received requests in this respect. Furthermore, news agencies have reported from Cairo that Egypt is ready to send forces for this task.

Thus, some six African states have responded to the OAU proposal, guaranteeing its successful implementation. This particularly holds true if we add France to this group in Paris' capacity as extending help within the framework of the African proposal, as a French Foreign Ministry spokesman has stated.

In conclusion, AL-AKHBAR affirms that it is the natural right of any state to ask that it be able to enjoy its independence which it won following a protracted struggle and that it be able to be its own master as far as its domestic affairs are concerned. It is the duty of all free and peace-loving states to help this state achieve this right. This is particularly the duty of the African states connected to such a state with ties of neighborliness, race and common interests. Even more, this is the duty of the United Nations and the very core of its mission. This duty should be discharged to make it possible to eliminate the hotbeds of trouble and to achieve security and peace throughout the world.

CSO: 4504/49



SOCIALIST LABOR PARTY LEADER INTERVIEWED

JN251539 Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 24 Oct 81 pp 26, 27

[Interview with Ibrahim Shukri, Egyptian Socialist Labor Party leader, by AL-MUSTAQBAL correspondent Sulayman Nimr, in Cairo--date not given]

[Excerpts] [Question] How did you voice your support for nominating Husni Mubarak as president of the republic at the time when he announced that he would continue to pursue President al-Sadat's policy which you opposed.

[Answer] The circumstances and implications which accompanied the assassination of al-Sadat could have caused disturbances and chaos in Egypt with unpredictable results. That is why we in the Socialist Labor Party felt that all the sons of this homeland, irrespective of their political views, had to stick together in order to establish stability as soon as possible. This was our main motive in supporting the nomination of Husni Mubarak. Furthermore, we are confident that President Husni Mubarak will be prepared to tackle the mistakes committed by the previous regime and will study thoroughly the criticism which was leveled against the previous regime by the opposition and the majority of the people. Our support for Husni Mubarak's nomination does not mean that we are giving up our views on al-Sadat's policy.

[Question] But President Mubarak asserted that he would continue to pursue the same policy of President al-Sadat?

[Answer] We understand why he announced that he would pursue President al-Sadat's line. He meant that he would work to attain the same pan-Arab objectives for Egypt, but not necessarily by means of the former president's method. We are certain that President Husni Mubarak's policy will bring about something new. There should be an inevitable change due to the nature of the new developments and because the personality of the new president is different from that of the former one. Since I knew what went on during al-Sadat's era, I can say that President al-Sadat had the first and last word in his decisions.

[Question] Does this mean that you will continue to support President Mubarak and that you will give up your role as an opposition party?

[Answer] Our support for the nomination of President Mubarak does not mean that we will not oppose any of his views or decisions that our party might disapprove

of. We will continue to record our criticism and remarks against any conditions or decisions which we believe are against the interest of the public and do not serve the pan-Arab objectives.

[Question] Do you believe that the Egyptian-Arab relations will be restored in the near future following the departure of President al-Sddat?

[Answer] We must admit that the person who is currently in charge of the Egyptian policy is not al-Sadat. Despite President Mubarak's declaration that he will pursue the broad lines of al-Sadat's policy, he still has a big chance to restore the Arab-Egyptian relations to their normal condition. We believe that one of the gravest results of the Camp David agreements was the division of Arab rank and the creation of a wide gap between Egypt and its Arab sisters. I believe that the situation will be different in the near future. The new circumstances make it feasible now to look for alternative solutions other than those contained in the Camp David agreements with regard to the autonomy issue. We also believe that there were ideas and initiatives concerning the Palestinian people's rights much better than those contained in the Camp David [agreements]. Here I refer to Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz's peace plan which we fully support. There was also the Soviet proposal for holding a conference in which all the parties concerned with the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the Palestinians, would participate. Such ideas are much better than the formulas contained in the Camp David agreements. It is expected that the new president, Husni Mubarak, will move within the context of these ideas to obtain better results concerning the Palestinian people's rights.

CSO: 4504/49

'AFP' ON NEW EGYPTIAN CIVIL SERVICE WORK CODE

NC261202 Paris AFP in English 1153 GMT 26 Oct 81

[Report by Ahmed Loutfi]

[Text] Cairo, 26 Oct (AFP)--Tens of thousands of Egyptian civil servants have been warned "no more slacking in the office" in a brand new official work code.

The French-language daily LE JOURNAL D'EGYPTE which published the full text of the new draconian code shocked many bureaucrats by noting that: "40 cases of negligence can mean dismissal."

The "negligence" is mainly sleeping on the job, a favourite bureaucratic past-time.

The new code lays down that: "Sleeping in the office will be punishable by the deduction of one half-day's pay, and if it happens three times, the deduction of two days' pay."

Up to now the civil servant could more or less consider that he was unsackable. In fact dismissal was a very rare administrative measure, and usually only for outstanding incompetence or misbehaviour.

But times have changed and the government has decided to clean up what many members of the public considered "a paradise for bureaucrats and a hell for the ordinary man-in-the-street."

The usual advice which greeted a visitor to a ministry was the refrain "Come back tomorrow."

Not only can lazy officials no longer go to sleep in the office, but they are also barred from using the telephone for their own private calls.

If they do so they are given two warnings, and if caught a third time they will be fined two days' salary.

This is a particularly biting deprivation when one considers that many Egyptians have no telephones at home, owing to a lack of available lines, and wait until they reach the office to make their calls.

The use of the office car for private reasons is also banned--another blow at the civil servant's privileged lifestyle--on pain of dismissal.

The new code, issued by the Central Agency for Organisation and Administration, seems to have been drawn up by a strict disciplinarian, as nothing is left to chance.

Even going to the office and leaving must be done through recognised entrances and exits.

Another blow is delivered to the custom of receiving private visitors in office hours which can now be punished by a fine equal to four days' pay for a consistent offender.

If this is implemented, then a whole epoch of Oriental courtesy and tradition will be broken.

Very harsh punishment is levelled at an official who refuses to carry out a set task, or refuses to work overtime to complete it--he faces a loss of 30 days' pay, and even demotion and dismissal.

It's a dog's life--even for the once hallowed scribe.

CSO: 4500/27



## EGYPT

### BASIC EDUCATION LAW PROMULGATED

Cairo AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH [The Official Gazette] in Arabic No 34, 20 Aug 81 pp 2147-2164

[Law Number 139 for 1981 Promulgating the Education Law]

[Text] In the name of the people:

The president of the republic:

The People's Assembly has decreed the law whose text follows, and we have promulgated it.

Article One: The provisions of the accompanying Education Law are to be put into operation.

Article Two: The minister of education is to issue the decrees that are necessary to implement this law, while taking into consideration the requirements of developing and modernizing education. Upon the approval of the Supreme Board of Education the minister of education may issue temporary orders as these are called for by the system of education, the syllabi, the curricula or the examination procedures. He may issue other orders that are necessary during the period of transition which he determines in a decree he issues.

Article Three: The following laws are hereby repealed:

--Law No 68 for 1968 Regarding Public Education.

--Law No 16 for 1969 Regarding Private Education.

--Law No 75 for 1970 Regarding Technical Education.

Every provision that violates the provisions of the accompanying law is hereby repealed.

Article Four: This law is to be published in AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH [The Official Gazette], and it is to be put into effect the day following its publication.

The seal of the state is to be affixed to this law and it is to be implemented as one of its laws.

Issued at the presidency on 9 Shawwal 1401 (9 August 1981).

Husni Mubarak

## The Education Law

### Chapter One: Objectives and General Provisions of Education

Article One: The purpose of pre-university education is to mold the emotional, national, intellectual, social, physical, ethical and athletic aspects of a student's cultural, scientific and national character progressively for the purpose of cultivating an Egyptian who believes in God, in his homeland and in the values of good, truth and humanity. The purpose of pre-university education is also to provide that student with an appropriate measure of values and theoretical and practical instruction and fundamentals that would establish his humanity, his dignity and his ability for self-actualization, for making an effective contribution to the operations and activities of production and services or for pursuing higher education for the purpose of developing society and realizing its prosperity and its progress.

Article Two: A Supreme Board of Pre-University Education is to be established and it is to be chaired by the minister of education. This board undertakes the planning activities for this education and devises the plans and programs for it. The board is to include representatives of the sectors of education, the universities, al-Azhar, culture, planning, finance, production, services, manpower and others who are interested in the affairs of education. On the basis of a proposal from the minister of education the president of the republic issues a decree forming this board and defining its areas of jurisdiction.

Upon the approval of the Supreme Board of Education the minister of education is to form categorical boards that grow out of that board and have jurisdiction over a stage or a category of pre-university education. Local boards of education and categorical committees that grow out of these local boards are also to be formed. These local boards and their categorical committees are formed by a decree issued by the authorized governor upon the approval of the minister of education.

Article Three: All citizens are entitled to free pre-university education in state schools. Students may not be asked to pay fees for the educational services that are offered to them.

Fees may be collected for additional services rendered to students, for their use of equipment and tools or for use of an educational [service] that precedes basic compulsory education. The minister of education issues a decree setting those fees and the conditions for them.

Article Four: The term of study in pre-university education is as follows:

Nine years for basic compulsory education.

Three years for secondary education (general and technical).

Five years for advanced technical education and for teachers' colleges.

Article Five: After the approval of the Supreme Board of Education the minister of education issues a decree determining the duration of the academic year, the number of weekly classes in every stage and class, the curriculum, the distribution of lessons to the classes, the determination of courses, the number of students established for each class, the rules of evaluation, examinations, maximum and minimum grades for examination subjects, and the examination dates for the public certificates.

After consulting with the governors and getting the approval of the Supreme Board of Education, the minister of education may add a few courses of study to the curriculum in accordance with the requirements of developing education or in accordance with the needs of local environments.

Article Six: Religious education is a basic subject in all the stages of education. A minimum grade of 50 percent is required to pass religion, but the grade earned in religion is not computed in computing the over-all average.

The Ministry of Education is to organize periodic competitions for those who memorize the Holy Koran, and it is to grant students who excel prizes and incentives in accordance with the rules set by the Supreme Board of Education.

Article Seven: A decree from the authorized governor sets the beginning and ending dates for school in the governorate and the dates for holidays which are required by local conditions. This is to be carried out without violating the provisions of Article Five of this law.

A governor may increase the maximum number of students per class in the various stages of the governorate's schools, if that becomes necessary, provided that the increase does not exceed 10 percent of the number set for the class.

The number of students per class in practical subjects, in drafting and in typing in technical education schools may not exceed 20 students.

Article Eight: After consulting with the authorized governor the minister of education may decide to establish kindergartens that would be affiliated with or attached to government schools. He is to determine their specifications with regard to location, building, capacity, facilities, equipment and sanitary specifications. He is also to determine the rules of instruction, curricula, syllabi, conditions for admission, the supervisory and educational staff and the fees that may be collected in return for enrollment in those institutions.

Article Nine: After the approval of the Supreme Board of Education the minister of education may decide to establish experimental schools and set the conditions and rules of admission in those schools as well as the rules of study and examination. These schools are to be utilized for putting new educational experiments into practice in preparation for their use in all schools.

The minister may also establish schools to educate and care for gifted students so as to develop and polish their talents. He may also establish special schools to teach and look after the handicapped in a manner that is commensurate with their abilities and their inclinations. The decree establishing such schools is to include the conditions for admission, the study plans, the examination systems and other matters.

Article Ten: The minister of education sets the conditions and criteria for admission in every stage of education, provided that admission in the basic stage of education be based on the age [of the student] on the 1st of October of an academic year. Admission in the secondary stage is based on weighing the applicants on the basis of the two factors of age and the over-all average of grades throughout the governorate.

Article Eleven: Taking into consideration the provisions of the Local Autonomy Law, the central agencies of pre-university education are to undertake the task of devising the general policies of education and the functions of planning, evaluation and general follow-up. The governorates are to undertake the [actual] process of implementing education and follow-up functions locally. They are also to establish, equip and manage the schools that come under their jurisdictions, in accordance with the requirements of the national plan of education and within the set limits of the budget.

A governorate may benefit from citizens' spontaneous efforts to implement the local education plan in accordance with an order issued by the authorized governor after the approval of the minister of education. This order may include the establishment of a local fund to finance spontaneous educational efforts.

Article Twelve: A parent-teacher council is to be formed in every school and in every governorate. Councils for students' associations may [also] be formed. The method of forming these councils and [an outline of] their jurisdictions are to be set in a decree issued by the minister of education.

Article Thirteen: After consulting with the Supreme Board of Education the minister of education is to issue a decree setting the qualifications standards for the faculty, the supervisors and the technical guidance counselors in the various stages of pre-university education.

The minister's decision also determines the methods of evaluating their work and the incentives that are to be granted to them as is appropriate to the nature of every stage of education.



Article Fourteen: Pursuant to the special provisions of this law, the minister of education, after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education, sets the conditions of medical suitability that are necessary for admission in the various stages of education; for the examination procedures in the various stages; the rules of passing; how many times a student can fail and repeat a course; incentives for students; student disciplinary procedures; conditions for canceling an examination or denying students examinations; and re-enrollment rules. This system is to include a mandatory fine of 10 pounds for re-enrolling a student who had been suspended.

## Chapter Two

### The Stage of Basic Education

Article Fifteen: Basic education is a right for all Egyptian children who reach the age of 6. The state is obliged to provide them with this education, and parents or guardians are to carry this out for a period of 9 academic years. Governors, each within his jurisdiction, are to issue the necessary decrees to regulate and implement mandatory education throughout the governorate as far as parents and guardians are concerned. Governors are also to issue the decrees that are necessary to distribute children to basic education schools in the governorate. In case of vacancies, a child who is 6 months younger than the required age for beginning mandatory education may be admitted to school provided that the set number of students per class is not disrupted.

Article Sixteen: The purpose of basic education is to develop students' capabilities and inclinations, to satisfy their preferences and to provide them with the necessary measure of values, conduct, knowledge and practical and professional skills that are congruent with the conditions of the various environments. Thus those who complete basic education can resume their education at a higher stage or go out into the work world after intense vocational training. The purpose of that is to cultivate the individual so he can become a productive citizen in his environment and in his society.

Article Seventeen: Instruction in basic education is to be organized so as to achieve the following objectives:

- Emphasize religious, national, ethical and athletic education during the various years of study.
- Emphasize the relationship between education and productive work.
- Strengthen the link with the environment on the basis of diversifying practical and professional fields in accordance with the conditions of local environments and the requirements for developing these environments.
- Integrate theoretical and practical aspects in curricula, syllabi and in courses.



--Tie education with the lives of young people and with the reality of the environment in which they live in a manner that would affirm the relationship between education and the practical aspects [of life], provided that the environment and the modes of social and economic activity in that environment are principal sources for knowledge, inquiry and activity in the various subjects of study.

Article Eighteen: A two-part examination is to be given throughout the governorate at the end of the stage of basic education. Students who pass that examination are to be awarded "A Certificate of Completing the Courses of Study in Basic Education." The minister of education, after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education, issues a decree [outlining] the procedure for this examination. Those who complete the mandatory period of basic education and do not take the examination or fail to pass it are granted confirmation from the Department of Education that they completed the mandatory period.

The minister of education, after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education, issues a decree [regulating] transfer examinations, their procedures, the rules of passing and the times one can fail or repeat an examination.

Article Nineteen: If a child does not report to school on schedule or if he misses school without an acceptable excuse for 10 consecutive or non-consecutive days, the principal of the school is to notify his parent or guardian in writing, as the case may be, and said notice is to be signed by the child's parent or guardian. If the child's parent or guardian is not available or if he refuses to accept the written notice, said notice is to be given to the mayor, the police station, police center or police precinct for delivery to the child's parent or guardian. If the child does not come to school within a week of his parent receiving receiving the written notice or if he is absent from school again without an acceptable excuse, his parent or guardian will be considered in violation of the provisions of this law, and the penalties stipulated in Article 21 of this law will be enforced.

Article Twenty: The principals of basic education schools and persons from the supervisory and technical guidance staff in educational precincts who are appointed by the authorized governor have the capacity to act as court officers in enforcing the mandatory education order.

Article Twenty-One: A child's parent or guardian is subject to a fine of 10 pounds, if the child is absent from school or stops attending school without an acceptable excuse, within 1 week of receiving the written notice stipulated in Article Nineteen of this law.

The parent or guardian is subject to repeated fines or repeated violations if the child's absence from school continues or if the child is absent again without an acceptable excuse after his parent or guardian is notified.

## Chapter Three

### The Stage of Secondary Education

#### Section One: General Provisions

Article Twenty-Two: The purpose of the stage of secondary education is to prepare students for life and to prepare them as well for higher and university education or for participation in public life. At the same time secondary education stresses the consolidation of religious, ethical and national values.

Article Twenty-Three: The duration of study in the stage of secondary education is 3 academic years. A student who is admitted to the first year of secondary education must have a certificate that he completed his basic education, and he must not be over 18 years old by the 1st of October of the academic year. The minister of education issues the decrees that regulate the cases wherein the age [factor] may be overlooked.

Article Twenty-Four: A student may repeat a class once provided that he does not repeat a class more than twice during the entire stage. Anyone who is suspended from school because he has exhausted the number of failures allowed to him, may apply for the examination of the class he attained, according to the rules which are issued by decree of the minister of education. The student is to pay an examination fee of 5 pounds. If he passes the examination, he is re-registered in the following class after paying a re-registration fee of 10 pounds.

Article Twenty-Five: A student may be suspended from school if he is absent for more than 15 consecutive days or more than 30 non-consecutive days without a reason that the school's administrative committee can accept. Absence at any time during the school day is considered absence for a whole day.

A student who was suspended in accordance with the provision of the previous paragraph may register again after paying a re-registration fee of 10 pounds if the school's administrative committee makes such a decision. A student may not re-register more than once in the same academic year and more than twice in the entire stage.

A student must have at least an 85 percent attendance record in order to be admitted to the examination.

#### Section Two: General Secondary Education

Article Twenty-Six: The course of study in the first year of secondary education is general for all students. In the second and third years students choose their specialties in accordance with the divisions and branches that [are outlined] in a decree issued by the minister of education after consulting with the Supreme Board of Universities.

Article Twenty-Seven: The subjects of study, the syllabi, the courses and the examinations in general secondary education are regulated by decrees issued by the minister of education after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education. The subjects of study are to include basic subjects for all students and elective subjects the student chooses in accordance with his inclinations and capabilities.

Article Twenty-Eight: A one-time general examination is to be given at the end of the third year of general secondary education. Those who pass that examination are to be granted "a Certificate of Completion of General Secondary Education."

All those who complete the required courses in all the three years of secondary education in a government or a private school supervised by the state may apply for this examination.

Everyone who applies for this examination is to pay a fee of 2 pounds. Regulations for this examination, application conditions and maximum and minimum grades for the subjects are [outlined] in a decree issued by the minister of education after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education.

Article Twenty-Nine: A student may not apply for the examination for completing general secondary education more than three times. The minister of education, in accordance with rules he lays down in this regard, may allow a student to take the examination a fourth time provided that the student pay a fee of 50 pounds.

### Section Three: Technical Secondary Education

Article Thirty: The purpose of technical secondary education is to cultivate a class of technicians in industry, agriculture, commerce, administration and services and to develop the technical aptitudes of students.

Students are admitted to the various branches of technical secondary education after acquiring a certificate of completing the stage of basic education in accordance with the conditions and the rules set in a decree issued by the minister of education.

Article Thirty-One: The specifications of technical schools, their operating plans and their responsibilities are determined by decrees issued by the minister of education after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education. A farm is to be attached to each agricultural school, and the area of this farm is to be commensurate with the number of students and the kind of study and [number of] departments in that school.

Article Thirty-Two: Each technical school is to have a board of directors in which the concerned sectors of production and services are to be represented. This board assists the principal of the school or its director in managing the school. The authorized governor issues a decree outlining the makeup of this board and determining its jurisdictions.

Article Thirty-Three: The departments of study in the categories of technical secondary education are to be determined in accordance with the requirements of development plans and local conditions.

After the approval of the Supreme Board of Education the minister of education issues decrees [outlining] the subjects of study that are to be included in every group in every one of the categories of technical secondary education and its branches. [The decree also outlines] the method of distributing the subjects of study, the number of lessons allocated to the subjects in the various classes, the necessary courses and textbooks and the evaluation and examination procedures.

Article Thirty-Four: Secondary schools for technical education may undertake production projects that are related to their specialty. These projects are to be financed, managed and audited in accordance with rules set in a decree issued by the minister of education. Authorized local units and production sectors may take advantage of the capabilities of these schools in raising the professional standard of technicians, craftsmen and workers within the environs of the governorate.

Article Thirty-Five: Technical workers in the various sectors of production and services who are not enrolled in a school may apply for the examinations of technical secondary schools. The conditions for applying for said examination and the rules therefor [are to be set] in a decree issued by the minister of education, without violating the provision of Article Thirty of this law.

Article Thirty-Six: A general examination is to be given at the end of the third year of technical secondary education. The examination is to be given in two rounds, and those who pass it are to receive a technical secondary school diploma, according to the 3-year system, defining their area of specialization.

Anyone who has completed the required courses of study in the three years at a government school or at a private school supervised by the state may apply for this examination. Everyone who applies for this examination is to pay a fee of 2 pounds.

The minister of education, after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education, issues a decree regulating this examination, the conditions of applying for it and the maximum and minimum grades for the courses of study.

Students may not apply more than three times for the diploma examination. The minister of education, in accordance with rules he sets in this regard, may permit a student to take the examination a fourth time provided that the student in this case pay a fee of 50 pounds.

Article Thirty-Seven: Students taking transfer and general examinations are required to have a minimum attendance record of 75 percent of the over-all lessons that are assigned for vocational training, regardless of the reasons for the absences.



## Section Four

### Technical Education: the 5-Year System

Article Thirty-Eight: The purpose of technical schools is to prepare individuals for the categories of "chief technician" and "trainer" in the areas of industry, agriculture, trade, administration and services.

Students who have a certificate that they completed basic education in accordance with the conditions set in a decree issued by the minister of education are eligible for admission to these schools. The minister of education may set the rules for boarding students in some or all of these schools as well as the fees for room and board in those schools and the rules for exemption from those fees.

Article Thirty-Nine: The departments of technical education, the 5-year system, are set nationwide in accordance with the requirements of development plans. The minister of education, after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education, issues decrees defining these departments, the courses of study in each of them, the method of their distribution, the number of lessons designated for them as well as the courses, the necessary textbooks and the evaluation and examination procedures.

Article Forty: Each technical school is to have a board of directors in which the concerned sectors of production and services are to be represented. This board assists the principal or director of the school in managing the school. The minister of education issues a decree forming this board and defining its jurisdictions.

Article Forty-One: Technical schools may undertake production projects that are related to their area of specialization. These projects are financed, managed and audited in accordance with rules set in a decree issued by the minister of education. Authorized local units and production sectors may also take advantage of the capabilities of these schools to raise the professional standards of technicians, craftsmen and workers within the environs of the governorate.

Article Forty-Two: Two rounds of a general examination are given at the end of the fifth year. Students who pass that examination receive an advanced technical studies diploma, the 5-year system, defining the student's area of specialization.

Anyone who completes the required courses of study in the 5 years at a government school or at a private school supervised by the state may apply for the examination. Everyone who applies for this examination is to pay a fee of 2 pounds. The minister of education, after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education, issues a decree regulating this examination, the application conditions for that examination, and the maximum and minimum grades for the courses of study.

Students may not apply for the diploma examination more than three times.



The minister of education, in accordance with rules he sets in this regard, may allow a student to take this examination a fourth time provided that the student pay a fee of 50 pounds.

Article Forty-Three: Graduates in the "technician" category and those who have a certificate that they completed general secondary education may complete their education to the level of "chief technician" in accordance with conditions and regulations set in a decree issued by the minister of education.

Article Forty-Four: The provision of Article Twenty-Five of this law regarding absence from school and the provision of Article Thirty-Seven regarding percentage of attendance are to be applied in the case of technical schools, the 5-year system.

Article Forty-Five: A student may repeat a year of study once but not more than three times during the entire period of this stage of education. Anyone who is suspended from school because he has exhausted the times he is allowed to fail an examination may apply once for the examination of the class he had attained, without being enrolled in the school, provided that he pay an examination fee of 5 pounds. If he passes the examination he is registered again in the following class after paying a re-registration fee of 10 pounds.

Article Forty-Six: The faculty and the administrative staff in technical schools, the 5-year system must meet a high standard of qualification and competence in accordance with the rules and conditions set in a decree issued by the minister of education. This decree may include provisions for granting incentives to the school's administrative staff and faculty.

## Chapter Five

### Teachers' Colleges

Article Forty-Seven: Until an adequate number of highly qualified teachers is available to the Ministry of Education to teach in the basic education stage, teachers' colleges are to prepare teachers to teach in the first years of basic education and to provide them with the scientific and professional knowledge as well as the necessary expertise and skills. At the same time these colleges are to be considered centers for educational studies and experimentation in the field of basic education. Such studies and experiments are to be carried out with the cooperation of the colleges of education in the governorate. Teachers' colleges are also one of the ways that lead students to the colleges of education. Graduates of these schools may enroll in the colleges of education in accordance with the rules that are set by the Universities' Law and its executive ordinance.

Article Forty-Eight: The duration of study in these schools is 5 academic years. Those who have a certificate that they completed basic education may be admitted to these schools in accordance with the conditions set in a decree issued by the minister of education, who may set the rules for

boarding students in some or in all of these schools as well as the rules for exemption from room and board fees.

Article Forty-Nine: Specialized branches may be established in these schools to prepare specific kinds of teachers. The minister of education, after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education issues a decree regulating the plans and the courses of study, the rules for transfer examinations, the teachers' diploma examination and the maximum and minimum grades for subjects.

A two-round general examination is given at the end of the fifth year. Those who pass the examination receive a teachers' diploma defining their area of specialization.

Article Fifty: A school for the first classes in basic education is to be attached to each teachers' college. That school is to provide practical training for the students at the college.

Article Fifty-One: The faculty in teachers' colleges must be highly qualified in accordance with the rules and conditions set in a decree issued by the minister of education. That decree may include provisions for granting incentives to the faculty.

Article Fifty-Two: A board is to be formed in each governorate to oversee teachers' colleges, to plan an admissions policy, to set the numbers of students that will be admitted and to determine the means by which these colleges can be tied organically to the colleges of education in the governorate. The authorized governor, after the approval of the minister of education, issues a decree forming this board and determining its jurisdictions and its powers.

Article Fifty-Three: The minister of education may decide to set up studies in teachers' colleges to complete the scientific and educational training of teachers and principals of the first grades of basic education or for other purposes of preparation and training in the field of instruction at this stage.

## Chapter Six

### Private Education with Fees

Article Fifty-Four: Every non-government establishment that is founded principally or secondarily for the purposes of providing pre-university education or vocational and technical preparation is considered a private school. [The following] are not considered private schools:

1. Kindergartens that are under the supervision of the Ministry of Social Affairs.
2. Schools that are established by foreign agencies where education is restricted to non-Egyptians who are the children of those employed in the foreign diplomatic and consular corps and of other foreigners.

3. Cultural centers or institutes that are established by a foreign country or an international agency on the basis of a bilateral cultural agreement with the Arab Republic of Egypt that stipulates special treatment for these centers or institutes.

Article Fifty-Five: Private schools are established to achieve some or all of the following objectives:

--To assist in the area of basic or secondary education (general or technical) in accordance with the plans and courses that are set in comparable government schools.

--To expand in the instruction of foreign languages in addition to the established official courses.

--To offer special courses of instruction in accordance with what is determined by the minister of education after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education.

Article Fifty-Six: Private schools are subject to supervision by the Ministry of Education and the departments of education in the governorates. They are also subject to the employment and insurance laws about which there are no special stipulations in this law.

Article Fifty-Seven: A private school may not be established or expanded nor may supplementary lessons be set up in it unless a permit to do so is first obtained from the authorized department of education. As far as general secondary education schools are concerned, permits to establish or expand those are issued by the minister of education in the context of the national education policy.

The location, building, facilities and furnishings of the school are to be suitable to the requirements of its educational mission in accordance with the conditions and specifications set in a decree issued by the minister of education.

Article Fifty-Eight: The owner of a private school must meet the following conditions:

--He must be a legal person and a citizen of the Arab Republic of Egypt.

--He must be able to meet the financial obligations of the school and the other conditions that are set in a decree issued by the minister of education.

Schools that are in existence at the time this law is enacted and that are not owned by legal persons are considered authorized to operate [as private schools] for the duration of their owners' lives.

Article Fifty-Nine: An application to establish a private school is to be filed on the special form prepared for that purpose by the departments

of education. The application is to be filed with the department of education in the authorized governorate at least 4 months before school is to begin. The department of education is to look into the application in the light of general educational plans and the needs of the governorate. The department is then to notify the applicant within 30 days of the date the application was filed that his application has been accepted or rejected in principle and the reasons therefor. An application is considered accepted in principle if this period goes by without a reply from the department.

Article Sixty: Taking into consideration the provisions of Article Fifty-Seven of this law, private schools are not to begin their operations before the authorized department of education notifies the applicant that his application has received final approval. After his application is approved in principle, the applicant has to provide the department of education within 15 days of such notice with detailed information about the school that he wishes to establish so that the department can form a technical committee to make the necessary on-site examination. The authorized department of education has to notify the applicant about the suitability of the location, the building, the facilities, the furnishings, the employees' data and other conditions and specifications. Such notice is to be provided within a maximum period of 2 months of the date the applicant provided the department with the detailed data or of the date he completed the shortcomings [of the school] in preparation for another on-site examination within an agreed upon period.

Article Sixty-One: After a school is licensed, none of the following actions may be undertaken except after an approval for such action is secured from the agency that issued the license.

--Changing the data on whose bases the license was issued.

--Changing the rules of the school or its curricula or following other rules in admitting students or in setting due fees.

--Changing the organization of the school from one stage to another or adding new stages to the school.

--Suspending operations at the school or refusing to perform the school's mission.

--Changing the location or transferring ownership of the school.

If violation of any of these obligations by the school is established, the authorized department of education may decide to place the school under financial and administrative supervision. In this case the department of education manages the school until the violation is made to cease.

Article Sixty-Two: Considering the provisions of the education, employment and insurance laws, each school is to draw up its operating bylaws and to determine the tuition fees that are collected from students in each stage separately. The authorized governor issues a decree approving these



bylaws, without violating the provision of Article Sixty-Four of this law.

Article Sixty-Three: Each school is to have its own budget that is to include revenues and expenditures. A school's revenues are to be deposited in a special account in one of the banks or post offices in accordance with the rules and regulations set in a decree issued by the minister of education after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education.

Article Sixty-Four: Students' tuition fees, school activity fees, cost of textbooks, school bus service and room and board fees are set in a decree issued by the authorized governor in the light of the school's proposed budget and the general rules which are set in a decree issued by the minister of education.

A governor may re-evaluate the tuition fees that students have to pay and that were approved at the time this law was issued in light of the general rules that are set by the minister in this regard.

Article Sixty-Five: The procedure for instruction and examinations in private schools is to be identical to that which is in effect in comparable government schools.

Article Sixty-Six: The authorized departments of education are to oversee all aspects of private schools, just as they oversee government's schools. They are also to oversee admissions and transfer examinations in those schools, approve their results, audit their books and investigate their administration.

Article Sixty-Seven: Each private school is to have a qualified full-time principal and qualified full-time faculty according to the quota determined for comparable government schools. When necessary the authorized department of education may authorize the private school to hire part-time teachers provided that the number of lessons [they teach] in this case not exceed 25 percent of the total number of lessons for a single subject matter or a single class. The minister of education, after consulting with the minister of manpower, is to issue a decree regulating the work relationship between private school employees and the owner of the school.

Article Sixty-Eight: Private schools may hire government school teachers on a loan basis. Conditions and duration of the loan are determined by a decree issued by the minister of education.

Article Sixty-Nine: Free (subsidized) private schools, which were established in accordance with previous laws, are to continue their mission. The necessary capabilities are to be provided for these schools in accordance with the standards set in a decree issued by the minister of education after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education.



## BRIEFS

ELECTRICITY MINISTER TO BONN--Cairo, 25 Oct (MENA)—Engineer Mahir Abazah, minister of electricity and energy, left here before noon today for Bonn with a joint delegation from his ministry and the Foreign Ministry on a six-day visit to the Federal Republic of Germany. The delegation will be signing in Bonn an agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear power in generating electricity between Egypt and the FRG. The Egyptian minister is to head to London after his Bonn visit on November First for a three-day visit during which he will sign a similar agreement for nuclear cooperation between Egypt and the UK. [Text] [NC251022 Cairo MENA in English 1005 GMT 25 Oct 81]

CSO: 4500/27

## IRAN

### INTERNAL FOES OF KHOMEYNI DEEMED STRONGER THAN BELIEVED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 231, 5-11 Oct 81 pp 26-27

[Article by Antoine Matta: "The Alternative to Khomeyni: the Army or Tudeh? The Parties to the International Struggle Inside the Country Are Stronger Than the Opposition Abroad"]

[Text] Is the Iranian opposition abroad actually capable of overthrowing the regime of Imam Khomeyni? Does it have the local opportunities and international conditions to seize power?

Opposition circles themselves think that the statements made by opposition leaders abroad and the public acclaim with which they are surrounded do not change the fact that they have no practical, military and political presence on the Iranian scene to enable them to emphasize that they have the power to secure their control over government. According to these circles the operation of last 28 June was not the work of the opposition abroad. This was the operation to which the offices of the Islamic Republic party were subjected; it led to the death of 74 persons, chief among which was party leader Ayatollah Beheshti. The operation of 31 August also was not the work of the opposition abroad; it led to the death of the president, Mohammad Rajai and his prime minister Mohammad Javad Bahonar.

These circles add that the first operation [was carried out] to settle accounts; they say it was a struggle between the factions of the Islamic Republic party, and specifically between the faction of Ayatollah Beheshti and the faction that opposes him and all his renown among Americans, Soviets and Arabs. This faction insinuated that Beheshti was close to the Americans who lost in him, according to an article in THE LOS ANGELES TIMES by William Sulivan, former U.S. ambassador to Tehran, one of their most important supporters in Iran after the Shah's departure.

The second operation, however--and this is still according to these circles--was not carried out by the Majahedin-e Khalq which is led by Mr Mas'ud Rajavi. It was rather carried out by a military group in the Iranian army that began to take action and to make preparations for overthrowing the regime.

### No Hope for the Opposition

On the eve of electing a new president for Iran the same circles think there is no hope for any of the opposition leaders to come to power, beginning with former president Abol Hasan Bani Sadr, to Mas'ud Rajavi, Shahpur Bakhtiar, Reza Shah and all the other figures of less renown.

The struggle that is going on at present in Iran is a struggle between the army and the communist Tudeh party.

Shahpur Bakhtiar closed his military office in Paris, and he is coordinating efforts with Empress Farah Diba. When the military coup he had engineered in July 1980 failed about 1 month before the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war, Bakhtiar found himself outside the game of seizing power. As a result of that aborted coup 400 officers were executed; chief among them were Gen Mahdayun and Gen Muhaqqaqi, the leaders of the coup.

Although Reza Shah travels between Cairo, Morocco and Switzerland for recreational purposes without being engaged in any practical activity to speak of, the Free Iran Movement which is led by Princess Azadeh, the daughter of Princess Ashraf, the late Shah's sister, is the more active royalist movement. This movement was responsible for hijacking of the vessel, Tabarzine, across the coast of Spain. This action was coordinated with the Azadegan Movement—the Knights of Freedom—which is led by 80-year-old Gen Aryana whose command post is located in Ankara. The general had met recently with President Anwar al-Sadat. His influence in the army and within the ranks of the Kurds is widespread. However, the activities of these two movements inside Iran are extremely limited.

With regard to the Majahedin-e Khalq [organization] these circles are saying that Mas'ud Rajavi had 6,000 soldiers before Bani Sadr was deposed last 22 June. So far he has lost more than 3,000 men.

The leadership of Majahedin-e Khalq inside the country is controlled by a young 32-year-old attorney called Musa Khiabani. He is the grandson of Shaykh Mohamed Khiabani of Tabriz. This organization is the most militarily active organization inside Iran.

In addition to these movements there are small military organizations, the most important of which are the organization of Iran's Liberation Army, which is headed by Mo'in Zadeh a young general from Tabriz, and the powerful Naqab organization in Baluchistan. The activities of former navy commander, Admiral Ahmad Madani who is stationed in Germany, and those of Mr Hasan Nazih, former director of the Iranian Oil Company are also worth noting.

Opposition circles are also saying that despite efforts that are being made by former Iranian prime minister, Ali Amini and former minister Hushang Nahavandi to reconcile these various opposition movements there is no cooperation or even coordination between them. In fact movements that either support royalty or the republic do not want to cooperate in any way with former president Bani Sadr. They consider him one of the chief elements of the present regime even though he finds himself today in the ranks of the opposition as a result of the fact that he became a victim of the internal struggle over influence between the various factions inside the regime.

These circles add that the next presidential elections will take place under sensitive international conditions that will place the Iranian question outside Iranian hands. Today Khomeyni is isolated locally and internationally more than he has ever been in the past. In fact, he is forced to cooperate more with the Soviet Union and the communist Tudeh party. The evidence for this lies in the fact

that he chose Ayatollah Ali Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Republic party to be the next president. According to these circles, it is known that Khomeini is very close to the Soviets. His selection accordingly means increased rapprochement with the Soviet [leaning] left inside the country and with Moscow abroad. Hence the West, and that includes the United States, finds it has no choice other than the army as an alternative to Khomeini.

In case the army comes to power, these circles expect the country's leadership to be in the hands of young officers who are unknown abroad but who have broad influence in the ranks of the military, especially in the land forces and the police. These officers will also get the support of moderate clergymen like Ayatollah Shariatmadari, who is under house arrest in Qom. Ayatollah Shariatmadari is capable of mobilizing half the people of Iran and the entire province of Azerbaijan because he is the more popular leader, the one who is more respected in Iran.

These circles finally affirm that a Soviet blow in Iran today is more likely, since local conditions now are conducive to it; since Moscow has begun facing greater embarrassment in Afghanistan, Poland and Angola; and since a Soviet inspired attempt to overthrow President al-Sadat failed, according to President al-Sadat himself. The question of Iran is no longer the question of the opposition abroad; it has become an international struggle whose parties are inside the country. It will not be long before the consequences of that struggle take shape.

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CSO: 4604/5

## U. S. SAID TO PURSUE CLOSER TIES

London 8 DAYS in English No 42, 24 Oct 81 pp 26, 27

[Article by Russell Warren Howe]

[Text] WITH EGYPT NOW seen as more able to emerge from isolation in the Arab world, and with 'Camp David' due to grind to a halt in six months — when the last of occupied Egypt is scheduled to be returned — State Department policymakers are recommending that Washington respond more positively to signals from Baghdad for a closer US-Iraq understanding.

Basically, Iraq wants 'elbow room' with its superpower arms supplier, the Soviet Union. Jordan, and especially Saudi Arabia, have been urging Washington to take advantage of the opportunity to improve relations with the area's second largest oil producer, which is also the second largest Arab military power after Egypt.

Recommendations along these lines by the US chargé d'affaires in Baghdad, Bill Tagleton, have been stymied so far by the hopes of some Reagan administration policymakers — including Secretary Haig — for a counter-revolution in Iran that would propel that American-armed country back into the 'western camp'.

Even those who counsel full diplomatic relations with Baghdad acknowledge that America's vacillating position on Palestine, and Iraq's military spare-parts dependency on Moscow, will continue to inhibit Washington-Baghdad ties. But State Department specialists see President Saddam Hussein as ready to follow Saudi Arabia in accepting Israel's existence, in return for Israeli withdrawal from its 1967 conquests.

Haig is studying a report recommending

enhanced relations with Baghdad. Its main points are:

- Iraq has been stereotyped and misunderstood in the US, largely due to Israeli lobby efforts. But it is a stable country with a well-managed, flourishing economy. Its people's average earnings have quadrupled in 15 years, while prices have only doubled. Baghdad is cautious in diplomacy and strategically positioned, having borders with Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Syria and Jordan. War with Iran has united most of the population behind Hussein, although the regime is Sunni and faces Iranian-encouraged opposition from Shia — which groups over half the population.

- Iraq's claim to Kuwait, which dates from Ottoman times when it was part of Mesopotamia, could be eliminated if Iraq were brought into the 'Gulf fold'.

- Self-confident and economically self-sufficient, Iraq has been drawing away from Moscow for some time. It now buys only about 60 per cent of its weapons from the Soviet Union, and France — which has sold Baghdad over \$3bn worth of arms in the past three years — seems set soon to become its main supplier of state-of-the-art weaponry.

Hussein is angry with Moscow for not giving him the extra supplies necessary to defeat Iran, and opposes the Kremlin for its intervention in Afghanistan and its support of Ethiopia against Somalia. Iraq was influential in discouraging North Yemen from accepting large-scale Soviet military assistance, making up the difference from its own armoury.



● Iraq will be spending \$22.5bn on development this year. Its reserves are up, and it is the 'most lucrative market in the Middle East' and an obvious one for US goods and technology. US exports to Iraq are up 70 per cent this year to \$725m. Purchases from the European Community will be over \$3bn, and from Japan nearly \$2bn, while purchases from the entire Eastern Bloc will only amount to about \$700m.

Despite war damage, oil production should be back at 3m b/d within six months of the end of the war with Iran.

The war is stalemated, but a negotiated peace is possible. Iraq is ready to return most occupied territory and submit to international arbitration for the rest, confident that it will be allowed to keep the islands seized by the late Shah and recaptured early in the war. Iraq also wants Iran to grant greater local autonomy to Arabic-speaking, oil-producing Khuzestan. It is not in the US interest for Iran's success in stalemating the war to contribute to a humiliation of Hussein, since a weakened Iraq might present a continued temptation, with its oilfields, to adventurist regimes in Tehran.

The report stresses that Iraq's leaders, like those of Egypt and the US, oppose religious fundamentalism on the Iranian pattern. President Hussein's second-in-command, Tariq Aziz, is a Christian. Iraq is also a 'moderate' on oil pricing, is on frigid terms with Syria, and represses its Communist Party. It can probably not be denied a nuclear-weapons capability in the long term, and US influence against Iraqi use of 'nukes' to solve regional issues would be greater if relations were friendly.

Although Baghdad would not replace Riyadh as America's key friend in the Gulf, Iraq is a much more important nation than Saudi Arabia, the report points out, and a natural 'leader' in the area. Smaller Gulf states, Kuwait excepted, look to Iraq rather than to under-armed Saudi Arabia for protection against Iran. Iraq is the leader of the present Iraqi-Jordanian-Saudi triumvirate. With Hussein due to host next year's non-aligned conference, and to assume its chairmanship for three years, his influence, and his country's, can only grow, claims the report.

What effect will the report have? Under Nixon and Kissinger, the US often took bold foreign-policy initiatives, notably the

opening to China. Carter began boldly — notably in his October 1977 decision to revive the Geneva conference on Middle East peace, in tandem with Moscow. But Brzezinski was less innovative than Kissinger, and more imprisoned in his anti-Soviet rhetoric. Partly for this reason, Carter's objectives lost momentum.

Now, America has an ageing, inactive president — and a secretary of state whose every innovation draws intra-cabinet opposition. So the report is likely to be implemented gingerly, if at all, unless Iraq makes some overt move of its own.

Another problem is that Washington still hopes for a reversal of the situation in Iran, probably through a military coup, or possibly through a return of 'Shah' Cyrus Ali Reza, now in Cairo, as a constitutional monarch. Lobbying for such a development to be taken seriously is conducted by the Shah's twin sister, Princess Ashraf, who lives part of the year in the US, and by her militant daughter Princess Azadeh and General Baram Aryana, both in Paris. Aryana's group recently hit the front pages by seizing an Iranian missile boat in the Mediterranean. The US appears to have given up hope of a government led by former Premier Shahpour Bakhtiar.

Washington fears that an Iraqi humiliation of Iran may lead to a takeover of power by the leftwing Mujaheddin leader Masoud Rajavi, possibly in a brief and opportunistic alliance with ex-president Abol Hassan Bani Sadr. Washington also fears that an Iraqi victory might lead to the partition of the old Persian empire, with Moscow helping various irredentist regimes.

MIDEASTERN JEWS SEE DISCRIMINATION, SOCIOECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT Weekend Supplement 17, 24, 31 Jul, 7 Aug 81

[Article by Eli Tavor: "Revolt of the Orientals"]

[17 July 81 pp 1, 2, 30]

[Text] A central myth of the state of Israel was shattered in the elections for the tenth Knesset. It is the myth of the integration of the exiles.

The most significant phenomenon of the elections held on 30 June was what is called "ethnic polarization." It means the division of the electorate, principally between the two largest parties, not on the grounds of ideology, and not even on the grounds of interests, but on the basis of ethnic origin.

In these elections there came to a head the process which began in earlier elections, and which became quite apparent in the elections of May 1977, the elections for the ninth Knesset. In these elections the decisive majority of those who voted for the Likud were of the oriental community. Most of the voters for the Alignment were of the Ashkenazic community.

The distribution of voters according to their ethnic background was a slap in the face to those who claimed that ethnic political voting was a passing phase. This time it became apparent beyond doubt that quite the opposite was true. Ethnic voting is an increasingly serious phenomenon, and is becoming more extreme.

This is a warning for Israeli society. Not because the members of one ethnic group vote in particular for a certain party, while the members of another vote for its rival, and not because political confrontation has become ethnic. Rather, red lights should go on and alarms should sound because what is revealed in the political hostility is testimony to the fact that Israeli society is suffering from a chronic disease, which is developing at an accelerated pace.

If the ethnic polarization found expression only on the political horizon, it would not be so bad, but what has happened is in fact that the electoral system has opened a flood gate, in which polarization had been seething.

The outpouring did not reduce the boiling. The seething continues to go on beneath the surface and threatens to erupt in a destructive manner. The polarization should have been awarning of this. It left the writing on the wall and the writing proclaimed: What in Israel is characterized as the "ethnic problem," the "ethnic gap"

or "polarization" is not flickering out, but on the contrary is boiling at higher temperatures than ever. What once was perceived as the problem of marginal groups or of poor neighborhoods is now spreading all over the fabric of Israeli society.

In other words, in contrast to the accepted assumption of conservative sociologists in Israel and the political establishment, that the ethnic problem is temporary and passing, which will be healed in the passage of time, the elections for the tenth Knesset indicate a totally different trend.

In the course of 30 years, the political, social, and economic establishment of Israel has tried to minimize the seriousness of the problem. It knew of its existence. It sought solutions, especially when the problem took radical expression in the form of demonstrations, strikes, and riots. But it took comfort in the belief that the problem was one of the "generation of the wilderness," an interim stage, which would be ended with a complete and total integration of the exiles.

This illusion, which is also held by the present establishment along the whole spectrum from the Likud to the Alignment, was the bubble which was burst in the last elections for the tenth Knesset.

The integration of the exiles has become hostility among the exiles, and it threatens to become, if there is no solution, a war between the exiles.

How did the utopia of the integration of the exiles evaporate?

In his book "Ethnic Relations in Israel" the sociologist Yokhanan Peres of the University of Tel Aviv determines: "The series of findings (of research on the ethnic gap in Israel) are most serious, from the point of view of integration of ethnic groups.; it points to a stability in the gap. Israelis generally are informed about inter-ethnic inequalities. But the decisive majority of them believe that the phenomenon is transient, and affects only the transitional generation, and that efforts invested in education, health, welfare, and housing are gradually reducing its scope, The challenge hidden in this data is not that the problem has not yet been solved, but rather that in certain areas in the progress is so slow that the vision of ethnic equality has ceased to be a real goal but is rather an eschatological vision.

"The stubbornness of this gap has far reaching ramifications for ethnic relations in Israel. It appears that the tolerance of oriental ethnic group members for ethnic inequality is tending to decline, and their responses in the level of individual and political conduct is becoming sharpened. There are several causes of this process: The rising seniority of oriental ethnic groups, and the increase within them of children born and educated in Israel, reduces the difference between them and the Ashkenazim. The similarity in culture and way of life, and especially the common service in the IDF, constitute a basis for the demand for equality in the distribution of resources.... The strength of the ethnic gap, its appearance in so many spheres, its constancy, and the sharpening reaction to it will continue to occupy a more central place in ethnic relations in Israel."

Yohanan Peres adds in the summary of his research: "The coming together of ideas and values among various ethnic groups has both prospects and dangers. As people become more similar to one another, the demand for equality will be heightened. Success in integration in the spheres of culture and education in particular makes the ethnic gap intolerable.... In the coming years, years of gradual implementation

of the change from a generation of immigrants to a generation of native born Israelis, a choice will be made between complete and total integration and an increasingly intense struggle."

The thesis of Yohanan Peres and other sociologists who deal in research on ethnic relations in Israel is that ethnic alienation is several times stronger among the children of those born in Asian and African countries than among their parents who came to Israel from those countries, particularly because they come into contact with the children of those who come from Europe and America, and study together with them, spend time with them, and serve together with them in the IDF. By virtue of the strategy of integration of exiles, they are more aware than their parents of inequality in all spheres of life in Israel among orientals and Ashkenazim.

Another school of Israeli sociology maintains that the alienation and radicalization in inter-ethnic relations in Israel stem in particular from the fact that the ethnic struggle in Israel has become a class struggle.

Heading this school which developed in the Faculty of Sociology at the University of Haifa, is Dr. Shlomo Savirski. A few months before the elections, Dr. Savirski published a profound and original sociological analysis of oriental and Ashkenazic relations in Israel. His book "Not Failures But Foiled" is the most up-to-date and stunning research of the ethnic problem in Israel, in which the accusing finger is pointed at the true roots of the problem.

Dr. Savirski's research, which was published by Makberot Le-Mekhqar u-Viqoret, is required reading for anyone who studies and is interested in the central problem of Israeli society. In his work, he states:

"In Israel there is a class based division of labor, as in every society having a capitalist means of production, but it is a peculiar class structure, stemming from the peculiar character of Israeli economic development.

"The Israeli bourgeoisie is essentially Ashkenazic, while the Jewish proletariat in Israel is essentially Oriental. The bourgeoisie is essentially Ashkenazic because the Ashkenazim were the founders of the political Zionist movement; because in the pre-state period it was the Ashkenazim who created the economic, organizational, and political foundation, which they control; because the Ashkenazim directed and regulated the flow of immigration and integrated the immigrants in an accelerated development effort; because this development formed the basis and expanded their dominant position in Israeli society.

"The Jewish proletariat in Israel is Oriental because the Orientals, most of whom emigrated from their countries under conditions of emergency, abandoned their economic foundation in the country of their origin; because the foundation, since they had come within the framework of a national movement of which some of its members had already established a general basis for the whole nation; because the Orientals supplied this economic basis with that thing which it needed most in its development effort--cheap manpower subject to monopolization; because the processes of production in a capitalist system in Israel work in such a manner that the principal alternative facing the second and third generation of Orientals is to be workers on low level bureaucrats, while the administrative and controlling positions are open to the second and third generation of Ashkenazim.



"The Israeli bourgeois is an Ashkenazi because he is for the most part a son of parents who were not bourgeois, and his "goal" or their "goal" as bourgeois became apparent only in the encounter with Oriental workers; he is an Ashkenazi because most of the processes and symbols of bourgeois control--in economic, political, educational, and communications activities--are known to him from birth, from his home, from his family, from his neighborhood; he is an Ashkenazi because he is accustomed to find--and already expects to find--Ashkenazim in positions parallel to his own, and Orientals in positions lower than his own; he is an Ashkenazi because he sees it as his mission to transmit the values of an achievement of oriented-competitive ethic of the West which his parents encountered a generation or so ago, and which he acquired on his own advancement track, to the Orientals--in the army, in schools, and at work, and he views the nonsuccess of Orientals in acquiring that ethic as a justification for their low position, and for his higher position.

"The Israeli Jewish worker is for the most part Oriental because he is the son of parents who for the most part were not workers if they had remained there or had gone to other countries--and therefore he links the fact that he is a worker to the fact that he is an Oriental in Israel.

"He is an Oriental because everywhere he turns, his social conditions is presented as the product of characteristics peculiar to Orientals--a large number of children, low education level, origins in an undeveloped country, and the like. He is an Oriental because he is accustomed to find, and already expects to find, Orientals at levels parallel to his, and Ashkenazim at levels above him; he is an Oriental because in his contacts with the ruling apparatus, he feels a sense of alienation, because he does not find in it any of the symbols known to him from his home and environment; he is an Oriental because when he does reach positions of seniority, the attitude towards him is not only towards his personality and deeds, but also to him as a representative of his ethnic group.

"The specific development process of Israeli economy and society did not create a general class division, but an ethnic division of labor; therefore, the class struggle is not just a struggle of "workers" in general, but a struggle of Orientals."

The conclusion of Dr. Savirski--that in Israel there has developed a division of labor which is ethnic, in which Orientals fulfill the role of manpower while the Ashkenazim hold the positions of control and administration in all branches of the economy--is based on the analysis of employment distribution in Israel.

This distribution points to the fact that the ethnic division of labor is increasing and becoming more serious. With the passage of years it appears that the rate of advancement among Ashkenazim from the lowest rungs of the employment ladder to its higher rungs is much greater than the rate of advancement among Orientals.

In 1972, 375,000 of all those employed in the economy were natives of Europe and America; 25.8 percent of them were scientific and academic workers, as well as professionals and administrators--the highest rung on the employment ladder; 39.1 percent of those born in Europe and America were on the second rung, that of office, commercial, and service workers; 5.2 percent worked on the third rung--agriculture, and 29.9 percent were industrial trade workers in transport, construction, and unskilled areas--the lowest rung.



In that same year, 316,000 of those employed in the economy were natives of Asia and Africa. Only 9.7 percent of them were on the academic and administrative rung of the ladder; 38.9 percent were commercial and service workers; 7.8 percent worked in agriculture, and 44.9 percent were on the lowest rung of the employment ladder.

With the passage of 5 years, in 1977, there were already 30.9 percent of those born in Europe and America at the highest rung, while the rate of those born in Asia and Africa had risen from 9.7 percent to only 12.9 percent. At the lowest rung, there were employed among those from Europe and America 26.8 percent as compared to 40.9 percent of those coming from Asia and Africa.

This gap in rung of employment is much wider among native Israelis as between those from European-American parents and those from Asian-African parents.

In 1972, 38.7 percent of Ashkenazim born in Israel were at the highest rung, as compared to 9.3 percent of Orientals born in Israel. In 1977, 45.6 percent of native Israeli Ashkenazim were at the highest rung, as compared to 14.6 percent of native Israeli Orientals.

At the lowest rung of the employment ladder, that of industrial and construction workers and unskilled laborers, there were in 1977 only 6.9 percent of all employed Israeli born Ashkenazim, as compared to 37.5 percent of Israeli born orientals.

Dr. Savirski says: "Most of the studies of employment distribution in Israel tend to attribute employment differences (gaps) between Orientals and Ashkenazim to seniority in Israel or to education. The conclusion sought is obvious: If these two variables explain the gap, then the gaps are not linked to structural ethnic differences. Moreover, as seniority in Israel grows, along with possibilities for education, the employment gaps will be reduced.

"It appears to us that work differences are of such a proportion that neither changes in education for the foreseeable future nor seniority in Israel can make significant changes. The race for employment does not change from year to year, and participants who lack resources do not have any prospect of improving their abilities from year to year.

"The data which we have collected shows that to a great extent the Orientals have taken "greater control" of the lower rungs of the employment ladder, while the Ashkenazim control the higher rungs. Changes in educational level in the foreseeable future or during the stay in Israel can bring about only marginal changes in the structure of employment.

"In order to understand why changes in level of education or duration of stay in Israel will bring about only marginal changes in the structure of employment, two additional factors should be noted: First, control positions, ownership and administration, are for the most part in the hands of Ashkenazim. It is unreasonable to assume that this class will surrender its positions willingly. Secondly, government work patterns which are generally acknowledged to be decisive in the Israeli economy, tend to strengthen the position of the currently preferred classes."

Savirski believes that the gaps in Israeli society are first and foremost the result of the ethnic distribution of labor within it.

The accepted sociological school in Israel, that of the sociologist S. N. Eisenstadt and his students at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, views the solution of the "ethnic problem" in Israel to be "integration through modernization." It assumes that the ethnic gap in Israel stems from gaps in the level of modernization of the two groups--Oriental and Ashkenazic.

Yet Savirski and followers of the other sociological school reject this assumption. In an article published by Dr. Savirski and the sociologist Sarah Katsir in the periodical of the unit for Bridging Gaps at the University of Haifa, it was argued: "The structure of relations between the two ethnic groups is not passing and temporary. The distribution of labor in time strikes roots.... The approach of 'gaps' would argue that the situation is as it was according to the initial data indicating an inferior position for Orientals when they arrived in Israel; when the data improves, then they will be able to rise above their present position and spread out through the whole employment structure."

Opposite the school of "integration through modernization" is the school of "dependence" which argues: "Today, the structure of relations between the two ethnic groups is a structure of dependence; the senior positions in the employment structure, control of capital, control of political institutions, the ability to make decisions which will direct the development of Israeli society as a whole--all of these are essentially in the hands of the Ashkenazim.

"The Orientals, for the most part, are lacking in capital, supply labor at the lowest rungs of the employment ladder, and have relatively little representation in the corridors of political power. It may be said that the central aspects of the lives of most Orientals--scope of employment, quality of employment standard of living, and in a more general way the prospects and directions of their development, depend upon decisions made by organizations and institutions in which the senior positions are held by the Ashkenazim. Their development is a dependent development. It depends upon the development plans of the general society--a society cloaked in the values, aspirations, and patterns of conduct of the Ashkenazim."

"In light of what is said above," say Savirski and Katsir, "we are inclined to doubt the central assumptions of the school of 'integration through modernization' with respect to ethnicity and its future in Israel. As far as that school is concerned, ethnicity is a heritage of the past, which with increasing modernization will gradually disappear.

"The assumption is that ethnicity is a temporary and passing phenomenon. This approach emphasizes the past--from which ethnicity is nourished--and the future, in which it will disappear. Consequently, it ignores the present, which is conceived of as only a transition stage.

"In contrast to this approach, we think that emphasis should be placed on ethnicity especially in the present.... The process of 'modernization' is not totally a transitional phase: 'Modernization' means the development of ethnic division of labor and ecologic divisions.

"It seems to us more correct to speak of ethnicity as a phenomenon rather than a remnant of the past.... In contrast to the school of 'integration through modernization' which believes that Oriental ethnicity is waning, we believe that its fullest expression has not yet been realized."

These words were written many months before the elections for the tenth Knesset. What occurred in those elections strengthened the assumptions of the school of "dependence." The positioning of most Orientals in the camp of one political party which does not consider itself to be a representative of Orientals in particular, was the first public expression of an attempt by the Ashkenazic establishment to defend its position of control and management in Israeli society and economy.

The slogan "Anything but the Likud!" which led many Ashkenazic voters to support the Alignment expressed perhaps, unconsciously, more a fear of an Oriental revolt than of the political conceptions of the Likud.

Even if the ethnic gap in Israel is not just the result of only the ethnic division of labor, nevertheless all of the components of it--the psychological, cultural, social, and economic--stem from the same source.

The original sin, from which the process of ethnic polarization began, occurred during the first years of the state, during the absorption of mass immigration. It was not committed intentionally. It was the result of direct pressures which were dictated by the mass immigration. Within a period of 3 and one-half years, the Jewish population of 700,000 in Israel had to absorb a population of 750,000.

The early streams of immigration were housed in immigrant camps. From there the immigrants were supposed to gradually move to the Jewish population centers in Israel. But when the stream increased, another solution was discovered--the ma'abarot (transit camps).

The ma'abarot, which were first instituted in 1950, were supposed to respond to the negative phenomena of the immigrant camps--a life of rotting and idleness. They were supposed to be stations on the way to permanent housing. Their residents were supposed to receive employment so that they would be able to support themselves and not live on welfare.

By the end of 1950, there were already 123 ma'abarot throughout Israel, with 180,000 new immigrants living in their tents, tin shacks, huts, and canvas huts. Pursuant to the government policy, the ma'abarot were spread out in distant places so as to constitute a basis for the establishment of new settlements. At the height of the period of ma'abarot, their number was 140.

The ma'abarot were not intended particularly for Oriental immigrants. In the first years, there was an almost even balance between European and Afro-Asian immigrants. But the Ashkenazic immigrants succeeded in shortening their stay in the ma'abarot. Family ties, and their acquaintance with the veteran Jewish population, the large majority of which was Ashkenazic, made their absorption into the older population centers easier.

The Oriental immigrants remained in the ma'abarot for a more extended period, sometimes for years. In the middle of the 50's and the earlier years of the 60's, the large waves of immigration came from North Africa, and the number of immigrants from European countries declined. Then the Oriental immigrants constituted the majority of the population of the ma'abarot.

In 1957, when there were still 140,000 people living in 80 ma'abarot, the operation to eliminate the ma'abarot was announced. But the actual elimination stretched over many years. Six years later, in 1963, the then Minister of Housing, Yosef Almogi, proclaimed: "We are approaching the blessed moment when we will be able to proclaim that the period of the ma'abarot in Israel has ended." Two more years passed, and the director general of the Housing Center proclaimed: "The operation to eliminate the ma'abarot has ended." In 1971 there were still tens of thousands of people living in ma'abarot.

David Shalem was born and grew up in ma'abarot. His stay there was indeed due to objective forces. The resources and manpower then available to the country did not make possible the building of housing or new settlements for all residents of ma'abarot within a short period of time. But the results were destructive.

The period of ma'abarot was a traumatic time for all those who were forced to spend an extended period in them, under conditions of deprivation, next to veteran Israelis who lived in real homes. It was there that for the first time was born a justifiable sense of neglect.

In fact, ma'abarot were never eliminated.

Camps of tents and tin huts, which were called ma'abarot, were physically dismantled. Their residents moved into agricultural moshavim which were built for them, or into houses in development cities, or into Arab homes in abandoned Arab towns. Living conditions were improved. The standard of living rose. But the original sin, which was contained in the very establishment of ma'abarot and from which their way of life stemmed, remained.

The "culture of ma'abarot," if one can call it that, was transferred to the settlements to which ma'abarot residents moved. All of the economic, cultural, and social distortions which were the legacy of the residents of ma'abarot were transferred with them to their new homes.

The policy of population dispersal then dictated the establishment of settlements in far flung and desolate places in the country. Almost all of the new towns which were built, all of the border settlements and new moshavim, whose populations were composed of prior ma'abarot residents, were far flung and cut off just like the ma'abarot themselves. Just as the ma'abarot were homogeneous in terms of their population, so were the new settlements. Most of the Oriental immigrants were settled in development towns and new moshavim. The Ashkenazic immigrants flowed to the older population centers.

This phenomenon was called by the sociologists the "ecological gap"--a kind of apartheid in which each ethnic group lived in separate settlements or neighborhoods.

In the ma'abarot there was a collapse of the community and family frameworks of the Orientals and the whole scale of values and concepts which they brought with them from their lands of origin. Shmuel Vankin, who is 20 years old and a native Israeli, born to parents of the ma'abarot generation, and who now heads the Institute for the Study of Ethnic Gaps in Israel, opened this week at the initiative of the Sephardic World Federation, says: "In the ma'abarot there was a collapse of religious and family authority. All of the old hierarchy of the North African Jews, which had served them as a framework and representative, collapsed and was replaced. The Moroccan Jews, for example, had a religious leadership and a leadership which



represented them to the king. In Israel, the religious leadership became worthless, because religion ceased to be a tool of existence. The family authority also collapsed, mainly because the father ceased to play his role as provider for the family.

"The ethnic group was not able to substitute from within itself the leadership which had existed in the country of its origin. An external leadership was imposed upon it. Their support was provided by an outside-establishment person, usually an Ashkenazi. They did not take an elite economic group, to serve as an intermediary. There was no far-sighted sociological consideration. For what are intermediaries? They are the pipeline linking the sustenance provided by the government and the ethnic group, and they would naturally acquire leadership."

"Another thing which was done was the replacement of one set of educational forms for another set. The earlier set was that of the religious people, rabbis, teachers, cantors, ritual slaughterers. This set was treated like the dust of the earth. The set which was substituted in consisted of people from the Jewish Agency, the bureaucrats, or the young ineffectual teacher. When the substitution was made, the whole scale of values collapsed in several spheres: Religion, family, and sex."

"Thus, for example, there was a challenge to the ideas of the status of women, which in the past had been determined by the status of men. She had been inferior, because he had been superior. Now he was not at all superior. He did not bring home the money to support the family. He became the poor fellow who hangs around the house. He was powerless to impose his authority on his children."

"This led to a complete breakdown of frameworks. You could no longer trust in your father, because he was not someone you knew from the old country. He was a suppressed and depressed person who suffered all day long. In the evening he cried in the corner. You could no longer trust in your mother. She was no longer the woman to whom you could go to cry in time of trouble. She became a woman who went outside to work and yelled at your father, and they quarreled at night. This is what is called a broken family. The effect persists even today. And then, after a man acquired a pattern of conduct from 8 years in a ma'abara, do you think he would change the set once the gates were opened?"

"The trauma of most Orientals are the memories of our childhood," says Asher Edan (30), a native of Moshav Sharsheret in the northern Negev, where his parents were brought from the ma'abara at Lod, having come from Tunis.

Edan, who today is a lecturer in philosophy at the University of Tel Aviv, relates: "in the ma'abarot, our parents came up against the foremen and the bosses, while we had a totally negative encounter with the ways of thought of our parents. When many parents were taken from the ma'abara, they were told they were being taken to Beer Sheva. They took them into the desert. They did not want to get off of the truck. They were surrounded and removed by force in the moshav. In the first years they lived off of a few cows. A kibbutznik from Moshav Sa'ad ran the whole show. In nearby moshavim there were people who told how they had been brought to their moshav, how when they did not want to get off, the driver simply raised the lift on the truck and dumped them on the ground.... This is part of our psychological frustration!"



To the distortions which were transferred from the ma'abarot were added the economic distortions.

The ma'abarot residents were cheap manpower. They found employment in industrial plants nearby, or in agriculture at nearby kibbutzim and moshavim. The women found work as housekeepers. For those who found no work, the government supplied busy work.

The magic words in those years were "full employment." To prevent unemployment, the government spent large sums to supply work to ma'abarot residents. But it did not supply them with the means of production.

This dependence for employment and economic support on outside factors persisted even after the ma'abarot residents moved to new housing. In development towns, many people worked in agriculture for nearby kibbutzim, or in their factories. In new moshavim, farmers were forced to support their families by doing busy-work supplied by the government.

During the tenure of Pinhas Sapir as finance minister, enormous sums were invested in the building of factories to supply employment for residents of development towns. They did supply work. But the resources flowed to the entrepreneurs and private industrialists, or to large corporations. The Folgat factories of Yisrael Falk in Dimona, or the Carmel factories of Avraham Shapira in a number of development towns, are clear examples of this. The Oriental residents had no ownership in them.

The Orientals were given employment. The resources were given to the Ashkenazim. Thus, was created Oriental dependence upon the Ashkenazim, which exists even today principally in industry, agriculture, and services. Thus the ground was prepared for economic inequality between the ethnic groups.

The original sin which started in the ma'abarot, which were supposed to be a transitional phase on the road to complete integration of the mass immigration of Orientals, was perpetuated and took root and has become a permanent feature of Israeli society.

The political establishment of the country has always known of the dangers inherent in the existence of an ethnic gap. At a convention for North Africans, held in 1972, the Director General of the Histadrut, Yitshaq Ben-Aharon, said: "The guilt is on the leadership of the country, which conducted an economic policy which created poverty and social polarization.... Weak points from the Agency may destroy the country!"

At the same convention Prime Minister Golda Meir said: "The state of Israel cannot exist and carry out its mission if there is an ethnic gap.... Concern to eliminate that gap is not a matter of charity, but rather is incumbent upon the whole country!"

In spite of all the pronouncements, nothing has been repaired. Again, not because of lack of intention and good will, but because of a tragic series of mistakes, and a distorted perception of the problem. This will be dealt within the next article.

[24 Jul 81 p 11]

[Text] Shmuel Vankin warns: "There may arise groups who will want to burn down the homes of Ashkenazim!"

"Sub-culture groups are adopting violence and anarchism as a mode of operation. This has happened in Israel in the past. I have absolutely no doubt that if there is no change in the situation with respect to ethnic polarity in Israel, such a thing could happen. A group of Moroccan immigrants, for example, could attack the home of Ashkenazim and burn them down, just because they are homes of Ashkenazim. Not just because not enough is being done to prevent the development of this sort. Israeli society is not even aware of the existence of this danger."

Asher Edan says: "Perhaps they will not burn the homes of Ashkenazim. But they may select as targets of violence those institutions which are perceived by Orientals as being representative of Ashkenazim. Habimah House, for example, or the Workers Council building, or Metsudat-Ze'ev. If Orientals despair of any other means of achieving equality, they will have no way of avoiding the path of violence...."

Vankin and Edan are native Israelis. children of parents who came from North Africa. Both of them are young and educated, academics, having broad perspective. Vankin's principal preoccupations are mathematics and physics; Asher Edan is a lecturer in philosophy. Perhaps because their high intellectual level does not fit the stereotype of the Oriental, they are more sensitive to the psychological suffering of their generation--the first generation of Oriental immigrants. Because they are involved in problems of the ethnic gap and because they are part of it, they are aware of the dangers stemming from it.

Asher Edan relates: "Four months ago, at Kfar Yaroq, there was a convention of Oriental intellectuals. There were about 200 students, academics, organized within the framework of a program for public activists, intended to train a young leadership among Oriental ethnics. Most of the speakers at the convention recommended violence as a mode of operation. The organizers were shocked. They did not plan this, and of course they were opposed. But the people burst out with calls for violence...."

Manifestations of violence which appeared in the last elections were not the result of subversion or political plotting. What led to the political violence this time was the accumulated frustration of young Orientals. In the future, such violence could break out in another area. Violence is no longer the mode just of socially marginal groups. It has received legitimization among educated circles of Orientals, at the upper levels of the social class.

Little is said about this openly.

But in candid conversations, without fear of exposure which might have social or economic negative consequences, the same theme is heard repeatedly from Orientals throughout the country in all sectors of Israeli society.

A team of interviewers, some of them sociologists and some of them active in organizations and movements to change the ethnic alignment in Israel, conducted over an extended period, from 1978 to 1981, a series of interviews with about 100 persons, who were defined as the "potential elite" of the Oriental ethnic community. Those interviewed were members of the three largest groups of Oriental origin: Moroccans, Iraqis, and Yemenites. Some of the recorded interviews were published by the sociologist Shlomo Savirski in his book "Not Failures But Foiled," which recently appeared.

In all of the interviews there is a sense of neglect and discrimination expressed by those interviewed. The recurring motif in the interviews is the sense of belonging to a group which is controlled, a sense of economic and cultural subjection, and the recognition that the present situation of the ethnic group in Israeli society is not improving; and that the solution will not come of itself, but that one must work to bring it about.

This is a discussion among middle class persons in Beit Shean, as it is quoted in the book:

Rafael: You remind me of the Wadi Salib incident.

Aharon: Here people recall that incident. One thinks twice before going out to demonstrate, or in direct confrontation against. Example--today we cannot go out in direct confrontation against the kibbutzim.

Menahem: Good, we screwed the leaders of that time....

Aharon: Even today we say they are bought. Today we say that they do not serve the interest of Beit Shean, as they do serve the interest of the surrounding area.

Moshe: You only pose problems, but they must be solved...

Menahem: Nu, what do you suggest?

Moshe: What do I suggest? I say to you: I for one do not want there to be a civil war here, I do not want it. And I know, only by one will we succeed....

Menahem: Nu, then why not? Why not?

Moshe: If all of the people would succeed in rising up, and we would do a Wadi Salib ten times, a thousand times, then we would know how to succeed!

Following is part of what was said by Ezra, a native Israeli, of Iraqi parents, and a member of the Workers Committee at a state run factory:

"...There is an ethnic group in this country which has taken total control of this country, and I am not ashamed to say it, and that group is the polish group--people of the first immigration, or the second immigration. If you consider the government offices, and I visit a lot at the offices of the government and the Histadrut, take them one by one--all of them are polish. And one appoints the other to the senior positions. One pulls the other after him. The Orientals, of which I am one, are never included. They do the dirty work.

"He feels this strongly when he goes to an office, and I will give you an example from the university--where he did not go. He saw that the Ashkenazim are accepted immediately, but not him. He was in the paratroopers, he is smart, but wherever he goes they close the door in his face....

"The Histadrut is all polish. No doubt! Who are you talking to? You think there is a dispute between Begin and Mashal? Is that for the outsiders? Between Ehrlich and Mashal? Who is this Ehrlich and who is this Mashal? Like the idiot Moroccans, I say to them: Mashal is polish, idiots. You don't know Begin--he is not a Moroccan. He is polish? If there is one Moroccan, it is David Levy--and they close his mouth! They tell him: 'Shut up. If you don't, you will be kicked out of the cabinet.' He can't do anything. Why did they put David Levy in the government? For the votes! Folks, maybe I have illusions--but this is what I think, and I will die with these thoughts.

"A Sepharadi will never be in power. Never. He is bought and sold. You know what--they say that in Poland the Ashkenazim bowed their heads and went to the slaughter. But, if it had been Sepharadim, I think that they would not only have bowed their heads, they would have put them inside. They are sold people, used to going with their heads bowed, like the blacks in America. The blacks in America today raise their heads. Perhaps there will have to be a revolution here. That's all...."

Gabi, a resident of Kiryat Shmoneh, a hired worker at a kibbutz factory, says:

"I say one thing--I say that the ethnic gap and the discrimination were created by the government. I want to speak right to the heart of the matter. Why do I have to be a wretch, because I live in Kiryat Shmoneh? Why does the government build houses in Kiryat Shmoneh for a half a million pounds, and in Tel Aviv for 3 million pounds? Why don't they bring the employment and the higher education to the development regions? Every development region that you hear of is Oriental. Ofakim--a development region, Oriental; Kiryat Gat--a development region, Oriental; Ma'alot--a development region, Oriental. Let them build the factories we need in Kiryat Shmoneh, in Kiryat Gat, in all of the development areas. Let them bring the higher education, let them build those expensive houses. Let them build the cheap houses in Haifa, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and then you will see the gap close!

"But we don't have the education. Every teacher who doesn't have the money to buy an apartment in Tel Aviv comes to a development region. He gets himself to a development region, does good, and gets all kinds of benefits. I, who live in Kiryat Shmoneh, who was born there, I don't get one-fourth of his benefits. Why does it have to be this way?

One thing I do not expect--there will not be a Jewish war in Kiryat Shmoneh, because we are Jews. A Jew will not fight a Jew with weapons, but it could develop into a situation of civil war--a situation of despair, of suicides. Why are there suicides only among Orientals? Why is ther prostitution only among Orientals? Why are there theives only among Orientals?

"My answer is that the government is guilty. The state of Israel, whether it is the Alignment of the Likud, every government creates the ethnic gap and the discrimination. Only they, and they alone! Today I am not only thinking about leaving Kiryat Shmoneh, I am thinking about leaving Israel!"

This is what several of the hundred persons interviewed have to say. Almost all of them express the sense. It stems from accumulated personal and collective experience, covering about 30 years, in which there has been created an almost exact congruence between social status and ethnic background. Social status is for the most part determined by the level of income.



Since 1965, the Central Bureau for Statistics has been conducting ongoing surveys of income. In these surveys, the base index is the average cash income of a household of those born in Europe and America--the Ashkenazim.

In 1965, the average cash income of an Oriental household was only 71.1 percent of the average income of an Ashkenazic household. In 1978, the average income of an Oriental household was 80.3 percent of that of an Ashkenazic household. But while the Orientals who had come to Israel before 1947 had achieved an income of 99 percent of that of Ashkenazim, the income of those who had come after 1961 was only 76.1 percent of the average Ashkenazic income. The income of those who had come from Europe and America after 1961 was 93.5 percent of the average Ashkenazic income.

In a survey of standards of living conducted by the Central Bureau for Statistics in 1975/76, households, and not net income percapita, were studied. The population of the sample was divided into ten groups. The lowest tenth, included families whose average monthly income at that time was 1900 pounds per month. The upper tenth, number 10 (see the accompanying table) included families whose average monthly income was 9500 pounds per month.

The results of the survey clearly demonstrated that Orientals constituted the majority of the lowest tenth with the lowest income (55.5 percent). Their proportion in the upper tenth was limited to 5.7 percent, while Europeans and Americans constituted 70.2 percent of that tenth.

As one approaches the upper tenth, the proportion of Orientals declines.

In every country there are classes who are better off, who have higher incomes, and lower classes, whose income is lower. But when there is an exact congruence between income level and ethnic background, the problem becomes explosive. What has happened in England in recent weeks, where riots have spread like wild fire, is a clear indication of the danger involved in an ethnic gap of this sort.

In Israel, there has not only been an ethnic division of labor, but also an ethnic division of resources.

It was in particular the attempt to aid the hundreds of thousands of immigrants who came in a mass immigration from the Oriental countries, it was in particular the consciousness of the danger of an ethnic-social gap, which expanded, deepened, and paradoxically perpetuated this gap.

The road to the hell of the ethnic gap is paved with good intentions. Every Israeli government has recognized that after the problem of security, this was the most acute problem for Israeli society. They devoted enormous resources to absorb the Oriental immigration and to integrate it into the veteran community in Israel; by supplying employment, housing, welfare, and education so that these immigrants would be led to the goal of western modernization.

In order to supply mass employment, it was necessary to develop a broad economic base of industry, agriculture, and services with the help of government financing. This foundation was established by public bodies, companies, and entrepreneurs, who were already established in the field. These were mostly Ashkanazim. The resources flowed to them so that they would supply places of work. The Orientals received



the employment, the Ashkenazim received the capital, with the help of which they expanded and grew--and they expanded the gap.

Dr. Savirski's study determines the following: "The government cannot do everything by itself. Direct initiatives constitute only a small part of the government's investment. Most of the capital flows to private and public entrepreneurs in Israel. As in most other countries, this means not an infinite number of private entrepreneurs, but a relatively small group which concentrates in its hands control of most of the capital.... The large groups, including various Histadrut enterprises, at the center of which stands Bank Hapoalim; the Bank Leumi group, which is officially under the control of the Jewish Agency; the Bank Discount group, as well as various other groups such as Klal, the Israel Company, and the Sakharov Group. To these groups and the like are directed the financial aid of government investments in development towns. These groups are the owners of the largest enterprises which were set up in the development towns.

"From the foregoing, the principal conclusion regarding the capital investment structure in the development towns is that the Orientals in those towns have very little control. The plant managers and their senior teams are mostly Ashkenazim, and most of them live in the large cities, or live temporarily in the development towns, and then in special villa neighborhoods.... The patterns of investment and industrialization in the development towns do not work to the advantage of the inhabitants. They give special benefits to the groups which own the plants."

Similar processes have occurred in welfare, education, and housing. Savirski says: "The unequal development in the economic sphere was accompanied by the creation of a large 'social' apparatus, whose purpose was to bring Orientals into the circle of labor, to establish them within it at reasonable standards and conditions.... This apparatus included many workers, such as vocational teachers, social workers, counselors at labor bureaus and schools, and probation officers and street club leaders. This apparatus was composed essentially of Ashkenazim, with its activity directed principally towards Orientals."

"The growth of the educational system stemmed first and foremost from the growth of the student population. The proportion of Orientals in that growth was much greater, both because of their larger proportion in the mass immigration and because of the greater number of youngsters among them. But in terms of those employed, the expanded educational system supplied many new positions in particular to Ashkenazim."

The Orientals constitute the majority of consumers of welfare services in the country. But, welfare budgets are not transferred directly to the consumers. Educational services are provided by teachers: Health services are provided by nurses and doctors; welfare services are provided by social workers. This is the large apparatus, manned in particular by Ashkenazim. Every increase in the social service budget means an expansion of this apparatus. Every program to renovate neighborhoods means sources of income for the contractors, sociologists, and architects. Social services can solve the social problems of Orientals only through the increase of the profits of the Ashkenazim. Social services, which are supposed to reduce the gaps, contribute to their widening and perpetuation. This is the view of Savirski.

Asher Edan says: "The Chinese legend tells about the very rich man who used to give out free fish to the poor people of his city. They said to him: 'What a good man'. but the poor people of the city said: 'We don't want fish. Give us the net.' This is also the problem of Orientals in Israel. Instead of giving them nets, the government gives them fish. The nets remain in the hands of the Ashkenazim."

[31 Jul 81 p 11]

[Text] Dodo Topaz: "Chakh-chakhim," and the whole country was shocked, especially the Ashkanazic segment of it.

The history of insult, which follows this expression, was the clearest articulation of a bad conscience. "Chah-chahim" (mocking the way North Africans pronounce French) is insulting, racist, and almost as bad as "Frenk" or "schwartz khaye" which preceded it, despicable expressions.

On the other hand, "needing special help" is an academic cultured respectable expression. One does not feel a sense of guilt when he utters it. On the contrary, he is showing understanding, an open mind, a partnership in destiny, and a readiness to help.

But a thousand "chah-chahim" does not equal in negative value one "needing special help." Because "chah-chahim" is at worst an adjective. "Needing special help" is an operative term. It covers the educational oversights of a complete generation.

The term is not an Israeli invention. It exists wherever one ethnic groups seeks to perpetuate its superiority over another ethnic group. In Israel it was adopted by the political and educational system, and perhaps it unconsciously helped the veteran Ashkenazic community perpetuate its superiority over the new immigrants, the Orientals.

Lurking behind the term "needing special help" is a whole social educational philosophy, based on myths which many modern sociologists feel are lacking any basis. This philosophy maintains that in every society, in addition to primary disadvantage, which is from birth, there is secondary disadvantage, which is the result of social or cultural neglect. This disadvantage is the result of environment.

When the secondary disadvantage applies to children of an outer directed nature, who are affected by external conditions of life and are out off from internal factors such as sensitivity or values, the result is those who are characterized as "needing special help." Those needing special help are deficient in their ability to perceive and to abstract, and qualities such as rationalization and responsibility are weak, in comparison to regular children.

Even if this concept is not fundamentally rejected, as it is by many experts throughout the world, its very application in a general way to one population group, in comparison to a neighboring population group, is a type of social distortion. This is what has happened in Israel.

From the day that the social establishment became aware of the existence and seriousness of the problem called the "ethnic gap" it tried to solve it by means of the educational system. In 1968, after 2 years of consideration, the Interparliamentary Committee for Study of the Educational Structure decided upon an educational reform, which was passed by the Knesset.

It was explicitly determined then that the goals of the reform were "raising the level of instruction and educational achievement; reduction of the gap existing between children in the country in the level of education and the prospects of integration into society and a progressing economy."

At that time, in the Ministry of Education and Culture, a committee was set up to carry out the reform, which decided that one of the targets of the reform was: "acceleration of the processes of integration of members of various ethnic communities and classes into society."

Orientalism was defined as "needing special help" and the way to raise their educational and cultural level and abilities to adapt to Israeli society was the magic word-- integration.

By marking a whole ethnic community with the label "needing special help" it was assumed from the outset that members of that ethnic group were inferior, failures, suffering from secondary disadvantage, having limited ability to perceive, primitive, but not of their own fault but rather because of the environmental conditions under which they were raised.

The identity which was created between the term "needing special help" and the Orientalism was a sign of identifying failure, just as the term "ethnic group" was identified only with Orientalism. The Ashkenazim, coming from Poland or Germany, are not an ethnic group. This identification mark was angering and destructive. It angered those who were defined as "needing special help" as opposed to those who sought to help them and bring them up to their level, by an absolute denial of their tradition, culture, ideas, and way of life.

It defeated integration, since integration means unification. But unification can only occur between equals. Integration between inferiors and superiors is only a word which covers the desire of one component to swallow up the other component. In this way it creates a negative self image among those who are unjustly characterized as "needing special help."

Today there is almost complete unanimity among educators and sociologists that reject the reform in education, because integration by means of the educational system has failed.

The Public Committee for Study of Reform of the Educational System, which published its report in April 1979, determined among other things: "The second target of the reform--an acceleration of the processes of social integration--was not in practice dealt with, both organizationally as well as pedagogically...."

An inter-university seminar, in which most of the educationists of the country participated, spent 2 years in analyzing integrationist education. In November 1979 its conclusions were published:

"It appears to us, that in spite of the expanded use of the term "integration" it is not possible to find a clear definition or formulation of the goals of integrationist education." This is what the team of Israeli educators determined. "In our opinion, it is possible to deal with integration in the two following ways: As a goal in itself, or as a means of achieving national and educational goals which are defined."

The goals of the approach which viewed integration as a means were: Granting equal opportunity in education, improving the achievement level of students requiring special help and closing the gap between them and others, and improving positions through nurturing sound social relations between various population groups.

In spite of the fact that here and there it was possible to point to certain successes, in general national terms not one of these goals was achieved.

"We found that the almost sole educational solution within the integrationist framework is to divide the class into levels to enable each student to advance according to his ability. But most of the programs and educational materials prepared until now have been directed towards the students in the highest levels, while for the students in the lower levels--who are the ones needing the special attention--very little has been devoted to developing techniques, means of instruction, and special methods of study. The damage which may be caused to the prospects of integration because of this neglect is great, and places in doubt the success of the whole program, and perhaps even its continuation.

"...Not enough has been done to discover the potential which can be gotten from integrationist education. In fact, the term "not enough has been done" is an understatement, and the truth is that those people involved in the issue believe that it is satisfactory to achieve physical integration--seating students who need special help with students who have developed... so as to achieve the expected results. It is necessary to achieve integration but this is not a sufficient condition! Additional conditions must be maintained so that integration will yield positive fruits."

These are the conclusions of the experts who said from the start that integration was necessary.

Instead of integration being a meeting between cultures, of reciprocal enrichment, of mutual encouragement, it has become a tool of oppression and absolute negation of the values, traditions, worldview, and thinking of one ethnic group--that characterized as 'needing special help'. This type of integration cannot succeed.

In spite of the fact that apparently integration did open a way for giving equal educational opportunities--it increased the inequality. The most palpable example of this is perhaps what happens today in academic institutions in Israel.

The proportion of Orientals--native Israelis born to parents from Asia and Africa--among the student population in Israel was for many years extremely small; around 12 percent. In order to encourage interest in institutions of higher learning and to increase the number of Orientals studying in them, a series of steps were devised to give them preference.

Within the framework of a special program of the Hebrew University--"the Program for Public Activists"--last year about 3000 Oriental students studied at academic institutions. In the coming academic year their number will rise to 4000. The tuition for these students is paid by the Sephardic Community Department of the Zionist Union and the Jewish Agency.



The director general of the department, Eli Artsi (39), born in Morocco, who immigrated to Israel with his parents in 1952, living in the Kastel Ma'abara, sent from there to the boarding school Nitsanim, where he later became the educational director of that institution, relates: "At the beginning the goal of this project was to train cadres of leaders from the Oriental community. We took leaders from the development towns who had already reached senior positions but who lacked formal education, and we sent them to study at the universities at our expense and at the expense of the Department for Rehabilitating Neighborhoods.

"Later, needs dictated a change in the character of the project. We take in students from development towns and poor neighborhoods, who have the cognitive ability to progress but who do not have the ability to finance their education. We push them to continue and complete their academic studies.

"From the moment that a student begins this program, we track him. So that his involvement with the program will be real, he is required to contribute so as to participate in various programs. He does tutoring in development towns. He participates in prisoner rehabilitation programs. There are seminars and study days at which we discuss topics such as political and social problems of the country. We do not want the student to live in a hot house, but to become involved in what is happening on campus, in his town, and neighborhood, as well as in the whole country."

"But," says Eli Artsi, "I don't want this program to exist at all. I weep over it. Because what happens in actuality? A student from the Oriental community comes to register at the university. Lacking the means, he tries to clarify the conditions of study, immediately he is sent to the Department for Sephardic Communities in the Agency, which means: All of those state budgets which the university gets are intended only for the Ashkenazic and Arab communities. For the Sephardic community there is a Department for Sephardic Communities in the Agency.

"And not only that--for the students which we send, the university collects from us tuition of 120 percent of the regular tuition. Because we are a financing institution. If I were to give the money directly to the students so that they could register and pay the regular tuition, I would be able to increase their number by 20 percent. Because we pay directly to the institution, we pay 120 percent. This is robbery! This must be stopped! I am always complaining to the Agency about it.

"Why does there have to be a Department for Sephardic Communities in the Agency? So that it will be a solution for the Oriental students? This is absurd. This is a national problem, which the state of Israel has to confront, and not just the Agency. Why doesn't the Agency have a Department for Ashkenazim, which would bear the heavy educational burden for those from Europe and America?

"I am rebelling against this absurdity! I see it as part of the general system which was created to give the Sepharadim cover in all of the systems. I am revolted by the name which they have given to the department which I head. First, they create the problem, and later they complain--what do you want? Look you are getting and receiving. This is how they fulfill their obligation.

"When I hear the expression 'you and we' or 'they and we' I shudder. The leaders of the country do not understand that this seemingly innocent expression contains the seed of fragmentation and even civil war."



Eli Artsi sees the root of the problem in the conception which has been perpetuated since the beginning of the mass immigration from the Oriental countries.

"No one has yet studied and investigated which communities come to Israel, and which culture is behind them. What is their mentality? They simplify it and say: These people come from Islamic countries which are technologically backward. They make the analogy that technological backwardness means being backward developmentally and culturally. No one here has noted that the culture which is being labeled as backward is the culture of Maimonides, Yehuda Ha-Levi, Haim ben-Atar and others.

"That magnificent culture, which was rooted in the Jewry of North Africa, has lost its originality here. They have asked us to be swallowed up. But they have not given us a substitute. When they saw the results of this approach, it was already too late.

"The same educational-cultural crisis which began in the first years of the state have persisted until today, and it is leaving its mark in the political sphere. The coming earthquake will be a very severe one.

"I personally have witnessed a new phenomenon recently: Families of Orientals are trying to organize, in groups of 20-25, so as to emigrate from the country as a unified group. More than once I have confronted them and debated and tried to convince them. Because I know that if this process begins--God forbid--no one will be able to stop it."

[7 Aug 81 pp 11, 28]

[Text] The atmosphere in the office of the chairman of the administrative committee of the Broadcasting Authority is tense. The chairman is professor Reuven Yaron. Representatives of a group of intellectuals and humanists of the Oriental community who have met with him spoke in loud voices. They demanded that he cancel the showing of a television series on Zionism called "The Pillar of Fire." They claim that the series has ignored the contribution of Orientals to Zionism. Their demand was rejected with formal justifications.

When the meeting ended and the representatives of the group remained alone, one of them burst out in a shout. He was the young poet and lyricist, a Yemenite whose family was third generation Israeli. The frustration and despair broke forth without stop.

He called upon his colleagues: "Let's decide now to occupy this television building. Five thousand people! There will be blood, weapons, a few bombs, a few grenades, a few killings, but brutal! Real brutal! By force! This is the only power we have in this country!"

It is doubtful that he really meant the things which he said. There was no echo to them. The series "The Pillar of Fire" was shown without the Orientals storming the Bastille of television. But the fact that this poet and lyricist, who considers himself a humanist, could say such extremist things, indicates the seriousness of the thinking among Oriental humanists. Even if not to the same degree of extremism, this cry characterized the sense of anger shared by writers, lyricists, singers, actors, and communications people among Orientals, who are forced to live in what is an Ashkenazic culture, and to deal with it.

In a series of personal interviews, where identities were not revealed and those interviewed were able to express themselves freely, several of these Oriental humanists gave expression to this sense of cultural seige which they have, in which they believe they live in Israeli society. All of the segments quoted below are taken from those interviews, which are published in the book by the sociologist Shlomo Savirski, "...Not Failures, But Foiled."

Uzi, the Yemenite poet and lyricist, who made the call for war against television, said: "If I never experienced exile in the Diaspora, I have felt it here in Israel. I am a Sabra but I feel as though I am in exile. This is a lousy feeling. Sometimes I propose radical solutions, because I have had it, I am no longer patient...."

"When you talk about culture, it never has anything to do with the East. In every way, it is an Ashkenazic conception: We must undergo a re-education to know what true culture is--and the true culture is that of Europe. Anything which we brought with us must be destroyed...."

Haim, who is a writer and playwright, born in Morocco, says: "You feel it all along the way, at every step.... You simply feel emasculated, orphaned, isolated, and depressed. You are an undesirable, a stranger, unneeded--uninteresting in your culture. Your music is not their music, your songs are not their songs, and of course your values are not their values...."

"All the television heroes are Ashkenazic.... The communications media formulate experience, they create the images, and if you will, they create the psychology of the people.... The people which is created, or the psychology which is created, the images and the heroes which are created--all of it is Ashkenazic. I am waiting to see when they will create a Moroccan hero, or a Tunisian or Algerian hero.... Sometimes you listen and get the feeling that they are broadcasting with antennae in another country, and you seek shelter in another country. There is no communication...."

Says David Hamo, who in 1977 was the founder of a group at the University of Haifa, called "Yated", which worked towards the goal of establishing an enlightened, just, unalienated society with the values of which all Israeli citizens would be able to identify: "When I see a Naomi Shemer program on television, I call my Ashkenazic wife and say: 'Look, an Ashkenazic television program.' I do not find myself in any of Naomi Shemer's songs. Every holiday eve, every Friday evening, I sit in front of television of the Ashkenazim. An Ashkenazi speaks about my problems in an Ashkenazic context, not that of an Israeli.... Or when there are songs by Naomi Shemer, or "Songs of Grass", I always see very specific faces on the lawn, a very specific experience in which I have no part or interest."

In the heat of the last elections, a new expression came into use: Two cultures, or according to another form: "They-us. One can understand the negativity of the situation from these expressions. It is as though there is a national fault in the existence of two cultures under one nationality, or as though one culture is preferable over another.

Both the determination and the significance attached to it are in error. Central schools in modern sociology not only do not reject cultural diversity in one society, but they affirm societies in which there are various ethnic groups which respect one another and which develop their own special cultural qualities.

The sociologist Yohanan Peres of the University of Tel Aviv, says in his book "Ethnic Relations in Israel": "A pluralistic ideology is based not only on the pursuit of justice, but also on a certain conception of national culture. By vain efforts to achieve acknowledged achievements in society, the minority group member casts off his culture, substitutes and "imitation" for the original, and thus "contributes" to the impoverishment of the sources of cultural creativity.... Only a group having a collective memory formed over generations can serve as a fruitful soil for artistic creativity. Moreover, a homogeneous culture, because of an internal or external crisis, can run into a blind alley, while a pluralistic culture is able to overcome such a situation by forming new foundations from its many sources."

By nature, there should exist in Israel, side by side, two cultures, that of the Orientals and that of the Westerners. Each of them brought its own cultural heritage with it. It is not expressed only through literary or artistic works, but also through a different system of ideas regarding the world view and relations between people, or in a different order of priorities regarding the realization of goals.

But in Israel there are not two equal cultures each nourishing the other. There is a dominant culture and alongside it a dominated culture. Yohanan Peres says: "While the Ashkenazic communities drew together so that by the second generation there was a complete blend, the Oriental communities have been united only in their sense of neglect. The similarity in the ways of life of these communities is recognizable when they are compared, but it does not serve as a basis for collaboration in patterns of culture."

In an article which was published in "Makhbarot Le-Mekhkar u-Vikoret", the sociologist Deborah Bernstein argues that the rejection of a cultural program, or the rejection of the very existence of a culture among the Oriental communities was accompanied by a dehumanization, with the negation of their very existence as human beings. Leaders, sociologists, humanists, and officials viewed the Oriental communities which immigrated to Israel en masse as to people in absolute need of culture, as though they were primitives lacking in the ability to make independent judgment, lacking an identity and maturity. These deficiencies were supposed to be filled, as Ben Gurion claimed in his time, with "a deep and pure love," by the absorbing Ashkenazic culture, which would convert this "human dust into a cultural nation."

As a result, Oriental culture was repressed. Western culture, represented by the Ashkenazim, dominates all spheres of cultural creativity as well as the communications media. Isolated attempts to foster cultural creativity among the Orientals are judged and criticized according to the standards of Western cultural values.

One of the clearest examples of this is the "Festival of Oriental Music," which is held separately from the "Festival of Israeli Music." The Israeli festival, or as it is called "in the style of the Oriental communities," represents a community. Oriental music and song are given expression so that no one will level accusations of intentional discrimination. But they remain not belonging, or at best, they represent at most a sub-culture.

Official statistics confirm the claim. Orientals are not consumers of culture. This leads to the conclusion that they are culturally inferior.

At the beginning of the year, the Central Bureau of Statistics published the results of a survey on the reading and entertainment habits of the adult Jewish population. The survey, which was made between January and May of 1979, at the request of the Ministry of Education and Culture, testifies to substantial differences in the consumption of culture between African-Asians and European-Americans.

Among Orientals, 57.4 percent attended a cultural event outside of their homes at least once a month, as compared to 60.3 percent of Ashkenazim, and 77.7 percent of native Israelis who were the children of native Israelis. While attendance at movies was almost equal between the two groups, light entertainment was attended by only 7.2 percent of Orientals as compared to 15.6 percent of Ashkenazim; only 7.2 percent of Orientals attended the theater, as compared to 15.6 percent of Ashkenazim; 15.9 percent of Orientals visited a museum, as compared to 23 percent of Ashkenazim, and concerts were attended by only 1.3 percent of Orientals, as compared to 9 percent among Ashkenazim.

Even in listening to radio programs and reading the newspapers, the rate is lower among Orientals than among those from Western countries. On the other hand the rate of watching television was almost equal between the two communities.

For example, while 91 percent of those from Western countries read a daily newspaper, among Orientals only 69.6 percent read a daily paper. Among those from Europe and America 62.3 percent read at least one book a month, while among Orientals the rate is only 38.2 percent.

But one cannot conclude from the findings of these surveys the true rate of consumption of culture among Orientals and Ashkenazim. Since in most cases, what is considered is to supply of the dominant culture, the Ashkenazic culture, the surveys at most show the degree of consumption of Ashkenazic cultural products among the consumers of culture who are both Orientals and Ashkenazim. The index of consumption which was measured was for the most part clearly Western. When one measures consumption of concerts, theater, museums, and even radio, one is talking about cultural products which are controlled by the Ashkenazim.

If there existed in Israel, side by side, two cultures, responding to the specific needs of the various communities; if there existed Oriental theater, concerts of Oriental music, and Oriental radio--it is doubtful if there would be a gap in cultural consumption between Orientals and Ashkenazim.

There is also an economic reason for the present gap in cultural consumption

Since there is a congruence between ethnic origin and level of income, property, and allocation of national resources, it is only natural that there would be a congruence between ethnic origin and cultural consumption. Cultural products are not given away free. They cost money. As available income per capita increases the spending for consumption of culture rises.

So, there exists another official survey which proves that among Orientals, the average expenditure for educational needs and culture is higher than that among Westerners.



In June of this year, the Central Bureau for Statistics published the results of the "Survey of Family Spending" which was conducted in fiscal year 1979-1980. Among other things this survey showed that the average income of Ashkenazic families--coming from Europe and America--was 8.5 percent higher than the average income of those born in Asia and Africa.

A shocking detail: The survey finds that the income from wages of an Oriental family was greater than that of an Ashkenazic family, but since in the average Ashkenazic family income from capital was almost double that of the average Oriental family, the sum total of all its income exceeded that of the Oriental family.

The survey indicates that while the largest expense of an Ashkenazic family is for housing, the largest expense for an Oriental family was for food. But in the category of spending for education, culture, and entertainment, the spending of an Oriental family was 6.2 percent greater than that of an Ashkenazic family. The highest expense stems, apparently, from the difference in the average number of persons per family. In an Ashkenazic family, the average number of persons is 2.5, while in Oriental families it is four.

The difference in the average number of persons per family explains why the average Oriental family spends about 55 percent more than an Ashkenazic family for educational service. But in the rest of the categories of expenses for education and culture, the differences do not always stem from family size.

Thus, for example, it appears that the average Oriental family spends 67 percent more for cultural and entertainment events, and 23.8 percent more for cultural products and current entertainment than the average Ashkenazic family. On the other hand, the average Ashkenazic family spends about 15 percent more on newspapers, books, and writing equipment, and 78 percent more for recreation and trips.

In sum, expenditures for education, culture, and entertainment constitute 7.6 percent of the income of an Oriental family and only 6 percent of the total income of an Ashkenazic family.

The figures show that when one measures consumption of culture by spending, and not by the number of visits to cultural and entertainment events, or frequency of reading books and newspapers, there are no significant gaps between the two ethnic groups.

The gap exists in supply, not in consumption. The lack of expression for the culture peculiar to Orientals is interpreted among many of them as a negation of their honor and a blurring of their independent identity. When this factor is added to other factors, such as the gap in income and distribution of resources or the imbalance in political representation, it fans the flames of frustration and enmity.

In his research on ethnic relations in Israel, the sociologist Yohanan Peres states: "With the improvement of living conditions, educational possibilities, with vocational training, a whole class of Orientals is forming which is able to hold senior positions in many fields.

"But the thorn is this: With the coming together, the lower classes take over the middle or even upper class characteristics. But their inability to realize in theory and practice the desired way of life creates a sense of being neglected, which in turn causes a series of phenomena: Cheap imitation, flight from reality, and the attempt to take by unorthodox means what is beyond one's reach....

"Indeed, if the ethnic gap is not reduced, the sense of neglect may lead to a destructive outburst."

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CSO: 4323/57

SUCCESS OF INTEGRATION ANALYZED

Tel Aviv DAVAR 31 Jul 81 p 16

[Article by Yehuda Gotthelf: "Ethnic Integration in Theory and Practice"]

[Text] The storm of the 10th Knesset elections has subsided, and public life has returned to normal. But one cannot ignore the ethnic tension which left its mark on the election system, and which left us years behind in the process of ethnic integration. Have we failed in the principal mission of Zionism? Or is the pessimistic evaluation wrong in that it was only developed to exploit political differences?

Any objective comparison made not in the heat of an election will reveal that among countries of the world which contain ethnic differences, Israel has in a very short time and under emergency conditions achieved an impressive national unity, which other countries have not achieved even after hundreds of years of existence. It is Israel which in one generation increased its population five-fold; which absorbed immigrants from dozens of countries speaking various languages, and which shaped one people speaking one language. India, which gained its independence at about the same time as Israel, today speaks several hundred languages, and only the language of the colonial rulers has become the common language of all Indians. Ireland, which broke away from Britain, did not succeed in reviving its national language, and still the Irish speak English. In the language of Bernard Shaw: "two peoples, whose common language separates them." This is the case in dozens of "developing" countries on various continents, who do not have one common language, but find themselves in the generation of Babel.

In spite of the burden of security and poverty of natural resources, Israel, which numbered only 600,000 at its birth, undertook to assure employment, housing, and education for all those who came to it. The mass immigration occurred in the first years of the state's existence at a time when it lacked means despite the aid from Jews in the diaspora. It is no wonder that the conditions of absorption were such as to cause concern. Lack of administrative experience, which gave rise to a bureaucracy, did not improve the situation.

The truth is that the immigrations from before the establishment of the state did not experience very good integration. In fact, they encountered hostility on the part of the foreign rulers (Turkish and British), and rigidity on the part of

the Jewish community (the old and the new), which did not make easy the integration of the immigrants in work, housing, and social life. Each wave of immigration had to overcome the tendencies of conservatism and egoism of the preceding wave, which looked down upon those who came after it. The Sephardis of the old community did not look with favor on the Ashkenazim. The Russians, the Yemenites, the Poles, the Germans, the Rumanians, and others all served as a target for the arrows of criticism and mockery on the part of the veterans.

Even during the pre-state period there were certain signs of a socio-cultural differentiation. But it was limited. "East" and "West" went their separate ways, and there were only a few exchanges, because there was no contact between them and therefore there was no talk of "ethnic problems." Indeed, the national-historical conception which prevailed in most of conscious society, left no doubt that the differences and contradictions between the immigrants from various countries were commutative. Without exaggerating the "racial purity" of the people of Israel over the generations, in general there was no substantive genetic difference between Jewish groups in the Diaspora, because of the Jewish heritage, common Jewish fate, and the longing of all for redemption. So, the geopolitical and social background of the Diaspora changed from time to time. During a certain period the cultural level of the Islamic countries was higher, and the Jews of those countries in those times were at the pinnacle of Jewish culture and left us an important heritage. At a later period, the center of gravity of civilization shifted to other regions, and the Jews of more enlightened countries became the bearers of spiritual renaissance and the pioneers of the national and social movements of the Jewish people.

In spite of the differences in cultural level of the Jewish groups in the Diaspora, which were influenced by their various environments, our battle for existence and the study of Torah in all of the Diasporas "sharpened" the minds of the children of Israel, and this provided the basis for settlement of the generations in days gone by--on a high shared cultural level for all of the ethnic groups of Israel. The Zionist-socialist conception strengthened faith in this positive process: even if there is still a difference in the conditions of existence (either as a result of historic background or as a result of the pangs of absorption at the beginning of the state) and even if there are differences in class corresponding to a certain degree with the ethnic background (there are extremely wealthy persons among non-Ashkenazim), social progress will reduce these differences to the point of ending them. Thus the Labor Movement believed that the workers of the various ethnic groups would constitute a single working class, and this class would lead to the formation of a single people, a working people.

The progressive process of integration had an effect, for since the 1950's, almost no attempt to form an ethnic party has succeeded. But in the elections for the 10th Knesset we witnessed a sorry attempt to turn back the wheel of development and deepened the rift, both in the religious camp and the labor camp--against an ethnic background. No longer "from class to people" but "from a people to ethnic classes." Is there any justification for this?

The integration of those who came from various Diasporas is still not complete. And the reasons are known. There was "reality of deprivation," the result of hundreds of years of dispersion among peoples of various cultural levels, and it



caused the differences in the "starting points" for various groups of immigrants. For many oriental immigrants, coming to Israel was the first contact with "Western" civilization, with modern technology and political-social relations to which they were unaccustomed. Only 58.5 percent of the immigrants from Asia and Africa knew how to read and write, (in any language) as compared to 95 percent of the immigrants from Europe. The education gap was the principal factor in the employment trade structure of those coming from Asia and Africa; this meant that they were concentrated in agriculture and industrial trades, with relatively low income as compared to the employment of those coming from western countries, where a worker earns a relatively high income.

Castigation (and self-castigation) in this issue is exaggerated, because industrial distribution according to country of origin will only be solved by raising the level of education.

Distorted differences in the level of housing have also developed. Following the formal approach of mechanical equality in the distribution of dwellings, immigrants were granted equal housing, without regard for the differences in the number of persons in families. In time, this distortion was corrected to some extent. But in general, people do not point to achievements, but rather at what has not yet been achieved. Also, changes in authorities, following the "revolution" contributed very little to closing the gap. But the political demagogery of the Likud, which feeds on ethnic rivalries, is not obliged to be precise.

Difficult housing conditions were especially hard on families blessed with many children, who were unable to give proper conditions for development to their offspring, all the more so when parents were unable to help children in their studies. The fact that many of those of the cultural upper classes in the lands of Islam did not accompany the mass immigration, but preferred to go to Western countries, also did not help to even the socio-cultural balance of forces in this developing country.

But even the most ill willed could not prove that in the first decades of the state there was intentional discrimination against ethnic groups. The Compulsory Education Law (1950) was the first step in closing the gap in education. It is worth noting that Israel is the only country of Asia and Africa (except for Japan) which has succeeded in realizing such a law, in both theory and practice. But in poor neighborhoods and development towns there were at first fewer licensed teachers (the number of trained teachers in the mass immigration was very small). In raising cultural quality there is no shortcut, a fortiori that the gap among children begins at a very early age (for years greater attention has been devoted to kindergartens). It is no secret that while children of oriental origin constitute 80 percent of the pupils in first grade, their percentage declines to 19 in universities. Even though there has been progress in this area over the years, things are still not right. Yet there is no doubt that in various spheres--housing, livelihood, etc--the first two decades of government and Histadrut activity have brought about a gradual reduction of the gaps, in comparison to the preceding years.

In the decade preceding the "revolution" of the Likud, the number of persons living below the poverty line was reduced from 20 percent to 6.5 percent. (Since

1977, there has been a turn for the worse.) In 1960 there were 105,000 families living in deficient housing (three or more persons per room). In 1970 their number had declined to 50,000, and in 1977 there were only 23,000 families living three or more persons to a room.

Most strange is the claim that the immigration from the countries of Islam, which came after the creation of the state, bore the principal burden of population dispersal (the creation of development cities), and that this was one of the factors in the gap. So, from the beginning sophisticated industrial plants were not built there. Was there capital and trained workers necessary for this? There are those who have compared the dispersal of population to the cultural and economic development of the western countries at the expense of exploitation of colonial countries! But the analogy does not hold. Even "veteran" settlements were at first far from the "centers." Was it a mistake for the state to seek the development of desolate regions of the country? Kibbutzim and moshavim also bore the burden of dispersal, and their populations are varied ethnically. Tensions have recently surfaced between them and the populations of the development towns. The hatred-jealousy is meaningless. The rise of the standard of living of the kibbutzim is not the result of capital deals and brokering, but of collective labor and creativity. If the kibbutzim had not made these achievements after years of labor, we would have seen in their continued poverty the bankruptcy of Zionism in general, and of labor Zionism in particular. The kibbutz movement is open to members of all ethnic groups who are ready to join it. Can we ignore the fact that it established factories and employed--at first under compulsion--hired workers who did not want to join kibbutz life? (It is to be hoped that the kibbutz will be able to find a solution to the problem by eliminating hired labor, or by sharing responsibility and profits with the hired workers.)

Another complaint which has been heard repeatedly deals with the matter of representation. But it is natural that immigrations which came later would be in a position inferior to that of earlier immigrations which had already established a certain base. In the past, there was a preference for immigrants from Russia and Poland over German immigrants; but over the years the integration process has taken its course. This is also the case for representation of Oriental ethnic groups, which is steadily expanding. Their share in the Labor Party Center has reached 38 percent, and among secretaries of the Workers Councils--65 percent. Mayors of development towns are non-Ashkenazic. There are still some feelings of frustration because of lack of representation in the highest levels of government and the Histadrut (Hevrat Ovdim and Kupat Holim), and the distortion should be corrected at a faster pace.

In social life, a paradoxical phenomenon has appeared more than once: the masses rebel at times which are not especially the lowest in terms of their situation. On the contrary, at times of partial improvement and a lightening of the social burden, the rage of those deprived breaks out with greater force (the subjective sense of deprivation is sometimes greater than the objective deprivation) because the improvement has not been completed or is insufficient. Sometimes the deprived masses ignore the true causes of their deprivation, rebelling against the reformers and being drawn to revolution, or counter-revolution, which nurtures illusions, promises, and seduction.

Those who have engineered the Likud "revolution" have not only not contributed to the continuation of the process of reduction of ethnic-class gaps, but in fact have deepened the social polarity. Nevertheless, they have succeeded in misleading the masses by transferring the political struggle from the social sphere to the arena of national and inter-ethnic group tensions.

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CSO: 4323

ASHKENAZI, ORIENTAL CONSUMPTION PATTERNS STUDIED

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT 31 Jul 81 Economic Supplement p 1

[Article by Yisrael Tomer: Refrigerator and Private Car are Measure of Economic Gap Between Ethnic Groups"]

[Text] It is difficult to measure the sense of ethnic deprivation, as it found emphasized expression in the elections. It is possible to attempt an evaluation of it by standard of living, along the following lines: "Why does Rabinowitz drive a new car with four cylinders, while Rabino is forced to ride a rusty bicycle?" The ownership of a car--or a bicycle--as in the case of other durable goods, can serve as a measure of standard of living.

There are goods, such as an electric refrigerator, television, solar water heater, or electric water heater, and even a sewing machine or washing machine, which are equally owned by everyone. These products are so essential today that ownership of them does not reflect significant gaps in standard of living. In fact they may even testify to the closing of the gap, albeit gradually.

This is not the case with other durable goods, such as a vacuum cleaner, air conditioner, even a telephone, and certainly a private car. To a certain extent, ownership of these goods is a testimony of social class and standard of living.

The Central Bureau for Statistics is publishing additional materials on the survey of family expenditures. The data deals with a period of more than a year ago, but there is no reason to assume that the gap in ownership of durable goods, according to ethnic group, has changed appreciably in the meantime.

A comparison of the data on ownership of expensive durable products among families originating in the West and the East clearly points to significant gaps, which stem from differences in standard of living, as well as differences in life styles.

A number of conclusions are striking:

The ethnic gap is most striking in the ownership of expensive durable goods, such as private cars, a telephone, or vacuum cleaner. The rate of ownership among families originating in western countries is high, between 35 to more than 50 percent, in comparison to families originating in eastern countries.



Only 4.4 percent of families of eastern origin have air conditioners in their apartments, while among Ashkenazim the number is more than 20 percent, or four times as many.

Only one-quarter of families of eastern origin own private cars. In contrast, more than 36 percent of families originating in Europe and America own cars. This gap is even greater in second generation families. Among families born in Israel, whose parents are Ashkenazic, 75 percent own cars, while only 48 percent of Israeli born families whose parents are of eastern origin own cars.

In the case of two durable goods, there is a gap in favor of persons of eastern origin: solar water heaters and stereo systems. The data indicate that close to 53 percent of families of eastern origin have installed solar water heaters as compared to 39 percent among families originating in western countries.

It also appears that 32 percent of families originating in Asia or Africa have stereo systems in their homes, while among those of western origin, only 30 percent or less have purchased such systems.

Another phenomenon worthy of attention is that among young native Israeli families of western background, there are many more stereophonic systems (65 percent of the families own these) while among native families of oriental background, only 45 percent own such systems.

In ownership of other durable goods there is almost no difference in terms of ethnic group; if there is a difference it is of little significance. It is apparent that close to 100 percent of the families in Israel today own refrigerators; about 90 percent own television sets (in the survey it was indicated that 8 percent of the families own color televisions; but since the data was collected, this figure rose to about one-third of all families, but with respect to ethnic distribution there are as yet no figures). Seventy-five to 80 percent of all families own a washing machine.

The following table represents difference in ownership, according to ethnic background, of a number of durable goods. The data, based on findings of the Central Bureau for Statistics, reflect (in percentages) the share of families within that ethnic group, who own one or another product. Ethnic affiliation is determined according to the continent of birth of the family head in relation to the origin of native Israelis which is determined by the place of birth of the father.

Who Owns What? According to Ethnic Origin  
(In percentages, of the total number of families of that origin)

Type of Goods	Coming from		Native Israelis	
	East	West	East	West
Ovens (gas-electric)	73	60	83	70
Electric refrigerator	99	99	99	100
Electric blender	51	56	57	74

Washing machine	81	74	88	87
Vacuum cleaner	25	55	22	48
Television set	89	89	88	48
Stereo system	32	30	45	65
Tape recorder	9	14	11	22
Air conditioner	4	20	4	17
Solar water heater	53	39	35	26
Electric water heater	42	53	59	58
Telephone	55	73	48	76
Car	25	36	43	72

7075

CSO: 4323

# JORDANIAN VIEWS ON EUROPEAN INITIATIVE

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI No 227 7-13 Sep 81 p 19

[Article by Fuad Naim: "Cheysson Announces the Death of the European Initiative"]

[Text] "Owing to the existing ties between the Common Market countries and the United States, no European initiative at variance with the Camp David accords is possible at this time. It is better, therefore, that Europe desist from evolving such an initiative." This statement, it seems, is a fair summary of the substance of the discussions that took place last week in Paris and Amman between King Husayn and President Francois Mitterrand on one hand, and between Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson of France and Prime Minister Mudor Marwan and Foreign Minister Marwan al-Qasim of Jordan on the other.

To underscore this point, Mr Cheysson had previously declared that his government believes that any initiative toward a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East must originate with the countries of the region itself.

It seems clear, therefore, that the French Government intends to sound the death knell of the European initiative. This explains why the Jordanian officials were less than enthusiastic about Foreign Minister Cheysson's view, and why his Jordanian counterpart Marwan al-Qasim found it necessary to tell Mr Cheysson that he [al-Qasim] was still hopeful that France and Europe would play a more effective role in the region. Despite this reserved Jordanian response, however, there are no major differences between the two countries.

While there is no European initiative at this time, however, there are, nevertheless, secret and public French attempts to narrow the gap between the Israeli and American positions on one hand and the Arab countries' position on the other. While Mr Cheysson was careful to specify the points which his country supports, his list did not go beyond the traditional condemnation of forceful occupation of territory and France's belief that every people has the right to self-determination. It is noteworthy that Mr Cheysson's position remained unchanged despite his Jordanian counterparty's attempt to explain that a path toward a just peace could be established by convincing Israel to halt its expansionist policy and reconsidering the unjust and arbitrary laws imposed on the inhabitants of the occupied territory.

The French and Jordanians did agree, however, that the United States must, one way or another, abandon the Camp David accords and settle for a special role as a super-

power alongside the Soviet Union in a UN-sponsored peace effort. The UN resolutions [on the Middle East], both sides agreed, could serve as a foundation for a peaceful settlement in an international conference open to all parties.

In the meantime, as we await the realization of these "grandiose principles," France must, as its foreign minister made clear, continue to seek solutions to local disputes in the region, such as in Lebanon, for example. This attitude leaves observers in Amman puzzled as to whether the West is about to embark on a new attempt to fragment the issue and seek partial and isolated remedies, which, like the Camp David accords, serve only to advance the interests of the Jewish state.

9063

CSO: 4404/23



## COUNTRY'S NONALIGNMENT POLICY REVIEWED

London 8 DAYS in English No 39, 3 Oct 81 pp 22, 23

[Article by Annie King-Underwood]

[Text] KUWAIT'S EMIR, Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmad al-Sabah, has said he is determined 'to persuade my fellow Gulf leaders of our view that diplomatic relations must be established between their nations and the Soviet Union and socialist countries.' The emir, speaking to Kuwaiti newspaper editors on his return from a ten-day tour of Eastern Europe and Turkey, added that by taking this step 'the Cooperation Council declares to the world that it is a neutral, independent grouping able to guarantee the security of the Gulf and defend its land and sea by itself.'

None of Kuwait's partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain — have diplomatic relations with Soviet bloc countries. Sheikh Jaber told the editors that his special adviser, former finance minister Abdel Rahman al Atiqi, will be briefing these states on his tour of Eastern Europe.

So far, the other Gulf states have made no public announcement or signal that they will accept Kuwait's arguments for such links with Moscow. During the last six months, however, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have shown signs of softening their attitudes to the Soviet Union. Saudi officials have recently been quoted as saying that, if the US does not provide the arms requested, they would be prepared to look to 'any other country for arms supplies.' Some have refused to exclude the Soviet Union as a potential source.

UAE President Sheikh Zayed was one of the regional leaders won over to the

Kuwaiti view that the Soviet Union does not constitute a real threat to the area. In an interview published by the Paris-based Arabic language weekly, *Al Mustaqbal*, last June, he declared 'the Soviet Union is not our enemy.'

He added: 'In order to establish relations with the Soviet Union we will listen to the views of both those opposing and those in

favour of it, and then we will take a decision. If the argument not to set up relations with the Soviet Union is based on the view that the ideology of Moscow is anti-religion and anti-Islam, we are sure that this can be eroded by time.'

For Kuwait, such statements are an encouraging sign that some Gulf states are setting out a case for non-alignment. Kuwait has always believed that Gulf security is a purely regional matter. It was the only state in the area which supported President Brezhnev's advocacy — in Delhi late last year — of the Gulf as a region free of superpower intervention, be it in the form of military bases or nuclear weapons.

Kuwait had a pivotal role in establishing the GCC: its secretary-general, Abdullah Bishara, was the former Kuwaiti ambassador to the UN. One of the Gulf's most able diplomats, Bishara reflects his government's policy when he talks about the council. 'Those who believe that the GCC was formed to clash with the Red Army are suffering from delusions, and consider the Gulf as part of the western strategy to defend western interests. Those who think that the Red Army is the major threat to the Gulf are also suffering from nightmares and

delusions,' was the view he expressed at the time of his appointment to the post.

As the GCC was being formed last May, the Soviet media attacked it as a covert pro-western military pact. In response to this initial criticism Kuwait sent its foreign minister, Sheikh Sabah al Ahmad al Sabah, to Moscow to try to calm Soviet suspicions.

Kuwait believes that the main threat to the Gulf is Israel, and that any solution to the real core of the Middle East crisis — the Palestinians — must involve the Soviet Union. The communique at the end of Sheikh Sabah's visit suggested that Kuwait agreed to a Soviet role in negotiations aimed at finding a solution to the main problem in the region.

For the past decade Kuwait has played an energetic balancing game in the diplomacy of the region, and actively supported the Palestinians. This has given it a degree of credibility among the radical Arab states. Kuwait is also fully aware that the individual Gulf states — with the exception of Saudi Arabia — can do very little on their own to change the course of events in the region. Hence came Kuwait's keenness to form the GCC.

Kuwaitis also feel that the security problems of their small state can only be resolved — to a certain extent — within a larger security pact among neighbouring states with similar problems. Kuwait's security forces were reviewed about three months ago, and important changes were made within senior ranks.

Updating Kuwait's military capabilities is important to the government. As one diplomat put it, 'to know that in the long run, as a state on our own, we cannot defend ourselves does not mean that we do not try our best.' In buying arms as well, the Kuwaitis have shown their commitment to balance: last August they turned down an American offer of 60 improved Hawk anti-aircraft missiles and related equipment. Indeed, diversification of arms sources is one of the government's main aims: 'Kuwait will buy arms from any source which will supply the requirements of its military strategies,' said the defence minister, Sheikh Salim al Sabah.

Diplomatic sources in Kuwait believe that, despite the military delegation's visit to Moscow last month, a European country will eventually provide the required arms.

The British prime minister's visit to Kuwait last Sunday could not have been better timed, for Mrs Thatcher might be able to convince the Kuwaitis that British policy in the Middle East has been reasonably consistent during the last two years.

During the rule of the previous French government, Kuwait was keen to increase cooperation with France. But the new French president has not clarified his position vis-a-vis the Middle East crisis, and it is difficult for a country like Kuwait to establish close ties with it, let alone buy arms.

Since Menachem Begin's visit to Washington last month, it appears clear that the greatest danger for the Gulf now is posed by strategic cooperation between the

US and Israel. For Kuwait, this was the time to convince its regional allies — especially Saudi Arabia — to steer away from the pro-western and specifically pro-US line. In its editorial of 15 September, the Kuwaiti daily *al Qabas* came to the conclusion that: 'The people of the Gulf have come to realise more and more that it is time for Saudi Arabia to re-examine its cooperation with the US thoroughly, and to establish new relations on a different basis.'

Kuwait is also taking an active role in regional diplomacy. In recent months, together with the UAE, it has attempted to mediate between Oman and South Yemen in their border dispute. Last month, with tacit Saudi support, it brought together North and South Yemeni leaders to discuss the unification issue.

As long as the Iran-Iraq war does not produce a victor and soon ends, as the Kuwaitis hope, without any side being the loser, Kuwait's reputation in the area will be boosted yet again.

## ECONOMIST URGES STRENGTHENING OF CAPITAL MARKETS

London 8 DAYS in English No 42, 24 Oct 81 pp 42, 43

[Article by Annie King-Underwood]

[Text] THE MIDDLE EAST needs capital markets with financial institutions which can compete with and complement the business undertaken by the international finance markets, says Hikmat Nashashibi, chief executive of the Al Mal group. 'The lack of local institutions has forced Middle East investment to flow towards the international markets,' Nashashibi said, and added: 'For a Middle East capital market to be viable, it has to meet three aspects of loan demand — domestic, regional and international.'

At a recent meeting on Kuwait organised in London by the Arab-British Chamber of Commerce, Nashashibi spoke on developing the Kuwaiti capital markets: 'Let me stress the organic relationship between the local, regional and international activities of the Kuwaiti capital markets. For Kuwait to become an important centre, it has to develop its local markets. These should become capable of accommodating longer-term domestic loan demand, in local and international currencies, and should also offer more financial instruments to the investor, together with adequate secondary markets to trade these instruments. This will allow growth in the local markets and increase their ability to determine prices. Kuwait's international financial role would thereby acquire a stronger and healthier base.'

The role of Middle East capital markets is primarily 'to convert the demand which already exists in the region into the sort of demand that can be met by means of bonds and loans.

The ten-fold increase in Arab-led euro-credits during the first four months of 1981 compared with the same period in 1980 is greatly welcomed, but activities of Arab financial institutions have not increased at the same rate. This can be attributed to a lack of initiative in merchant banking — which is badly needed in the future recycling of Gulf surpluses. Kuwaiti financial institutions went a long way in creating the local bond issuing business, but the number of transactions carried out by Arab financial bodies is still very limited.

Nashashibi believes that 'efficient' Arab participation in all Middle Eastern investments is necessary, and sees the Al Mal group as the embodiment of many of his ideas and theories. He is the architect and co-founder of the company, which is an investment banking group with paid-in capital of \$25m. Based in Luxembourg, it has been in operation since June 1981. The company aims to participate in business between Middle East sources of equity and debt finance and the end-users — in the corporate and government sectors of the world's major industrial countries.

Nashashibi believes that in order to develop their domestic and regional industries, Arabs should change the pattern of their investment on the international markets. For him the main aim is that the Arab investor does not remain merely a lender but helps to build a local financial sector. 'In international investment, the Arabs should see that they are more involved, and that the lending made abroad is channelled

through Middle East financial institutions,' he said. Citing Kuwait as an example, he added: 'In as much as Kuwait aims to process oil locally and build up a petrochemical industry instead of exporting it all in the crude form, it likewise aspires to build a financial sector around exporting capital that does more than merely export funds in the raw cash or deposit form.'

The development of a Middle Eastern capital market, Nashashibi believes, hinges on the creation of the necessary financial instruments, institutions and, most important, legislation, which would enable the financial institutions to function properly and in an orderly manner.

● Hikmat Shariff Nashashibi, 38, is a Jordanian who studied at the American University in Beirut. As a student he worked for a Beirut stockbroker and after graduation was appointed head of the foreign trade department of the Kuwaiti chamber of commerce and industry.

Among the posts he has held are that of general manager of the Kuwait International Investment Company (KIIC) and investment manager of the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development. He still acts as an adviser to KIIC and is vice-chairman of the Jordan Securities Corporation.

Nashashibi has carried out a number of studies on Arab investments and Arab capital, for the Arab League, the board of governors of the Arab Central Banks and for UNCTAD and UNIDO. He is the author of three books, two in Arabic and one in English, on Arab capital markets.

CSO: 4400/31

## BRIEFS

OIL TANKER PURCHASE--Kuwait Oil Tankers Company (KOTC), the transport branch of the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation, is to buy \$510m worth of new tankers. The tankers are currently under construction in shipyards in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, according to specifications laid down by the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation, which establishes standards for ballast pollution, safety and maritime training of crews. KOTC, which earlier this year took delivery of two 80,000-tonne crude carriers, is confident that the market for tankers will pick up in the next two years. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 39, 3 Oct 81 p 42]

CSO: 4400/31



## TUNISIA

### BRIEFS

SAUDI ARABIA, TUNISIA AGREEMENT--Saudi Arabia and Tunisia have signed a protocol in Tunis covering the development of agricultural cooperation between the two countries. Amongst the fruits of the agreement was a decision by Saudi Arabia to import large quantities of olive oil, Tunisia's principal agricultural export. Tunisia is to send experts on irrigation, sewage and veterinary medicine to Saudi Arabia. The two countries also wish to set up a joint Saudi-Tunisian fishing company and to exchange scientific, technical and agricultural research. They plan to establish a joint institute for land reclamation, and to expand the exchange of technicians. A training programme is to be set up in Tunisia to train Saudi technicians in agricultural production techniques. [Text]  
[Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 42, 19 Oct 81 p 6]

CSO: 4500/28

DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION EXAMINED

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English No 638, Oct 81 pp 4-7

[Article: "North Yemen: Precariousness of the Situation Increases in Wake of Recent Clashes and FAI\* Lure of Talks for the Reunification of Yemen"]

[Text]

Paradoxes, contradictions and the absence of stability have marked the history of North Yemen from the turn of the century and even more so ever since the Revolution of September 26th, 1962 which established the republic. Twenty years later, North Yemen seems likely to be overwhelmed by thorny issues and bloody conflicts which none of its rulers had ever managed to resolve. This situation has been made even more acute and serious by the accelerated process of polarization that the Gulf region and the African Horn have witnessed in the past year.

During the past year, the Arabian Peninsula has witnessed the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council, a 6-state Gulf alliance that North Yemen was not invited to join. At the same time, it also witnessed the signing of a cooperation treaty between South Yemen, Libya and Ethiopia, and North Yemen was left out in the cold.

With a State that is barely able to exert its power and control over part of the territory, and a geographical location of formidable strategic importance, overlooking the Bab Al Mandeb Strait, the channel through which oil reaches the outside world, while North Yemen up till now has not yet produced itself a single drop of the precious liquid.

Trying to maintain balanced relations with all, North Yemen today finds itself in a strange situation: Soviet military experts coexist with US oil experts prospecting for oil (see below), Soviet Migs and US F-5 fly in its skies. It is also a poor country relying for its survival of financial, economic and military assistance from the West, the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia and China. It also has to struggle hard to safeguard its neutrality and to promote the reunification of North and South Yemen despite considerable odds and oppositions while at the same time trying to reinforce its own national unity severely shaken by the fact

that a State in the modern sense of the term means next to nothing to the many tribes that constitute its population. Each of these tribes has its own code of values and rules and places it above the national law and constitution and they often establish strong and sound "friendships" and alliance with outsiders - leaders or states - thus enlarging the gap between Sanaa's aspirations and its reality.

Now that the Middle East and the Arab world are on the brink of yet another major change brought about by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's sudden disappearance and by disagreement of a major sides concerned on the Saudi plan, the question is how North Yemen will survive.

The Problems Besides the paradoxes and contradictions underlined above, North Yemen's precarious stability is underlined by the following factors and developments:

1) A party-less democracy: Seeking, above all, to be a democratic state, North Yemen ended up being a "democracy" without any authorized parties. The National Pact which is currently under study will reportedly define the position of the State about parties, but in the opinion of Prime Minister Abdel Karim Al Iryani, who was recently quoted by the Beirut daily AL NAHAR, the present state of social development in North Yemen does not allow for party pluralism. For this reason, political groupings and parties are not allowed to exist and attempts at forming parties or political organizations are severely crushed.

The absence of parties and political organizations is given, by the North Yemeni opposition, as the main reason why the opposition is resorting to military violence and action to achieve its objectives, since the system does not allow for political action.

2) Major reliance on the armed forces: In the past two years, the North Yemeni President, Ali Abdallah Saleh, has both increased the power and armament of the Army and his own control and power inside the Army. According to most observers, the North Yemeni President is relying on the Army to safeguard democracy inside the country and positive neutralism and non-alignment as far as foreign policy is concerned.

3) There have been over the years, frequent skirmishes between the North Yemeni tribes that have different allegiances. Heavy weaponry was used during these clashes, indicating the extent of outside support the various tribes enjoy. Skirmishes were also reported between the North Yemeni Army and anti-regime tribes. The Army had to resort to the air force against the tribes.

4) Frequent skirmishes between the Army and the leftist National Democratic Front which regroups Marxists and Nasserists and which enjoys the backing of South Yemen, Libya and more recently - Syria. The influence of the NDF inside the country and among many tribes, as well as the support it receives from outside has prompted President Saleh to rely on dialogue and compromise with its leaders and members, and this has earned him the disapproval of officers and officials who favoured heavy blows against the opposition. It has also earned him the antagonism of tribes.

5) The NDF enjoys influence and power in two regions, that which lies close to the South Yemeni border and near the border with Saudi Arabia where it is backed by anti-Saudi feeling among certain tribes. The anti-Saudi feeling dates back to the South Arabia war at the end of which Yemen had to give away the regions of Najran and Jizan to Saudi Arabia.

In order to settle the conflict with the NDF and to avoid more bloodshed, President Ali Abdallah Saleh met with the Front's leaders. After this meeting, he pledged to deal with all the country's regions in the same way as far as social and economic development plans were concerned, to promote equal participation of all in power and to adopt a balanced foreign policy.

The pledges displeased Saudi Arabia which intervened and told Sanaa that it would reconsider its relations and support to North Yemen if President Saleh should go ahead with the project of bringing NDF leaders into the government. President Saleh withdrew his pledge and proposed, instead, to appoint NDF leaders and ambassadors and military attachés abroad. The NDF refused and a new crisis broke out. The clashes which erupted last month in the southern and south-eastern regions were a result of these disagreements.

Most of the NDF operations are commando-like attacks against the Army positions and garrisons, ambushes and the planting of mines. Tension is particularly high in the region of Eb .

6) South Yemen: A South Yemeni delegation took part in the September 26th celebrations marking the anniversary of the revolution, but unity talks between the two countries have reached a deadlock.

The South Yemeni and North Yemeni presidents met last month in Taz, in North Yemen and declared that major steps have been achieved towards unity. According to the Beirut daily AL NAHAR, the Taz meeting ended with an agreement on the following points:

- the withdrawal of heavy weaponry and the formation of a committee to be headed by the Deputy Chiefs of Staff of the two countries. In addition, military manifestations are to be removed from the region where clashes took place with the NDF forces.

- to speed up work of reunification plans so that a special committee may be appointed to examine political reunification.

- to have North Yemeni refugees in South Yemen return to their country and vice versa, with assurances and guarantees, and on condition that they do not get involved in political activities.

- to implement what was agreed upon in June 1980 in regard to prisoners and media warfare.



Sources in Sanaa had considered that this agreement was a victory for North Yemen because it provided for the "elimination" of the NDF. But, nothing was implemented.

The re-unification with Aden is problematic, in any case. Sanaa is . . . insisted on a unified but non-aligned state while Aden has already chosen its camp. Sanaa is insisting on using the Shāria (Islamic law) as a foundation of the unified state while South Yemen is ruled by a Marxist party. Furthermore, North Yemen is calling for a referendum on the unified state's system, a request that South Yemen could hardly accept in view of the fact that North Yemen has a population of 8.5 million and South Yemen of 1.5.

With unification efforts in a deadlock, increasing tension between the Sanaa regime and the National Democratic Front\*, increasing pressure from the outside, the precariousness of the North Yemeni situation is getting every day more acute.

Observers do not foreclose the possibility of a coup d'état that would topple President Ali Abdallah Saleh on the grounds that he is not strong enough to resist mounting pressures from South Yemen and its allies, the Soviet Union and the NDF and may give in to their demands. At the same time, South Yemen, Libya and Ethiopia and the Soviet Union fear that President Saleh may not resist pressures made by Saudi Arabia and the United States for action against the NDF and the leftists and for direct control over the Bab Al Mandeb Strait/

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\* The NDF regroups the following banned parties: The Yemeni Labour Party; the Democratic People's Union Party; the Democratic Revolutionary Party; the Popular Vanguard Party, as well as branches of the Baathist and Nasserist parties.

— An "Islamic Front" has recently been formed and sometimes takes part in the fighting against the NDF, it regroups the Moslem Brotherhood and other fundamentalist Islamic organizations.



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